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Abstract
The European Commission mandated the consulting rm CE Delft to develop
a framework for the internalisation of external costs and to devise a number
of potential internalisation scenarios for further analysis. The results of their
preliminary research are published in a CE discussion paper, and the Commis-
sion is now formulating draft legislative proposals which will be subjected to a
consultation of stakeholders.
The present report oers a critical assessment of the above mentioned CE study,
provides a theoretical examination of the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the polluter pays principle and the cheapest cost avoider principle in relation to
the problems arising in the road transport sector, demonstrates how the cheap-
est cost avoider principle can be applied in practice by providing examples of
external costs in road transport, and puts forward recommendations for the
appropriate principles that should guide the Commission's further activities in
this area. 
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Executive Summary 
 
In March 2000, in what has come to be known as the “Lisbon strategy” European 
leaders committed the EU to become, by 2010, the most dynamic and competitive 
knowledge based  economy  in  the  world  capable  of  sustainable  economic  growth 
with  more  and  better  jobs  and  greater  social  cohesion,  and  respect  for  the 
environment.  Achieving  these  aspirations  requires  a  careful  and  comprehensive 
analysis and assessment of likely economic, social and environmental impacts, both 
direct and indirect, of all regulatory measures. Regulatory impact assessments, as 
part of the Better Regulation Agenda, are a key tool for the European institutions in 
designing better policies and laws. By providing a detailed study of the economic, 
social  and  environmental  impacts,  this  procedure  helps  the  European  Union  to 
reach  the  goals  of  Better  Regulation,  and  its  underlying  Lisbon  and  Sustainable 
Development strategies. 
 
As a follow up to the Lisbon statement, the European Council concluded during its 
meeting in Göteborg (2001) that a sustainable transport policy should tackle rising 
volumes of traffic and levels of congestion, noise and pollution, and encourage the 
use  of  environment friendly  modes  of  transport  as  well  as  the  internalisation  of 
social  and  environmental  costs.  At  the  heart  of  this  sustainable  transport  policy 
should  be  a  fair,  transparent  and  efficient  system  of  charging  for  all  modes  of 
transport. 
Given  this  mandate,  and  required  by  the  upcoming  revision  of  the  Eurovignette 
Directive (2006/38/EC) and more generally by the EU “Better Regulation” initiative, 
the  European  Commission  recently  launched  the  debate  on  how  to  internalise 
external costs caused by all modes of transport.  
As a first step, the European Commission mandated the consulting firm CE Delft to 
develop  a  framework  for  the  internalisation  of  external  costs  and  to  devise  a 
number  of  potential  internalisation  scenarios  for  further  analysis.  The  results  of 
their  preliminary  research  are  published  in  a  CE  discussion  paper,  and  the 
Commission is now formulating draft legislative proposals which will be subjected to 
a consultation of stakeholders.  
The present report was commissioned by IRU from the Center for the Study of Law 
and Economics, University of the Saarland, in order to contribute to the ongoing 
debate about the appropriate treatment of external costs in the transport sector. 
More specifically, we have been asked to: 
•  offer a critical assessment of the above mentioned CE study; 
•  provide a theoretical examination of the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of the polluter pays principle and more modern concepts such as the cheapest cost 
avoider principle in relation to the problems arising in the road transport sector; 
•  demonstrate  how  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  can  be  applied  in 
practice by providing examples of external costs in road transport; and to 
•  put  forward  recommendations  for  the  appropriate  principles  that  should 
guide the Commission’s further activities in this area. 
 
The results of our study are grouped into four corresponding parts which are now 
discussed in turn.  
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Part I: A critical assessment of the CE study  
 
1.  The CE study addresses two distinct issues, namely:  
•  how external costs are to be defined and measured for various modes of 
transport with regard to a number of potential sources of external costs; and  
•  why and how external costs should be internalised, what problems arise 
with such internalisation in practice, and what internalisation scenarios should be 
further considered.  
 
Reliable and robust answers to both of these questions are essential if the Commission wishes to adopt 
policies that promote economic growth and address problems of growing congestion and pollution in an 
equitable and efficient manner – or, in short, policies that are required by the pursuit of the Lisbon 
agenda. 
 
Having carefully studied the CE report from a scientific point of view, the following 
assessment can be made:  
 
2.  Although crucial for any attempt to estimate external costs or assess the most 
appropriate way of internalisation, a proper definition of external costs and a 
consistent  and  coherent  discussion  of  external  effects  are  completely 
missing from the CE study. It is long on assertion and short on analysis. 
Subsequently the CE lacks a sound and reliable basis for the evaluation of 
potential internalisation scenarios and policy options. 
 
3.  The CE study does not take into account that both the measurement of 
external  costs  and  the  choice  of  an  appropriate  internalisation  strategy 
crucially  depend  on  the  insight  that  externality  problems  are  reciprocal, 
and that external costs are caused jointly by all parties involved.    
The  CE  study  endorses  a  naive  view  of  external  cost  as  being  caused  by  one 
particular  party  –  the  polluter  –  and  suppresses  the  more  sophisticated 
understanding of external costs as costs arising from competing demands for scarce 
resources,  which is now a generally accepted view in economics.  It neglects the 
basic insight that external costs are caused jointly by all the parties involved and 
that the problem is of a reciprocal nature; avoiding pollution and thus improving 
the pollutee’s situation would inflict harm on the polluter.    
In the CE study, the question is thought of as one in which a polluter inflicts harm 
on a pollutee; what has to be decided is how to restrain the polluter. This is the 
logic underpinning the polluter pays approach. It obscures the nature of the choice 
that  has  to  be  made.  The  real  question  that  has  to  be  decided  is:  Should  the 
polluter be allowed to harm the pollutee, or should the pollutee have the right to 
restrain  the  polluter?  The  aim  should  be  to  avoid  the  most  serious  harm;  its 
solution is the cheapest cost avoider principle.   
 
4.  Efficiency can require charging a polluter, a pollutee or even that both 
parties pay. In brief, no single party can enjoy an automatic immunity from 
this joint responsibility as implied by the polluter pays principle.    
The question how one should most appropriately deal with external effects is more 
complex than simply asking – as the CE study does – how much the party “causing” 
the external effect should be paying (and on what particular variables the payable 
amount should depend). 
 
5.  It seems inappropriate, and potentially dangerous, to rely on the cost 
estimates  presented  in  the  CE  study  as  a  basis  for  internalisation.  
The  CE  study  lacks  a  coherent  framework  for  measuring  external  costs,  or 
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assessing  external  cost  estimates  prepared  by  others.  The  CE  study  does  not 
explore the potential reasons for the differences in cost estimates. Neither does it 
sufficiently  take  into  account  the  enormous  variation  in  the  presented 
numbers, some examples of which are:   
 
•  The  CE  study  quotes  results  form  a  UIC  study,  which  estimates  the  total 
external  costs  of  road  transport  as  €  650  billion  whereas  a  UNITE  study 
estimates costs at € 129 billion.  
 
•  Regarding accident costs, the CE study admits the under reporting of fatalities 
and injuries in official statistics, as well as substantial differences in the valuation 
of lives lost. Estimates for the Value of a Statistical Life (VoSL), which are used in 
the estimation of external costs range from less than US$200,000 to US$30m. 
 
•  Maximal air pollution and climate change externality costs present respectively 
500% and 383% of the minimal values. 
 
•  Establishing the costs of climate change is complex owing to the long term 
effect of greenhouse gas emissions and to the difficulty in anticipating risk patterns. 
The share of climate change in generating natural disasters is difficult to establish. 
 
Even though one of the declared objectives of the CE study is the collection of such 
third party cost estimates, it is unclear how the various estimates can be compared 
and used in an internalisation framework without an appropriate methodology for 
the measurement of external costs.  
 
6.  The CE study fails to provide any reliable guidance with regard to the 
choice  of  potential  internalisation  scenarios,  let  alone  help  in  relation  to 
the  assessment  of  their  relative  costs  and  benefits. 
This  is  because  the  CE  study  does  not  put  forward  a  consistent  set  of  criteria 
against  which  one  could  judge  the  relative  merits  of  different  internalisation 
options. It lacks a coherent framework for internalisation. 
 
7.  The  objectives  of  internalisation  in  the  CE  study  are  unclear.  Clarity 
about  policy  objectives  cannot  be  obtained  by  listing  the  different  motives  for 
internalisation, and then – as the CE study does – suggesting that in practice the 
objectives  underlying  internalisation  may  be  a  bit  of  everything.  The  potential 
objectives may not only be poorly aligned, but may actually be conflicting.  
 
8.  The  CE  study  does  not  provide  a  comparative  assessment  of 
internalisation tools.   
What  is  missing is  a  comprehensive  list  of instruments  that  can  be  used,  and  a 
comparison  of  these  different  instruments  with  regard  to  their  effectiveness  and 
error tolerance, which is of particular importance given the substantial uncertainty 
about  external  costs  implied  by  the  vastly  differing  estimates  collated  in  the  CE 
study. 
 
9.  The CE study fails to identify the implications for the assessment of 
different  policy  options.  There  is  also  neither  a  detailed  analysis  of 
implementation  costs  and  of  the  consequence  on  the  economy  of 
regulatory failure, nor any regulatory impact assessment. It correctly notes 
that marginal cost pricing methodologies might not be appropriate because they are 
only optimal under certain theoretical assumptions that are not satisfied in practice. 
However, the CE study does not sufficiently insist on the fact that interventions to 
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address externalities can and must take into account the restrictions characterising 
a second best world. 
 
Part II: Polluter pays vs. cheapest cost avoider principle  
 
From an economics point of view, the polluter pays principle is an outdated and 
limited approach. It is widely agreed in economic circles that its shortcomings have 
been exposed and its suitability as sound basis for internalisation policies soundly 
superseded by the Cheapest Cost Avoider Approach developed by Ronald Coase. In 
the cheapest cost avoider framework, the “polluter pays” is one possible outcome of 
the analysis, but not a generally applicable principle.  
To better understand the two economic approaches, it is necessary to first define 
them: 
 
1.  According  to  the  polluter  pays  principle,  the  polluter  should  on  all 
occasions pay the bill of the external costs he produces, usually via a tax. 
The elevation of the “polluter pays” idea to a principle is not justifiable. 
 
2.  The cheapest cost avoider principle requires that the party which can 
prevent  (or  abate)  the  damage  at  the  lowest  cost  overall  should  take 
action. For example, (see case study 1 in Part III) it would be better for economic 
and  social  welfare  overall  to  build  a  direct route  motorway  rather  than  to  make 
HGVs take a detour, simply because the extra economic and environmental costs of 
the detour are higher than the costs of building the motorway. Another simplified 
example would be noise emission: When a truck drives through the open fields the 
question of noise emissions plays only a minor role. However, when the truck uses 
a road nearby a house there is a conflict of interests. The house owner wants quiet 
and the truck needs to emit noise. The question that needs to be answered is: Is it 
more effective to build a sound barrier to solve the noise problem or does it make 
more sense to just charge the truck user?    
The cheapest cost avoider principle is applied in all areas of public decision making 
under the heading of “regulatory impact assessment”. It is not currently employed 
in the context of the regulation of transport related externalities. 
 
 
Furthermore it is essential to understand the fundamentals of external costs: 
 
3.  The fundamentals of external costs are:  
•  External costs are always the result of conflicting interests in the use 
of a scarce resource: the environment. They arise only when there are competing 
uses of scarce resources.  
•  Without rivalry for the use of a  scarce  resource there are no  external 
costs. 
•  Consequently, damage (external cost) is jointly caused. 
•  Damage is to be considered as a loss  of  value  to  somebody from a 
change in the quality (state) of the environment. 
•  If  there  is  rivalry  in  the  use  of  the  scarce  resource,  policy  makers  are 
faced  with  a  “tragic”  choice:  Furthering  the  interests  of  one  group  necessarily 
damages the interests of others. This is known as the reciprocal nature of the 
problem.  
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Bearing this in mind, the polluter pays principles has the following weaknesses:  
 
4.  The  underlying  economic  logic  of  the  polluter  pays  principle  is 
fallacious.   
The  mere  existence  of  externalities  does  not,  of  itself,  provide  any  reason  for 
governments to induce polluters to take action, because the polluters might well be 
the highest cost avoiders. Coming back to the example of truck noise, it might be 
that it is more costly for the overall economy to impose general charges on trucks 
than to build a sound barrier where there are conflicts of interests.  
 
5.  The polluter pays principle has the same flaws as the CE study which 
endorses it: 
•  it does not take into account the fact that externalities are jointly caused 
by all involved parties; 
• • • •  it  does  not  take  into  account  that  the  externality  problem  is  of  a 
reciprocal nature. Improving the pollutee’s situation necessarily inflicts harm on 
the polluter. 
 
Most regulatory policy decisions now require some form of what has become known 
as  regulatory  impact  analysis,  regulatory  impact  appraisal  or  regulatory  impact 
assessment. The polluter pays principle discounts such an assessment because the 
decision  over  who  should  pay  has  automatically  been  taken.  By  contrast  the 
cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  is  free  from  such  preconceptions  and  includes  a 
built in  cost benefit  analysis  which  can  be  applied  fairly  and  efficiently  to  each 
situation  requiring  an  internalisation  of  external  costs.  For  the  example  of  truck 
noise it could mean that a cost benefit analysis establishes whether it is the truck 
user or the house owner or a third party like the state who can avoid the damage at 
the lowest cost for the overall economy by taking appropriate action.  
 
6.  The  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  presents  a  number  of  clear 
advantages over the polluter pays principle:  
• • • •  It  guarantees  efficiency,  i.e.  no  waste  of  resources,  which  is  in  turn 
fundamental in the pursuit of the European Community’s Lisbon goals of growth, 
jobs and competitiveness.  
• • • •  It is a better means to achieve fairness than the polluter pays principle. 
• • • •  It  studies  a  broader  set  of  options.  In  contrast  to  the  polluter  pays 
principle, it can lead to the choice of innovative projects  
• • • •  Its  use  of  some  form  of  cost benefit  analysis  in  a  welfare  economics 
framework  makes  it  take  a  much  broader  range  of  relevant  variables  into 
account, such as administration costs or moral values. 
• • • •  The logic of the cheapest cost avoider principle helps to avoid regulatory 
failure  and  contributes  to  the  success  of  the  Commission’s  Better  Regulation 
Agenda at the heart of which is regulatory impact assessment. 
• • • •  The cheapest cost avoider analysis incorporates “polluter pays” as 
one  possible  outcome.  In  contrast  to  the  polluter  pays  approach,  it  does  not 
make this outcome a principle.  
 
7.  The cheapest cost avoider principle is clearly more sophisticated than 
the  polluter  pays  principle  in  terms  of  efficiency,  and  it  is  also  superior 
when  taking  into  account  values  such  as  corrective  justice,  distributive 
11 Schmidtchen et al.: The Internalisation of External Costs in Transport: From the
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justice,  undamaged  environment  or  the  interests  of  future  generations. 
Thus it meets challenges which the polluter pays principle cannot 
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Part III: Case studies  
 
To show that the cheapest cost avoider principle can, is and must be applied, the 
study commissioned by the Centre for the Study of Law and Economics illustrates 
the methodology in two exemplary cases: 
• • • •  The question of the construction of the missing part of the A 44 motorway 
near Kassel in Germany; and 
• • • •  The problem of the sectoral ban on the use of the Inn valley motorway in 
Austria.  
Both making the trucks drive a detour (A44 case) and banning certain trucks from 
using the Inn valley motorway can be interpreted as regulatory measures following 
the idea of the polluter pays principle. 
 
1.  In the first case study, called the A 44 case, there exist plans for the 
motorway  A  44  connecting  Dortmund  to  Kassel  to  be  extended  in  the 
direction Erfurt, Chemnitz and Dresden, via Eisenach. However, except for a small 
section, these plans have never been realised. Instead, there is a direct road B7 
between Kassel and Eisenach along the route of the planned motorway. This route 
is closed to trucks, who are obliged to drive a detour of 42 km via the motorways 
A7 and A4. This detour generates both extra private and external (pollution) costs, 
amounting to between 34 and 590 million € per year, depending on the source. 
 
2.  The  A  44  case:  The  cheapest  cost  avoider  analysis  of  this  case 
involves the cost-benefit analysis of two scenarios:    
Scenario  1  serves  to  address  the  question  whether  the  interests  of  society  are 
better  served  by  building  the  A  44  compared  to  the  detour.  
Scenario  2  serves  to  address  the  question  whether  the  interests  of  society  are 
better served by lifting the ban to use the B7 compared to the detour.   
 
 
3.  The  second  case  study  concerns  the  prohibition  of  a  46  km  long 
section of the Inn valley motorway for trucks transporting goods belonging 
to a number of sectors. The sectoral ban on the Inn valley motorway is estimated 
to  cost  Germany  approx.  250  million  €,  plus  the  losses  of  2500  jobs  due  to 
insolvencies, increases in costs, and a reduction in demand. 
 
4.  Most cheapest cost avoider principle scenarios suggest that it would 
be  beneficial  to  build  the  A44  and  to  lift  the  ban  on  the  Inn  Valley 
motorway.    
The detour and the ban are inefficient. 
 
5.  Legal  reasoning  by  the  local  court  in  the  A  44  case  and  by  the 
European  Court  of  Justice  implicitly  applies  the  cheapest  cost  avoider 
approach.  
 
13 Schmidtchen et al.: The Internalisation of External Costs in Transport: From the
Produced by bepress.com, 2011Executive Summary 
  xii 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
1.  Due  to  its  many  shortcomings,  the  CE  Study  cannot  be  regarded  as  a 
reliable or robust basis for policy prescriptions. 
 
2.  It  is  not  necessarily  only  the  transport  industry  (i.e.  the  polluter) 
which should be made liable for externalities. Other actors, such as the state 
or  the  pollutee  may  well  be  in  a  better  position  to  take  measures  to  reduce 
externalities,  and  they  should  do  so  in  the  interest  of  economic  efficiency  and 
fairness. 
 
3.  Not all harm caused should automatically be internalised. Internalising 
too  much  of  the  damage  would  cost  society  more  than  it  would  benefit  it.  An 
efficient level of damage should be accepted. 
 
4.  When introducing new measures to reduce pollution by the transport 
industry, all existing levies should be taken into account in order to create 
optimal incentives. Among other taxes, the transport industry pays VAT and fuel 
tax. Environmental requirements for vehicles also present a cost to the transport 
industry. 
 
5.  The type of measure taken to make the transport industry pay must 
be  based  on  a  broad  impact  analysis.  For  example,  a  km  toll  would  not 
sufficiently  reduce  the  harm  caused  by  pollution  if  trucks  could  employ  an 
alternative route with the same (or even more) emissions. Furthermore, making 
the polluter pay might not solve the pollution problem and it will give no 
incentive for the pollutee to solve the problem either. 
 
6.  The  polluter  pays  principle  should  not  be  used  because  its  underlying 
economic  logic  is  fallacious.  It  neglects  the  basic  insight  that  external  costs  are 
caused  jointly  by  all  parties  involved  and  that  the  externality  is  a  problem  of 
reciprocal nature. 
 
7.  The PPP can lead to the levying of unjustified, i.e. socially inefficient, 
taxes. 
 
8.  The cheapest cost avoider principle, for which Ronald Coase received the 
Nobel Prize for Economics, should clearly be used, also for transport, because it 
guarantees efficiency and fair competition. It is based on some form of cost benefit 
analysis (which is also part of regulatory impact assessment), it is a better means 
to achieve fairness, and it finally leads to better incentives for all parties involved. 
Not  using  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  and  thus  not  conducting 
some form of a cost-benefit analysis might lead to yet another regulatory 
failure. 
 
9.  The cheapest cost avoider principle is partly already in use, especially 
in  courts,  which  handle  conflicts  of  interests.  Regulation  agencies  active  in  road 
transport should follow the same maxims.  
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10.  The cheapest cost avoider principle presents the fundamental tool in 
the  pursuit  of  the  European  Union  “Lisbon  Goals”  of  growth,  jobs  and 
competitiveness. 
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In  March  2000,  in  what  has  come  to  be  known  as  the  “Lisbon  strategy” 
European leaders committed the EU to become, by 2010, “the most dynamic 
and  competitive  knowledge based  economy  in  the  world  capable  of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion, and respect for the environment”.  
 
Achieving these aspirations requires a careful and comprehensive analysis 
and assessment of likely economic, social and environmental impacts, both 
direct  and  indirect,  of  all  regulatory  measures.  Regulatory  impact 
assessments, as part of the Better Regulation Agenda, are a key tool for the 
European institutions in designing better policies and laws. By providing a 
detailed  study  of  the  economic,  social  and  environmental  impacts,  this 
procedure helps the European Union to reach the goals of Better Regulation, 
and its underlying Lisbon and Sustainable Development strategies. 
 
As  a  follow up  to  the  Lisbon  statement,  the  European  Council  concluded 
during  its  meeting  in  Göteborg  (2001)  that  a  sustainable  transport  policy 
should tackle rising volumes of traffic and levels of congestion, noise and 
pollution, and encourage the use of environment friendly modes of transport 
as well as the internalisation of social and environmental costs. At the heart 
of this sustainable transport policy should be a fair, transparent and efficient 
system of charging for all modes of transport.
1 
 
According  to  Directive  2006/38/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  amending  Directive  1999/62/EC  on  the  charging  of  heavy  goods 
vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures, a “fair” system of charges is 
based on the “user pays” principle and the application of the “polluter pays” 
principle.  The  directive  specifically  mentions  “the  polluters  [sic]  pays 
principle  for  all  modes  of  transport,  by  means  of  the  internalisation  of 
external costs”.
2 
The  2006  directive  requires  the  Commission  to  provide  a  model  for  the 
assessment  of  all  external  costs  of  road  transport,  which  are  to  be 
internalised in the form of infrastructure charges. A study was commissioned 
from CE Delft and INFRAS (hereafter “CE study”) to offer proposals on how 
external  costs  are  to  be  defined  and  measured,  and  on  why  and  how 
external costs should be internalised.
3  
 
The present report was commissioned by IRU from the Center for the Study 
of Law and Economics, University of the Saarland, in order to contribute to 
                                            
1 See European Commission 2001. 
2 See Directive 2006/38/EC, recital 18. See also recitals 18 and 19. 
3 See Directive 2006/38/EC, especially recital 19. 
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the ongoing debate about the appropriate treatment of external costs in the 
transport sector. More specifically, we have been asked to: 
•  offer a critical assessment of the above mentioned CE study; 
•  provide  a  theoretical  examination  of  the  relative  strengths  and 
weaknesses of the polluter pays principle and more modern concepts such 
as the cheapest cost avoider principle in relation to the problems arising in 
the road transport sector; 
•  demonstrate  how  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  can  be  applied  in 
practice by providing examples of external costs in road transport; and to 
• put  forward  recommendations  for  the  appropriate  principles  that  should 
guide the Commission’s further activities in this area. 
 
Our study offers a critical assessment of the CE study (part I), in which its 
narrow focus on the “polluter pays approach” is identified as a fundamental 
methodological flaw. Moreover, given that the need for a careful assessment 
of  costs  and  benefits  associated  with  any  policy  intervention  is  a  well 
established  principle  of  community  policy
4  one  would  expect  such 
assessment being undertaken. But the CE study fails to do so.  
 
Although  crucial  for  any  attempt  to  estimate  external  costs  or  assess  the 
most appropriate way of internalisation, a proper definition of external costs 
and a consistent and coherent discussion of external effects are completely 
missing from the CE study.  It is long on assertion and short  on analysis. 
Subsequently the CE lacks a sound and reliable basis for the evaluation of 
potential internalisation scenarios and policy options. 
 
The  CE  study  does  not  take  into  account  that  both  the  measurement  of 
external  costs  and  the  choice  of  an  appropriate  internalisation  strategy 
crucially depend on the insight that externality problems are reciprocal, and 
that external costs are caused jointly by all parties involved.    
The CE study endorses a naive view of external cost as being caused by one 
particular  party  –  the  polluter  –  and  suppresses  the  more  sophisticated 
understanding of external costs as costs arising from  competing demands 
for scarce resources, which is now a generally accepted view in economics. 
It neglects the basic insight that external costs are caused jointly by all the 
parties  involved  and  that  the  problem  is  of  a  reciprocal  nature;  avoiding 
pollution and thus improving the pollutee’s situation would inflict harm on 
the polluter.    
In the CE study, the question is thought of as one in which a polluter inflicts 
harm on a pollutee; what has to be decided is how to restrain the polluter. 
This is the logic underpinning the polluter pays approach.  It obscures the 
nature of the choice that has to be made. The real question that has to be 
decided is: Should the polluter be allowed to harm the pollutee, or should 
the pollutee have the right to restrain the polluter? The aim should be to 
avoid  the  most  serious  harm;  its  solution  is  the  cheapest  cost  avoider 
principle.
5  
                                            
4 See European Commission 2001, 2005.  
5 See Schmidtchen 2003.  
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Efficiency  can  require  charging  a  polluter,  a  pollutee  or  even  that  both 
parties pay. In brief, no single party can enjoy an automatic immunity from 
this joint responsibility as implied by the polluter pays principle.    
The question how one should most appropriately deal with external effects is 
more complex than simply asking – as the CE study does – how much the 
party “causing” the external effect should be paying (and on what particular 
variables the payable amount should depend). 
 
The CE study not only lacks a coherent framework for measuring external 
costs, where the appropriate measure of external cost is closely linked to the 
underlying objective of internalisation. The discussion of cost functions and 
external cost measures in the CE study is also conducted largely in terms of 
inappropriate  variables.  There  are  a  number  of  inconsistencies  that  cast 
serious doubt on the scientific robustness of the analysis. It seems entirely 
inappropriate to rely on the cost estimates presented in the CE study as a 
basis for internalisation.  
Additional flaws of the CE study are: 
•  The CE study does not put forward a consistent set of criteria against 
which  one  can  judge  the  relative  merits  of  different  internalisation 
options; 
•  It is unclear about the effects of various instruments,; 
•  It fails to take into account the problems that arise from the fact that 
any practical internalisation policy will face substantial limitations; and  
•  It  does  not  properly  consider  the  interplay  between  internalisation 
policies and existing charging schemes.  
•  It can lead to the levying of unjustified, i.e. socially inefficient, taxes 
and charges.  
 
In summary, the CE study does not provide a sound and reliable basis for 
the evaluation of potential internalisation scenarios and policy options. 
Part II compares the polluter pays principle with the cheapest cost avoider 
principle. The underlying economic logic of the polluter pays principle turns 
out to be fallacious because the mere existence of externalities does not, of 
itself,  provide  any  reason  for  governments  to  induce  polluters  to  take 
action.
6 Indeed, the polluters might well be the highest cost avoiders. Thus 
the full internalisation of external costs is not always socially useful in that it 
does not necessarily maximise welfare. Moreover, the polluter pays principle 
does not take into account the fact that externalities are caused jointly, i.e. 
both the polluter and the pollutee cause of the damage. The fundamentals of 
external costs are these:
7 
                                            
6 See Schmidtchen 2003.  
7 On external costs, see Schmidtchen 2003. 
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•  External costs are always the result of conflicting interests in the use of 
a scarce  resource: nature (environment). They arise  only when there 
are competing uses of scarce resources. 
•  Without rivalry for the use of a scarce resource there are no external 
costs. 
•  Consequently, damage (external cost) is jointly caused. 
•  Damage  is  to  be  considered  as  a  loss  of  value  to  somebody  from  a 
change in the quality (state) of the environment. 
•  If  there  is  rivalry  in  the  use  of  the  scarce  resource  nature 
(environment), policy makers are faced with a tragic choice: Furthering 
the  interests  of  one  group  we  necessarily  damage  the  interests  of 
others. This is known as the “reciprocal nature of the problem”. 
The cheapest cost avoider principle requires policy makers to make a cost 
benefit  analysis  of  alternative  uses  of  the  scarce  resource  and  of 
corresponding abatement costs by all actors. Consequently, the party which 
can  prevent  (or  abate)  a  damage  at  the  lowest  cost  overall  should  take 
action.  
The  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle,  for  which  Ronald  Coase  received  the 
Nobel Prize for Economics, presents a number of clear advantages over the 
polluter pays principle: 
•  It  guarantees  efficiency,  i.e.  no  waste  of  resources,  which  is  in  turn 
fundamental  in  the  pursuit  of  the  Lisbon  goals  of  growth,  jobs  and 
competitiveness of the European Community.  
•  It is a better means to achieve fairness than the polluter pays principle. 
•  It  studies  a  broader  set  of  options.  In  contrast  to  the  polluter  pays 
principle, it can lead to the choice of innovative projects. 
•  Its use  of  some form  of  cost benefit analysis in a welfare  economics 
framework makes it take a much broader range of relevant variables 
into account, such as administration costs or values. 
•  The  logic  of  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  helps  to  avoid 
regulatory failure and contributes to the success of the Commission’s 
Better  Regulation  Agenda  at  the  heart  of  which  is  regulatory  impact 
assessment.
8 
•  The cheapest cost avoider analysis incorporates “polluter pays” as one 
possible outcome. In contrast to the polluter pays approach, it does not 
make this outcome a principle. 
There is no criticism that can be made of the cheapest cost avoider principle 
that is not also valid for the polluter pays principle. 
 
                                            
8 See European Commission 2005.  
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To  show  that  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  can,  is  and  must  be 
applied, part III illustrates the methodology in two exemplary cases: 
• • • • The question of the construction of the missing part of the A 44 motorway 
near Kassel in Germany; and 
• • • • The problem of the sectoral ban on the use of the Inn valley motorway in 
Austria.  
Both making the trucks drive a detour (A44 case) and banning certain trucks 
from  using  the  Inn  valley  motorway  can  be  interpreted  as  regulatory 
measures following the idea of the polluter pays principle. 
 
In  the  first  case  study,  called  the  A  44  case,  there  exist  plans  for  the 
motorway  A 44  connecting  Dortmund  to  Kassel  to  be  extended  in  the 
direction Erfurt, Chemnitz and Dresden, via Eisenach. However, except for a 
small  section,  these  plans  have  never  been  realised.  Instead,  there  is  a 
direct road B 7 between Kassel and Eisenach along the route of the planned 
motorway. This route is closed to trucks, who are obliged to drive a detour 
of 42 km via the motorways A 7 and A 4. This detour generates both extra 
private  and  external  (pollution)  costs,  amounting  to  between  34  and  590 
million € per year, depending on the source. 
 
The A 44 case: The cheapest cost avoider analysis of this case involves the 
cost benefit analysis of two scenarios:    
Scenario 1 serves to address the question whether the interests of society 
are  better  served  by  building  the  A  44  compared  to  the  detour.  
Scenario 2 serves to address the question whether the interests of society 
are better served by lifting the ban to use the B7 compared to the detour.    
 
 
The second case study concerns the prohibition of a 46 km long section of 
the  Inn  valley  motorway  for  trucks  transporting  goods  belonging  to  a 
number of sectors. The sectoral ban on the Inn valley motorway is estimated 
to cost Germany approx. 250 million €, plus the losses of 2500 jobs due to 
insolvencies, increases in costs, and a reduction in demand. 
 
Most  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  scenarios  suggest  that  it  would  be 
beneficial to build the A 44 and to lift the ban on the Inn Valley motorway.  
The detour and the ban are inefficient. 
 
Legal reasoning by the local court in the A 44 case and by the European 
Court of Justice implicitly applies the cheapest cost avoider approach.  
 
Insights  of  the  economic  analysis  of  law,  which  is  largely  efficiency 
orientated, are increasingly used in policy making and legal reforms. In part 
inspired  by  the  American  model  that  requires  a  fully  fledged  cost benefit 
analysis  to  be  undertaken  in  preparing  major  regulatory  proposals,
9 
                                            
9 See Ogus 2006, p 282; European Commission 2001, 2005. 
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government  departments  in  Europe,  when  making  proposals,  have  to 
prepare  what  has  become  known  as  a  “regulatory  impact  analysis”,  a 
“regulatory impact appraisal”, or a “regulatory impact assessment”, which 
includes some form of cost benefit analysis.
10  
Cost  benefit  analysis  in  its  strict  form  is  a  procedure  for  comparing  the 
aggregate  (social)  gains  to  be  attained  by  the  application  of  a  regulatory 
proposal against aggregate losses. Maximising the welfare of society, i.e. the 
sum of the welfare of the members of society, requires a comparison of the 
costs  and  benefits  of  different  regulatory  options,  and  the  choice  of  the 
option which promises the highest net benefit to society. Such a cost benefit 
analysis is concerned both with the determination of the optimal goal of a 
regulatory proposal and with the means of realising it at the lowest cost.  
Some methods of regulatory impact assessment apply what we would like to 
call  a  “weaker”  form  of  cost benefit  analysis  which  is  known  as  cost 
effectiveness  analysis.  Cost effectiveness  analysis  has  two  principal 
functions: to determine how to maximise benefits for a given level of costs, 
or to determine what regulatory intervention will generate specified benefits 
at lowest cost. Compared to cost benefit analysis in the strict sense, cost 
effectiveness analysis is a less ambitious mode of economic appraisal, since 
it  does  not  address  the  problem  of  specifying  the  optimal  level  of  an 
economic policy goal, such as the optimal reduction of pollution. However, 
both the cost benefit analysis in the strict sense and the cost effectiveness 
analysis can be used to identify the cheapest cost avoider. 
Note that at the heart of the cheapest cost avoider principle is the insight 
that the environmental performance of all modes of transport is crucial in 
order to encourage sustainable transport in the Community. Insofar, there is 
no  difference  to  the  polluter  pays  principle.  However,  the  cheapest  cost 
avoider principle shows much better than the polluter pays principle how to 
reconcile  the  EU  goals  of  the  Lisbon  strategy,  i.e.  the  respect  for  the 
environment with becoming the most dynamic competitive and knowledge 
based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.  
 
                                            
10 See Ogus 2006, p 279 292. 
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1  A critical assessment of the CE study 
1.1  Introduction and background 
Directive 2006/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
May  2006,  amending  Directive  1999/62/EC,  requires  the  Commission  to 
present,  “after  examining  all  options  including  environment,  noise, 
congestion and health related costs, a generally applicable, transparent and 
comprehensible model for the assessment of all external costs to serve as 
the basis for future calculations of infrastructure charges. This model shall 
be accompanied by an impact analysis of the internalisation of external costs 
for all modes of transport and a strategy for a stepwise implementation of 
the model for all modes of transport”
11 no later than 10 June 2008. 
In order to assist the Commission’s work in this area, CE Delft and INFRAS 
prepared  a  discussion  paper  (“the  CE  study”)  covering  potential 
methodologies  for  the  estimation  of  external  costs  and  possible 
internalisation  scenarios  subject  to  further  consideration.  The  paper  was 
discussed in a workshop in Brussels on 15 March 2007, and the consultants 
are expected to provide a final report in November 2007. The findings of this 
final  report  are  expected  to  feed  into  the  expected  Commission 
Communication  on  proposed  policy  options  (and  an  accompanying  impact 
assessment) which will be published in June 2008 and which will form the 
basis for a full stakeholder consultation. 
The CE study addresses two distinct issues, namely: 
•  How external costs are to be defined and measured for various modes 
of  transport  and  with  regard  to  a  number  of  potential  sources  of 
external costs (Chapter 2); and 
•  Why  and  how  external  costs  should  be  internalised,  what  problems 
arise  with  such  internalisation  in  practice,  and  what  internalisation 
scenarios should be further considered (Chapter 3). 
Tackling either of these issues on its own would be a formidable task, and 
dealing  with  both  of  them  is  extremely  ambitious.  Unfortunately,  the  CE 
study does not live up to this ambition, and falls short of what is required in 
order to provide a sound underpinning of important policy choices. It is long 
on assertion and short on analysis. It does not seem to provide a robust and 
coherent framework that allows one to assess the extent to which external 
effects in various modes of transport can lead to economic inefficiency, i.e. 
waste of resources, and how any such inefficiencies can best be avoided. It 
is confused and unclear about the objectives of internalisation, and seems to 
pay little attention to the potential risks of intervention and the associated 
welfare  losses  that  could  flow  from  ill  designed  or  ill informed  policies.  It 
notes  the  significant  amount  of  uncertainty  that  exists  with  regard  to 
external  cost  estimates,  but  fails  to  highlight  the  implications  of  such 
                                            
11 Directive 2006/38/EC of 17 May 2006, Article 11. 
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uncertainty. In short, it should not be regarded as a reliable or robust basis 
for the design of policies. 
The  remainder  of  this  section  provides  a  brief  overview  of  the  approach 
taken in the CE study and its findings. This is followed by a discussion of the 
main methodological flaws of the CE study, namely: 
•  That it is based on a flawed notion of external costs; and 
•  That, even based on its inappropriately narrow notion of external costs, 
it  does  not  provide  a  consistent  and  coherent  framework  for  the 
measurement of such costs; 
•  That  it  lacks  a  consistent  and  coherent  framework  within  which  one 
could assess the different options for internalisation. 
In  addition,  the  CE  study  is  strewn  with  inconsistencies,  ambiguities  and 
mistakes that cast serious doubts on its reliability and robustness. We will 
provide  some  examples  of  these  in  order  to  highlight  concerns  in  this 
respect.  
1.1.1  A brief summary of the CE study  
The CE study is made up of two distinct parts.  
•  The  first  part  (Chapter  2)  is  dedicated  to  a  discussion  of  how  to 
establish external costs estimates, and the collection of such estimates 
from third party studies. 
•  The  second  part  (Chapter  3)  presents  a  number  of  possible 
internalisation scenarios, following a discussion of potential objectives 
for internalisation, theoretical considerations relevant to internalisation, 
and practical issues that need to be addressed in order to internalise 
externals costs. 
1.1.2  Estimation of external costs 
The first part begins with a brief overview of the general approach, setting 
out  the  practical  problems  confronting  any  attempt  to  establish  external 
costs  associated  with  various  modes  of  transport.  The  authors  give  their 
definition  of  external  costs,  discuss  different  methods  for  measuring  such 
costs,  and  then  review  the  best  practice  estimates  for  different  cost 
categories.  
According to the CE study, external costs are simply costs “not paid by the 
transport users” who are “thus faced with incorrect incentives for transport 
supply and demand, leading to welfare losses” (p 6).
12 However, one  can 
distinguish between: 
•  The  “scientific  discussion,  focussing  on  welfare  optimisation  and 
efficient  pricing”,  in  which  “the  term  “external”  is  not  of  major 
importance”, but where one started from the “marginal social cost of 
                                            
12 References are to the CE study unless otherwise specified. 
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transport” which formed the basis of optimal infrastructure pricing, and 
which implicitly defined external costs as the difference between these 
costs and marginal revenues (e.g. from infrastructure charges and fuel 
duties); and 
•  The  “transport  accounts  discussion,  where  external  costs  are  the 
difference  between  the  total  social  costs  of  transport  and  the  costs 
already paid by the user”. 
The CE study then considers different categories of external costs, defined 
with reference to the various effects that might arise from the decisions of 
transport  users,  namely  congestion  and  scarcity,  accidents,  air  pollution, 
noise, climate change, and other external costs.  
With regard to scarcity and congestion costs, the CE study argues that it 
is important  to  distinguish  between  congestion  (which  “denotes  the  social 
loss  due  to  the  fact  that  users  do  not  care  for  the  additional  costs  and 
inconvenience they cause to others”, p 10), delays (which are the effects of 
congestion), reliability (which is equally a consequence of congestion), and 
scarcity  (which  “denotes  the  economic  costs  to  users  and  operators 
occurring when infrastructure can not [sic] be used at the desired time due 
to overcrowding”, p 11).
13 
Best practice approaches for measuring the cost associated with scarcity and 
congestion  are  based  on  deriving  time  estimates  from  speed  flow  models 
and applying the opportunity cost of time associated with these (for road 
transport) and opportunity cost approaches for scarce tracks (for scheduled 
transport modes). This in turn suggests that it is appropriate to differentiate 
between  various  traffic  networks  (e.g.  urban/inter  urban)  with  their  own 
specific speed flow  characteristics. The assumed value for the opportunity 
cost of time is a crucial determinant of the resultant estimates, and it is in 
this  regard  that  considerable  variations  can  be  observed.  While  there  are 
concerns  about  the  quality  of  the  underlying  traffic  data,  methodological 
uncertainties are described as being comparably low. 
Regarding  accident  costs,  the  CE  study  states  that  external  costs  are 
“those costs which are not covered by risk oriented insurance premiums” (p 
12), so that the level of external costs depends on the insurance system. 
Discussing best practice approaches, the CE study finds that there are “two 
different approaches leading to rather different results”, namely: 
•  A top down approach which “estimates total and average accident costs 
considering  national  accident  statistics  and  insurance  systems”, 
focussing  on  “material  damages  and  administrative  costs  (usually 
covered  in  the  insurance  premiums),  medical  costs  (including  other 
                                            
13 These quotes are typical for the somewhat loose use of terminology throughout 
the CE study, which often makes it difficult to establish the precise meaning of a 
statement or to understand the logic underlying a particular argument. Though this 
is a pervasive problem of the CE study, we will not address it in the remainder of this 
section but rather attempt to reconstruct the intended meaning wherever possible. 
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insurance  systems),  production  losses  and  societal  valuation  of  risks 
(usually external)” (p 12); and 
•  A bottom up approach which “aims at estimating marginal costs” which 
“depend  on  risk  elasticity  (correlation  between  traffic  levels  and 
accidents) and on the assumption of risk values” (p 13). 
However, according to the CE study, there is no consensus on which of these 
two  approaches  should  be  considered  to  be  the  best  practice  approach, 
although the authors declare their preference for the top down approach as 
it “is more transparent and considers the insurance system properly” (p 13). 
The  CE  study  also  notes  concerns  about  under reporting  of  fatalities  and 
injuries in official statistics, and the substantial differences in the valuation 
of lives lost. Estimates for the Value  of a Statistical Life (VoSL), which is 
used in the estimation of external costs, range from less than US$200,000 
to US$30m. 
In  relation  to  air  pollution  costs,  the  CE  study  refers  to  health  costs, 
damage  to  buildings,  crop  losses  and  further  costs  of  damage  to  the 
ecosystem arising from the emission of air pollutants. The most appropriate 
method for calculating external costs of air pollution is the so called impact 
pathway  approach,  which  is  based  on  a  detailed  assessment  of  the  link 
between  activities  and  emissions,  their  transport  and  conversion,  which 
result  in  specific  concentrations  and  the  deposition  of  pollutants.  These 
cause  a  response  from  receptors  and  a  physical  impact,  which  in  turn  is 
valued in terms of associated changes in utility and welfare losses expressed 
in monetary terms. While this very detailed bottom up approach is capable 
of considering detailed input variables and thus produces tailored estimates 
of  air  pollution  costs  for  very  specific  traffic  situations,  deriving 
representative average figures for a whole country, say, is relatively costly. 
The  CE  study  also  notes  a  number  of  critical  aspects  and  uncertainties, 
mainly related to the underlying data and the causal links between pollution 
and health, for example, as well as uncertainties with regard to VoSL and 
the  appropriate  social  discount  rates  for  costs  imposed  on  future 
generations. 
Noise costs are linked to the fact that noise is a nuisance which reduces 
the quality of life of those exposed to it, and can also have an impact on 
health.  Noise  costs  can  be  estimated  using  a  bottom up  impact  pathway 
approach,  tracing  the  effect  of  accommodating  an  additional  vehicle  on  a 
particular route (for a  given traffic volume,  speed distribution, technology 
etc.), or a top down approach based on national data on noise exposure and 
some  measure  of  the  willingness  to  pay  for  silence,  derived  for  example 
from hedonic pricing studies providing the impact on property prices of an 
increase  in  noise  levels.  According  to  the  CE  study,  both  approaches  are 
valid, but subject to similar uncertainties, as for example approaches for the 
estimation  of  air  pollution  costs  (e.g.  uncertainties  about  the  appropriate 
figure for VoSL) as well as uncertainty with regard to the threshold value 
above which noise should be considered a nuisance. 
Establishing the costs of climate change is complex owing to the long term 
effect  of  greenhouse  gas  emissions  and  the  difficulty  in  anticipating  risk 
patterns. According to the CE study, a “differentiated approach (looking both 
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at  the  damages  and  the  avoidance  strategy)  is  necessary”  (p  19).  In 
particular,  when  assessing  the  potential  damage  associated  with  climate 
change, “there is a general lack of knowledge about the physical impacts 
caused by global warming” with some “possible impacts, such as extended 
flooding or hurricanes with higher energy density” often not being taken into 
account  because  of  “the  lack  of  information  on  the  relationship  between 
global  warming  and  these  effects.  Secondary  impacts  such  as  socially 
contingent  damages  (e.g.  regional  conflicts)  are  even  more  difficult  to 
assess” (p 19). According to the CE study, an “alternative approach which 
avoids the uncertainties associated with assessing damage costs of climate 
control is to assess the costs of avoiding CO2 emissions. (…) The method is 
based on a cost effectiveness analysis that determines the least cost option 
to achieve a required level of greenhouse gas emissions reduction. (…) In 
practice the avoidance costs approach is more feasible, since the approach is 
more transparent and refers to climate change policy” (p 19 f). Obviously, 
the choice of target level, both in terms of the total value and the sectors to 
which  it  applies,  and  the  estimation  of  the  reduction  potential  of  various 
technologies, play a critical role in this regard. 
Other  external  costs,  such  as  costs  for  nature  and  landscape,  soil  and 
water  pollution,  costs  in  urban  areas  or  costs  of  up   and  downstream 
processes are often considered, but not widely estimated owing to complex 
impact patterns. 
The first part concludes with a presentation of figures for total external costs 
and various unit cost measures for the different cost categories across the 
various  transport  modes  compiled  from  a  number  of  third  party  studies 
(which produce a substantial range of values), and a brief discussion of the 
issues that need to be considered in order to transform these figures into 
values that can be used in internalisation scenarios. More specifically, the CE 
study proposes to use the unit values as “the basis for calculating the values 
for  the  various  traffic  situations,  modes,  types  of  vehicles  and  countries”, 
noting  that  such  “value  transfer  is  useful  and  appropriate  to  save 
expenditures  for  detailed  estimation  of  external  costs  in  specific  traffic 
situations, vehicle types, modes of transport and countries” (p 32). Such a 
“value  transfer”  would  have  to  consider  differences  in  dose response 
functions, be based on local data or appropriate adjustments of unit values 
(such as VoSL, which would be adjusted on the basis of differences in GDP 
per capita). Further adjustments will have to be made for changes in the 
base year, and in order to obtain values for future costs. Last but not least, 
the  CE  study  discusses  how  such  figures  might  be  used  in  internalisation 
scenarios, concluding that “the internalisation of congestion costs requests a 
road pricing scheme which differentiates at least between urban areas and 
interurban  bottlenecks”,  while  the  “internalisation  of  environmental  costs 
can be linked to km or fuel charging” (p 33). 
1.1.3  Scenarios for internalisation 
The  second  part  starts  from  the  observation  that  transport  “gives  rise  to 
various types of external effects” for which there is no economic market so 
that  “the  market  clearing  process  does  not  lead  to  the  most  optimal 
outcome, from a societal point of view” (p 35). The CE study distinguishes 
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between  inter sectoral  externalities  –  external  costs  inflicted  by  transport 
users  on  others  outside  the  transport  sector  (noise,  pollution  and  climate 
change)     and  intra sectoral  externalities  where  the  external  effects  are 
experienced by transport users themselves (e.g. congestion and accidents). 
The solution to the problem of external costs, in the tradition of Pigou, is to 
“introduce a regulatory charge equal to the marginal external costs” so that 
transport users will “take account of the external effects on one another and 
others,  and  may  or  may  not  adapt  their  decision,  depending  on  whether 
their marginal benefit is lower or higher than the marginal external costs to 
others. This is the basic idea behind internalisation of external costs” (p 35). 
Having set out this “basic idea” – ensuring that decision makers  face the 
cost  that  their  actions  may  impose  upon  others  –  the  CE  study  then 
progresses  to  discussing  various  potential  objectives,  or  aims,  of 
internalisation, namely  
•  Influencing behaviour (to reduce environmental impacts or allow a freer 
flow of traffic); 
•  Generating  revenues  (to  cover  infrastructure  costs,  fund  new 
investments or contribute to the general budget); and 
•  Increasing fairness (in terms of making polluters pay; identical taxes 
and  charges  for  everyone;  changing,  or  prevent  changes  in  income 
distribution; and levelling the playing field between modes). 
According  to  the  CE  study,  all  of  these  objectives  are  to  some  degree 
present in Directive 2006/38/EC. 
The discussion of potential motives for internalisation is followed by a review 
of the theoretical framework for internalisation, starting from the claim that 
the  “internalisation  of  external  costs  can  be  done  by  a  wide  variety  of 
methods  and  instruments”.  Even  if  one  focuses  on  market  based 
instruments  “there  are  (…)  many  different  ways  of  implementing  pricing 
policies, for example with regard to price structures and price levels” (p 37). 
According to the CE study, the “optimal internalisation strategy depends on 
the underlying aims and motifs. If internalisation takes place out of equity 
considerations,  intersectoral  externalities  are  especially  relevant,  because 
these make up the “unpaid bill” that transport imposes upon society” (p 38). 
The  CE  study  notes  that  marginal  social  cost  pricing  (which  involves 
appropriate  Pigovian  taxes)  would  be  “optimal  for  optimising  economic 
efficiency” and “would, under some conditions, lead to allocative efficiency in 
a static perspective”, but that in “the dynamic real world, deviations from 
marginal social cost pricing may be more appropriate or practical” (p 38) 
because: 
•  Marginal  social  cost  pricing  might  not  guarantee  the  full  recovery  of 
infrastructure costs; 
•  Pigovian taxes are only optimal under certain theoretical assumptions 
that may not be satisfied in practice (namely that all other prices in the 
economy  correspond  to  marginal  social  costs,  i.e.  that  there  are  no 
distortive  taxes  or  economic  profits,  for  example,  that  would  lead  to 
deviations from allocative efficiency); or 
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•  The cost of implementing full marginal social cost pricing would be too 
high. 
Following a brief discussion of the scope for differentiating existing charges 
in order to achieve internalisation, and the potential benefits from combining 
different  policy  instruments  into  acceptable  packages,  the  CE  study  then 
considers how revenues raised from the imposition of Pigou taxes should be 
used. While efficiency considerations suggest that it would be inappropriate 
to earmark the revenues from charges aimed at internalisation for transport 
projects,  various  institutional  conditions  can  offset  the  inefficiency  that 
would otherwise be associated with earmarking. Equity considerations would 
not  strongly  support  earmarking,  but  earmarking  revenues  may  increase 
acceptability. 
The CE study further notes that there are a number of legal constraints that 
may need to be taken into account, such as the exemption of jet fuel from 
minimum tax levels set out in Directive 2003/96/EC. 
Before  defining  potential  internalisation  scenarios,  the  CE  study  then 
considers a number of “cross cutting issues” (p 45 ff), namely: 
•  The most important cost categories for each mode of transport; 
•  The  “incentive  base”  for  charging  (i.e.  the  dimensions  along  which 
charges should be varied); 
•  The question of how existing taxes and charges should be dealt with (in 
particular whether they can be considered to be aimed at internalising 
costs);  
•  How revenues raised from internalisation charges should be used;  
•  How  to  deal  with  different  potential  sources  of  external  costs  (air 
pollution, congestion, noise, accidents, and climate change); and 
•  The special issue of whether a toll system for passenger cars is needed. 
The findings can briefly be summarised as follows: 
•  Generally,  for  most  modes  of  transport,  climate  change  and  air 
pollution  are  the  most  important  categories.  For  rail  and  aviation, 
scarcity and noise can be added to the most important cost categories. 
With regard to road transport, all cost categories with the exception of 
scarcity have to be considered as being most important. 
•  With  regard  to  most  cost  categories,  charges  would  have  to  be 
differentiated according to a combination of criteria. With the exception 
of climate change costs, where fuel use (and the CO2 content of fuel) 
are  closely  correlated  with  the  marginal  (social)  cost  level,  no  single 
variable provides a good proxy for marginal cost drivers. 
•  Internalisation should in some form take account of existing charges in 
spite of some of the theoretical problems associated with relating those 
charges to marginal social costs. The CE study claims to take account of 
marginal  taxes  and  charges  that  are  not  related  to  marginal 
infrastructure costs, the most prominent being fuel excise duty. The CE 
study  assumes  that  fuel  excise  duties  are  used  partly  for  the 
internalisation of climate change costs to the extent that revenues from 
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fuel excise duties for a particular transport mode exceed the variable 
infrastructure  costs  of  this  mode.  Fixed  charges  are  considered  on  a 
case by case basis. 
•  As a consequence of this approach, revenues from CO2 taxes should be 
assumed to be used in order to “lower fuel excise duties to the extent 
that  they  exceed  marginal  infrastructure  costs”.  Revenues  from 
congestion charges are assumed to be used for investment within each 
mode,  or  for  inter modal  funds,  and  taxes  and  charges  for  other 
external effects are assumed to be used for investments to reduce the 
external effects and rewarding the best in class (p 54). 
•  The CE study proposes further to tighten the Euro standards (or other 
standards) for road vehicles and locomotives, vessels and aircraft. In 
relation to congestion, tolls should be levied on congested links, with a 
recommendation  to  earmark  revenues  for  road  infrastructure 
investments.  Noise  can  be  best  addressed  through  regulation  and 
standards for road transport, and track prices and landing charges are 
linked to noise emission for rail and aviation. Regarding accident costs, 
the  CE  study  proposes  to  charge  insurance  companies  in  line  with 
estimated external costs, and rely on the insurance companies to pass 
on these charges in the most effective form to its customers. Climate 
change  costs  should  be  borne  by  each  mode,  and  where  legal 
constraints  prevent  passing  through  these  costs  in  the  form  of  fuel 
duties, it is proposed that the transport modes should be included in 
the existing emissions trading system. 
•  Given the previous considerations, there would seem to be little benefit 
from  a  sophisticated  toll  system  based  on  per  kilometre  charging  for 
passenger cars. 
The CE study concludes with the definition of six different scenarios (from 
which four to six are to be picked for further detailed evaluation).  
•  The  current  situation  defines  Scenario  1,  and  serves  as  reference 
scenario. 
•  Scenario 2 comprises a differentiation of existing taxes and charges to 
bring  them  more  in  line  with  cost  drivers,  combined  with  regulatory 
intervention. Scenario 2 does not seek to introduce new charges, but to 
modify  existing  charges  based  on  external  cost  estimates,  with 
arbitrary  limits  on  deviation  from  the  average  charge  level.  For 
example,  CO2  taxes  or  fuel  charges  would  be  set  on  the  basis  of 
external climate costs, while at the same time additional standards can 
be introduced to reduce emissions of pollutants. Existing road pricing or 
toll  schemes  would  be  modified  to  achieve  a  better  spread  of  traffic 
between peak and off peak, and so on. 
•  Scenario  3  aims  to  achieve  full  internalisation  of  external  costs.  This 
would require the introduction of new charges which should adhere as 
much as possible to marginal cost pricing, including a variable kilometre 
charging system for road traffic, and charging of insurance companies 
for accident costs. Two subscenarios are defined with regard to revenue 
use,  where  in  one  case  (3A)  revenues  are  used  in  different  ways, 
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whereas in the other case (3B) all revenues are used in order to reduce 
charges  that  are  not  linked  to  marginal  costs,  and  any  remainder  is 
used to reduce taxes on labour (which are assumed to have the largest 
distortive effect). 
•  Scenario  4  aims  to  achieve  the  full  internalisation  of  inter sectoral 
external costs only, i.e. it does not take into account costs the users of 
a particular transport mode impose on each other (namely congestion 
and accident costs). Revenues would be used in the same way as in 
scenario 3B. 
•  Scenario 5 consists of a mix of scenarios 2 and 3 in that only some new 
instruments are to be introduced. For example, unlike scenario 3, the 
scenario  would  not  envisage  a  variable  kilometre based  charging 
system. 
•  Scenario 6 assumes that certain optional measures laid out in Directive 
2006/38 are made compulsory and thus applied to the maximum. For 
example,  the  scenario  assumes  that  all  Member  States  will introduce 
tolls  for  freight  road  infrastructure  costs,  differentiated  by  Euro 
standard and based on infrastructure costs as indicated in the Directive. 
These scenarios were presented at the workshop, and a subset is expected 
to be assessed in more detail in the final report. 
1.2  The CE study is based on a flawed notion of external costs 
Although crucial for any attempt to  establish external costs or assess the 
most appropriate way of internalisation, a proper definition of external cost 
and a consistent and coherent discussion of external effects are completely 
missing from the CE study. The CE study notes that “the production of unit 
values  ready  for  internalisation  needs  a  modelling  approach  with  a  clear 
definition  of  external  costs”  (p  5),  but  no  such  clear  definition  is 
forthcoming. In its place one finds the somewhat imprecise statement that 
“external  costs  are  not  paid  by  the  transport  users”  (p  6),  followed  by  a 
distinction  between  the  “scientific  discussion”  and  the  “transport  accounts 
discussion”, which appear to differ with regard to whether they consider the 
gap between marginal social and private costs, and the gap between total 
social  and  private  costs  respectively.  The  section  entitled  “Definition  of 
external  cost  and  level  of  externality”  then  proceeds  with  a  discussion  of 
what  costs  transport  users  consider,  a  number  of  –  unsubstantiated  and 
unexplained   assertions with regard to the level of externalities for different 
cost  components  and  transport  modes,  and  some  claims  relating  to  the 
extent to which some of these costs may already be internalised, which – as 
the study claims – is “crucial for the definition of external costs”.  
Overall, this section does not provide any clear definition of external costs 
that  could  form  the  basis  for  measuring  such  costs  (or  establish  the 
robustness  of  cost  estimates  from  third  party  studies),  and  would  be  the 
precondition for assessing internalisation strategies.  
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1.2.1  The economic notion of external effects and external costs 
In  very  general  terms,  externalities  are  effects  of  a  consumption  or 
production  decision  made  by  one  agent  on  the  consumption  set,  utility 
function or production function of other economic agents which do not work 
through the price system.
14 Externalities may be positive or negative, i.e. 
they may generate a benefit for, or impose a cost on other agents, which is 
by definition not taken into account by the decision maker. External costs 
can then be defined as the utility loss (expressed in monetary terms) or the 
increase  in  production  costs  suffered  by  those  agents  affected  by  the 
decision.  By  contrast,  private  costs  are  the  costs  faced  by  the  decision 
maker. Social costs comprise both private and external costs. 
A number of implications follow from this: 
•  External costs do not exist in a void, but are derived from utility losses 
or higher production costs of economic agents. For example, effluents 
pumped into a river are not an external cost; the increase in production 
costs of a downstream plant having to clean up the water before it can 
be used in their manufacturing process, by contrast, are external costs, 
as are the utility losses suffered by those who are (or would be) using 
the river banks for their recreation. 
•  External  effects,  and  thus  external  costs,  arise  only  when  there  are 
competing  uses  of  scarce  resources.  Without  a  downstream  factory 
using  the  water  in  its  manufacturing  process,  or  swimmers  and 
sunbathers using the river as a leisure facility, there would not be an 
external effect, and there would not be any external costs. 
•  The fact that there are competing uses of scarce resources also means 
that  reducing  the  harm  to  one  party  inevitably  implies  harming  the 
other  party.  Reducing  the  cost  faced  by  the  downstream  firm  for 
cleaning  river  water  by  reducing  the  amount  of  wastewater  pumped 
into the river upstream means imposing costs on the upstream  firm, 
which will have to find other ways of disposing of wastewater, treating 
the  water,  or  moving  elsewhere.  Externality  problems  are  of  a 
reciprocal  nature:  reducing  the  cost  imposed  on  one  party  imposes 
costs  on  the  other.  Total  costs  depend  on  the  actions  of  all  of  the 
parties involved – the decision maker as well as those affected by the 
decision. For example, the extent to which using the river as a deposit 
of  waste  water  causes  external  costs  is  likely  to  depend  on  the 
                                            
14 Strictly speaking, we are dealing here with so called ‘technological’ externalities as 
opposed to ‘pecuniary’ externalities, which do work through the price system. For 
example, an increase in demand for a particular product by an economic agent may 
cause the market price for that product to increase, which obviously affects other 
buyers who now face higher prices. However, such pecuniary externalities are not 
Pareto relevant, i.e. they do not affect the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria 
provided that all assumptions underpinning the first fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics hold, and thus prices only have the effect of equating supply and demand. 
For a definition and discussion of externalities see Laffont 1987. 
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production technology  chosen by the downstream firm, which in turn 
affects  how  much  cleaning  is  required.  The  utility  loss  suffered  by 
swimmers  and  sunbathers  might  be  avoided  if  they  chose  a  spot 
upstream,  although  in  this  case  they  would  experience  higher  travel 
costs.  
The last two points are of particular importance, as they highlight that the 
question  how  one  should  most  appropriately  deal  with  external  effects  is 
more  complex  than  simply  asking  how  much  the  party  “causing”  the 
external  effect  should  be  paying  (and  on  what  particular  variables  the 
amount payable should depend). It may be efficient to charge the upstream 
“polluter”  for  pumping  wastewater  into  the  river,  but  not  necessarily  so. 
Welfare may be higher if the downstream firm were left to face the cost of 
cleaning  the  water  that  it  requires  for  its  production.  Or  efficiency  may 
require that both parties pay   the upstream polluter some internalisation 
charge, and the downstream firm some cost of cleaning up the water. Which 
of these options should be chosen depends on the effectiveness with which 
the various parties can reduce the externality. 
The CE study appears to acknowledge this fundamental insight arising from 
the work of Coase – albeit in a very cursory manner – by stating that “the 
quantification  of  environmental  costs  has  to  consider  the  interrelation 
between  the  cause  and  the  effect  of  the  externality.  Noise  is  a  good 
example: According to the Coase theorem, it must not only be the causer 
(transport)  who  has  to  pay  for  the  externality”  (p  7).  However,  the 
implication of this insight – namely that there is no justification for assuming 
that only “the causer” has to pay on the basis of the reciprocal nature of the 
externality problem – appears not to play any role in the remainder of the 
study,  which  proceeds  without  taking  into  consideration  the  fact  that 
external costs can be avoided by multiple parties. Rather, with the exception 
of the brief reference to the Coasian perspective, the study is based on the 
presumption that internalisation is all about making the “causer” pay, based 
on  the  “cost”  its  actions  are  causing  to  other  parties.
15  As  the  following 
example shows, this can lead to inefficiencies and welfare losses. 
1.2.2  Externalities as a reciprocal problem and the cheapest cost avoider: a 
simple stylised example 
A very simple stylised example may be helpful in illustrating the difference 
between the naive view of external cost as being caused by one particular 
party,  and  the  more  sophisticated  understanding  of  external  cost  as  cost 
arising from competing demands for scarce resources. 
                                            
15 One possible exception is the discussion of external costs of climate change, where 
the CE study acknowledges that the crucial issue is how to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions  with  the  least  cost.  However,  as  we  discuss,  this  discussion  is  again 
superficial  and  incomplete,  and  only  refers  to  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle 
without taking it seriously. 
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Consider the case of a driver using a particular stretch of road, and assume 
that  the  noise  caused  by  driving  along  this  road  harms  a  local  resident. 
Assume further that driving at greater speed benefit the driver (e.g. because 
he  spends  less  time  on  the  road),  but  also  increases  the  harm  for  the 
resident.  More  specifically,  consider  that  the  value  to  the  driver  and  the 
harm  to  the  resident  associated  with  various  speeds  –  both  expressed  in 
monetary terms (i.e. as the amount the driver would be willing to pay for 
driving at the indicated speed
16, and as the amount the resident would be 
prepared to pay to avoid a car passing at the indicated speed)   are as set 
out in Table 1 1:
17 
Table 1-1 External cost from noise – a simple stylised example 




Total value  
(equals social welfare) 
80 km/h  3  2  1 
100 km/h  5  3  2 
120 km/h  6  7   1 
140 km/h  5  11   6 
 
The harm to the resident of driving at higher speeds (or, indeed, of driving 
at all) is not taken into consideration by the motorist and can therefore be 
considered  as  the  proper  measure  of  “external  costs”  that  require 
internalising. Maximising his own benefit, the motorist would choose to drive 
at 120 km/h, which is clearly inefficient, as the resident would gain more 
from a reduction in speed than the motorist would lose. Indeed, it would be 
socially optimal if the motorist chose to drive at 100 km/h, at which speed 
social  welfare  would  be  maximised.  A  lawmaker  knowing  the  respective 
figures for benefit and harm with sufficient certainty could ensure a welfare 
maximising outcome by simply imposing a speed limit of 100 km/h (ignoring 
for the moment that it can of course be costly to enforce such a speed limit).  
Alternatively, efficiency can be achieved by making sure that the motorist 
takes  account  of  the  harm  he  causes  the  resident,  i.e.  by  transforming 
“external cost” into costs faced by the motorist when deciding how fast to 
drive. Assume that it is possible to charge the motorist for the use of that 
particular  stretch  of  road,  and  to  differentiate  charges  according  to  the 
                                            
16  This  willingness  to  pay  in  turn  captures  the  difference  between  the  value  of 
arriving faster and the direct cost borne by the motorist associated with travelling at 
higher speeds, e.g. in terms of higher fuel consumption or increased accident risk. 
17  From  these  values,  it  is  straightforward  to  calculate  incremental  benefits  and 
costs. For example, the incremental value to the driver of driving at 120 km/h rather 
than 100 km/h would be given by the difference in her valuation, i.e. 1. Similarly, 
the incremental harm caused to the resident by increasing the speed from 100 km/h 
to 120 km/h is 4. 
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speed  chosen  by  the  motorist  (ignoring  the  cost  of  implementing  such  a 
charging scheme). Then, by setting charges equal to the harm suffered by 
the resident, the motorist will take account of the full cost of his decision, 
and  choose  to  drive  at  100km/h.  This  is  the  internalisation  model  that 
appears to underpin the CE study. 
What  this  model  ignores,  however,  is  that  the  underlying  problem  is  not 
caused by the motorist alone, but by the motorist and the resident jointly. It 
is only because the resident is there that the noise caused by the motorist 
causes harm; harm is not caused by the noise emission of the travelling car 
per se, but by the fact that this emission affects someone who values peace 
and quiet and suffers a loss in utility as a result of the noise. The fact that 
the harm is caused jointly by the resident and the motorist matters to the 
extent that the resident can take actions to affect the magnitude of such 
harm. For example, assume that the resident could reduce the amount of 
harm by installing sound insulation in his property at a cost of 2, and that 
the reduced harm resulting from this is as shown in Table 1 2. 
Table 1-2 External cost from noise with mitigation efforts 
Speed  Benefit to driver  Harm to resident if 
sound insulation 
installed* 
Total value, including cost 
of installing sound 




3  0 (2)  1 
100 
km/h 
5  1 (3)  2 
120 
km/h 
6  1 (3)  3 
140 
km/h 
5  5 (7)   2 
* Figures in parentheses show the sum of harm and installation costs 
 
In this case, the welfare maximising outcome would be for the motorist to 
drive at 120 km/h. Moreover, total welfare in this case is higher than the 
maximum welfare that can be achieved by naively focusing on the motorist 
as the party responsible for causing harm, and pursuing the corresponding 
internalisation strategy (as described above). This is because, by installing 
sound insulation, the resident can reduce the harm he suffers by more than 
the motorist ever could as a result of driving more slowly, and at any given 
speed up to 140 km/h, can do so more cheaply.  
Perhaps even more importantly, attempting to internalise external costs on 
the  basis  of  the  naive  view  of  cost  causation  outlined  above  will  in  all 
likelihood lead to welfare losses relative to what could be achieved if one 
took  into  account  the  fact  that  some  harm  is  unavoidable  (i.e.  that  any 
attempt to reduce the amount of harm due to noise suffered by the resident 
will go hand in hand with other costs that have to be incurred, or with lost 
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benefits to the motorist from having to drive more slowly), and that in order 
to minimise the magnitude of the (inevitable) welfare loss one has to ensure 
that the party with the lowest cost of reducing the amount of harm suffered 
has an incentive to do so.  In  order to see this, we need to  focus  on the 
incentives of the resident to install sound insulation on his property.  
Without charging the motorist for any “external cost”, or imposing a speed 
limit,  the  motorist  would  choose  to  drive  at  120  km/h,  and  the  resident 
would  obtain  a  net  benefit  of  4  from  installing  sound  insulation.
18  By 
contrast,  if  the  motorist  drove  at  100  km/h  because  of  a  speed  limit  or 
because of being faced with external costs determined on the basis of the 
naive view of who is responsible for causing harm, the resident would not 
have  any  incentive  to  install  insulation.
19  By  contrast,  doing  nothing  to 
confront  the  motorist  with  the  harm  he  causes  would  lead  to  the  right 
outcome.  
This  last  conclusion  rests  on  the  assumption  that  the  resident  is 
unambiguously the cheapest cost avoider
20, which may of course not hold in 
practice. For example, assume that the benefits to the motorist from driving 
at 140 km/h were 7, say. In this case, absent any charging mechanism or 
restriction, the motorist would choose to drive at this speed, even though as 
a  result  total  welfare  would  decrease.  It  may  therefore  be  appropriate  to 
confront  the  motorist  with  the  external  cost  he  causes  –  but  these  costs 
need to be measured appropriately and taking into account the reciprocal 
nature of the problem and the fact that the harm is caused jointly by both 
parties rather than one party alone. More specifically, in the above example 
the appropriate external cost charge (or Pigou tax) would need to be set at 
the  level  of  harm  suffered  by  the  resident  under  the  condition  that  the 
resident has taken appropriate measures to reduce the quantum of harm.
21 
The following table presents the difference between the external cost charge 
that results from the naive view of cost causation, and the understanding 
that externality problems are reciprocal in nature.
22 
                                            
18 The resident would reduce noise costs from 7 to 1, i.e. gain benefits of 6. Given 
that the installation of sound insulation costs 2, this leaves a net benefit of 4. 
19 The harm suffered at this speed is 3, the cost of installing insulation is 2, and the 
harm suffered at this speed with insulation is 1, as shown in the above Tables. 
20 Also called “cheapest cost avoider” in the literature. 
21 See Rose Ackerman 1989. 
22 See Baumol 1972. 
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Table 1-3 Pigovian tax based on correct notion of external cost 
Speed  Pigou tax based on reciprocal nature of 
externality* 
Naive Pigou tax 
80 km/h  2  2 
100 km/h  3  3 
120 km/h  3  7 
140 km/h  7  11 
*Calculated as the minimum of the harm suffered without insulation, and the sum of 
insulation cost and the harm suffered with insulation 
Note that the figures in the table give the total amount of tax payable rather than a 
tax schedule giving the tax associated with changes in activity levels. However, 
converting the total tax amounts into marginal tax rates for driving at 80 km/h 
rather than not driving at all, driving at 100 km/h rather than at 80 km/h and so 
forth is straightforward. 
This  stylised  example  is  of  course  very  simplistic,  and  a  more  detailed 
discussion of the underlying principles will follow in part II. It demonstrates, 
however, that both the measurement of external cost and the choice of an 
appropriate  internalisation  strategy  crucially  depend  on  the  insight  that 
externality  problems  are  reciprocal,  and  that  external  costs  are  caused 
jointly by all the parties involved. This insight is not limited to externalities 
from noise, but it is applicable to externalities in general.  
1.3  The CE study lacks a coherent framework assessing external 
costs 
In  addition  to  ignoring  the  reciprocal  nature  of  externalities  (and  the 
implications this has on the appropriate measure of external costs) the CE 
study does not set out a coherent “methodology” for the measurement of 
external costs.  
In  the  first  place,  the  CE  study  appears  not  to  contain  a  methodological 
framework  for  the  measurement  of  external  costs,  but  rather  presents  a 
collection of assertions and examples of cost measurements that have been 
conducted by third parties. Even though one of the declared objectives of 
the CE study is the collection of such third party cost estimates, it is unclear 
how the various estimates can be compared and used in an internalisation 
framework without an explicit discussion of an appropriate methodology for 
the measurement of  external costs (and a subsequent assessment of any 
differences that might exist between the methodology used in producing the 
various estimates and the extent to which these differences could potentially 
explain the variation in the estimated values).  
The  following  list  of  problems  (without  any  claim  to  being  complete) 
provides some indication of the underlying deficiencies of the CE study. 
•  The CE study does not appear to consider that the appropriate measure 
of  external  costs  is  closely  linked  to  the  underlying  objective  of 
internalisation. While it may be interesting to establish “total” external 
costs with reference to the difference between the overall cost caused 
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by a particular mode of transport, and the cost incurred by the users of 
this  transport  mode,  such  a  measure  is  entirely  inappropriate  and 
irrelevant  if  one  wants  to  correct  incentives  so  that  the  level  of  an 
externality is reduced to its efficient level. A measure of total external 
costs  may  be  relevant  if  one  were  to  intervene  purely  under  the 
heading of corrective justice (one of the many concepts  of  “fairness” 
mentioned as a potential policy objective) 
•  For a similar reason, it is entirely meaningless to calculate, for example, 
external costs per vehicle kilometre (which appears to be the prevailing 
method of calculation throughout most of chapter 2 of the CE study – 
see,  for  example,  Tables  7  to  10)  if  vehicle  kilometres  are  not  the 
relevant driver of external costs (as they appear not to be, according to 
Table 13, which suggests that the level of external costs depends on a 
mix of factors in a potentially highly complex way). Making the polluter 
face  some  arbitrary  average  cost  measure  that  is  unrelated  to  the 
impact her behaviour has on the level of external costs not only fails to 
achieve  internalisation  in  the  sense  of  improving  efficiency,  but  may 
even be counterproductive.  
•  Even  if  unit  costs  were  expressed  in  terms  of  the  correct  driver  of 
external  costs,  the  relevant  concept  for  internalisation  is  marginal 
rather than average cost (or unit cost).
23 Except in the case of constant 
marginal costs and no fixed costs, these two cost measures will differ. 
Of course, as the CE study points out, there are a number of reasons 
why the implementation of internalisation schemes based on marginal 
external  costs  is impractical  or  impossible,  but  this  does  not  suggest 
that one can afford simply to ignore the impact that the recourse to 
some  other,  more  easily  quantifiable  cost  measure  will  have  on  the 
effectiveness and the welfare implications of internalisation. At the very 
least, in order to examine to what extent unit costs (or average costs) 
may be used as a proxy for marginal costs, one has to take a view on 
the shape of the external cost function. A detailed discussion of these 
aspects is missing. Although a comparison of average and marginal cost 
per  vehicle  kilometre  is  undertaken  in  Table  3  of  the  CE  study,  it  is 
unclear  to  what  extent  these  findings  are  driven  by  modelling 
assumptions  which  may  or  may  not  be  realistic.  In  any  case,  the 
comparison  is  somewhat  meaningless  given  that  vehicle  kilometres 
seem to be a poor proxy for the underlying drivers of external costs. 
                                            
23 The CE study indeed notes that “[a]ccording to theory and ongoing research, there 
is no doubt that marginal social cost figures are needed for optimal internalisation 
scenarios”, but then continues by stating that “[I]n practice and related to the new 
Directive for HGV charging 2006/38, a separation between infrastructure costs (and 
recovery) and external costs is however decisive” (p 9). It is entirely unclear why 
(and  if  so,  how)  marginal  external  cost  estimates  would  be  incompatible  with  a 
separation  of  infrastructure  costs,  nor  how  such  a  separation  relates  to  average 
costs.  
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•  The  CE  study  briefly  mentions  that  it  is  “crucial  for  the  definition  of 
external  costs”  to  understand  which  costs  are  already  taken  into 
account  by  the  decision  maker  (p  7),  but  does  not  provide  any 
systematic  discussion  of  this  issue.  Any  attempt  to  do  so  would 
presumably have demonstrated that, in order to examine this question, 
one  not  only  has  to  consider  the  incentive  properties  of  existing 
charging systems, but also a wider set of legal and institutional factors. 
Accident costs are a good example for this.  
The CE study identifies as the external costs of accidents those that are “not 
considered  in  own  risk  anticipation  and  not  covered  by  insurance”  (p  7). 
Although  this  is  later  refined  by  stating  that  external  accident  costs  are 
those that are “not covered by risk oriented insurance premiums” (p 12), 
the  preferred  approach  for  the  measurement  of  external  accident  costs 
according to the CE study is a top down approach, which can, but does not 
necessarily  have  to  restrict  its  attention  to  insurance  premiums  that  are 
based on risk (as set out on page 12).
24 The CE study completely ignores 
that (a) those “causing” accidents
25 are often liable for damages that are not 
covered  by  their  insurance  (under  general  tort  law),  so  that  a  greater 
proportion  of  costs  would  be  internalised  than  is  suggested  by  looking  at 
insurance premiums and (b) that insurance systems in which the premium 
paid is unrelated to the insured’s risk characteristics and behaviour can be 
the cause of externalities rather than contribute to their internalisation. Put 
differently, if liability for the damage caused by one’s behaviour were not 
covered by insurance, then the incentives to take account of the likelihood of 
an accident might well be taken into account to a greater extent than in the 
case where liability is covered by insurance and the insurance premium is 
unaffected  by  one’s  behaviour.  Insurance  premiums  are  of  course  not 
generally  set  in  close  relation  to  the  risk  characteristics  of  individual 
insurance customers owing to the information asymmetry between insured 
and insurer, limiting the insurer to designing a set of policies and relying on 
customer self selection; monitoring costs limit the ability of the insurer to 
make  insurance  premiums  contingent  on  the  insured’s  behaviour. 
Sometimes,  insurers  also  face  restrictions  on  their  ability  to  differentiate 
their insurance policies or their premiums that have been imposed in pursuit 
of  some  other  policy  objective  (such  as  concerns  about  fairness  or 
affordability). Such constraints can contribute to externalities. Similarly, the 
fact  that  under  general  medical insurance  systems  some  health  costs  are 
shared by the community rather than being borne by those involved in an 
accident can give rise to externalities – but these are the consequence of a 
political choice to have in place a general system of health insurance rather 
than being caused by transport.  
                                            
24 Consequently, top down approaches may lead to very different cost figures, as 
noted in the CE study. 
25 Please note again that accidents are generally ‘caused’ by two parties, and that 
either party may be able to undertake efforts to avoid the accident, or limit the level 
of expected harm that results from the accident.  
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The general lesson of this discussion is that one needs to consider a wide set 
of  legal  and  institutional  factors  in  order  to  assess  what  proportion  of 
external costs is already internalised. 
The  complete  lack  of  a  systematic  and  robust  methodology  for  the 
assessment of external costs is reflected in the fact that the discussion of 
cost  functions  and  external  cost  measures  in  the  CE  study  is  conducted 
largely in terms of inappropriate variables, and that there are in addition a 
number  of  inconsistencies  that  cast  serious  doubt  on  the  scientific 
robustness  of  any  analysis  that  underpins  the  assertions  made  in  the  CE 
study. Table 1 4 brings together the entries in Table 3, Table 5 and Table 13 
of  the  CE  study  in  relation  to  external  cost  functions,  showing  these 
problems. 
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Table 1-4 The notion of external costs in the CE study 
Cost component   Table 3: Difference 
between marginal 
and average costs 
(costs per veh. km) 
Table 5: Cost 
function (costs 







cost level  
Comment 








Low  Consistent – increasing 
marginal costs imply marginal 
costs above average costs 
Accident costs  Marginal costs for 
infrastructure use 
unclear. Average 









Low  Marginal cost meaningless if 
vehicle kilometres are not a 
good cost driver; average 
costs cannot be a meaningful 
proxy in this case  
Air pollution costs   Linear doses 
response function: 
marginal costs 






Low  Inconsistent – increasing 
marginal costs imply marginal 
costs above average costs and 
suggest that linear dose 
response functions are 
inappropriate 








Low  Broadly consistent, but CE 




Climate change  Marginal damage 
costs similar to 











Medium  Inconsistent, given that 
preferred approach is 
avoidance costs. 
Unclear why damage costs 
excluding major risks are of 
any relevance; if major risks 
included, highly unlikely that 
marginal and average costs 
correspond given that 
relationship between cause 
and effect is complex and 
potentially highly non linear 
Nature and 
landscape 
Marginal costs are 
significantly lower 
than average costs 
Very low 
marginal 
costs, but high 
fixed costs 
Low  Broadly consistent, but 
unclear why high fixed costs 
(potentially explained by other 
than choice of wrong cost 
driver) 
 
                                            
26  As  Varian  1992,  p  434,  notes,  with  a  convex  external  cost  function,  optimal 
behaviour can be achieved be imposing a tax that is equal to the marginal external 
cost  at  the  optimal  activity  level.  By  contrast,  with  a  non convex  external  cost 
function, a non linear tax schedule that sets the tax payable for each level of activity 
equal to the external cost caused by that activity will be required.  
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The lack of a coherent and consistent framework is particularly regrettable 
given that the cost figures estimated by various third parties and quoted in 
the  CE  study  differ  widely.  This  may  simply  indicate  genuine  uncertainty 
about the magnitude of external costs, but it may also reflect differences in 
the  methodology  used  in  these  studies.  In  the  latter  case,  it  would  be 
important  to  establish  whether  particular  cost  estimates  should  be  given 
more  or  less  weight  (depending  on  whether  the  methodology  used  for 
estimating  the  value  of  costs  is  well  or  badly  aligned  with the  underlying 
internalisation objectives), or whether some cost estimates should even be 
disregarded because they include or exclude specific effects.
27 It might even 
have  been  possible  to  narrow  down  the  range  of  estimates  by  examining 
whether  the  different  methodologies  used  in  these  studies  were  likely  to 
result  in  over   or  underestimations  relative  to  an  appropriate  reference 
methodology.  
However,  no  attempt  is  made  in  the  CE  study  to  explore  the  potential 
reasons for the differences in cost estimates. Without such an analysis, and 
in  particular  taking  into  account  the  enormous  variation  in  the  numbers 
presented, it seems entirely inappropriate, and potentially dangerous, to rely 
on  the  cost  estimates  presented  in  the  CE  study  as  a  basis  for 
internalisation.  
A few examples suffice to show the extreme variations and inconsistencies 
in the cost figures presented: 
•  On page 27, the CE study refers to two studies looking at total external 
cost  estimates,  namely  the  UIC  study,  and  the  UNITE  project.  The 
former obtains a figure for total external costs of transport (excluding 
congestion  costs  and  with  a  not  further  specified  “high”  scenario  for 
climate change costs) as € 650 billion for 2000. 30% of total costs are 
accounted for by climate change costs, 27% by air pollution, 24% by 
accidents, 7% for noise and up  and downstream process respectively, 
and 5% by costs for nature and landscape and additional urban effects 
respectively.  The  latter  estimates  total  external  accident  and 
environmental costs of € 120 billion. The corresponding figure from the 
UIC  study  covering  the  costs  of  climate  change,  air  pollution  and 
accidents amount to € 526.5 billion – more than four times the UNITE 
estimate. According to the CE study, the difference is due to “different 
methodologies  for  accident  and  air  pollution  costs  and  cautions 
valuation  of  external  costs”  (p  27).  Assuming  that  the  reference  to 
cautiously  valued  external  costs  actually  means  the  costs  of  climate 
change, and excluding these from the UIC figure, one still ends up with 
a figure of € 331.5 billion – more than two and a half times the UNITE 
estimate,  with  differences  presumably  being  entirely  explained  by 
“different  methodologies”  for  the  estimation  of  accident  and  air 
                                            
27 For example, the different (and inconsistent) estimates in the third party studies 
quoted could be the result of differences in underlying assumptions, or they could 
reflect differences in the definition of the cost measures that are being established. 
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pollution costs. Relying in any way on such different estimates without 
fully  understanding  what  drives  the  differences  would  seem  to  be 
wholly unacceptable. 
•  Matters  become  worse  when  one  considers  the  various  unit  cost 
estimates presented in the CE study for various transport modes and 
cost  categories.  Given  that  road  transport  allegedly  accounts  for  the 
large  majority  of  external  costs  (83.7%  of  those  external  costs 
measured in the UIC study, and 94% of the external costs measured in 
the UNITE study, according to the CE study, p 27), we focus on the unit 
cost estimates for the external costs of road transport (Table 7 in the 
CE study). Table 1 5 reproduces Table 7 of the CE study, but gives in 
addition the difference between the minimum and maximum values as 
a proportion of the lower value.
28 This shows the considerable variation 
– with the exception of the accident costs associated with passenger 
cars in urban traffic, the maximum unit cost figure is at least twice the 
minimum figure; in most cases, it is four or five times the minimum 
figure, and it can be up to 24 times the minimum figure. Given these 
significant variations, there seems to be little point in even considering 
adjustments  in  order  to  arrive  at  applicable  figures  for  particular 
countries, or in order to rebase cost estimates to a particular year (e.g. 
adjustments  that  would  be  made  to  cost  estimates  based  on  historic 
data in order to obtain cost figures in current terms). In the light of the 
massive uncertainty regarding the underlying cost estimates, any such 
adjustment  would  do  no  more  than  result  in  spurious  precision,  and 
does not add any more plausibility or reliability to the estimates. 
                                            
28 Note that Table 7 of the CE study distinguishes between petrol and diesel engines 
in relation to air pollution costs, but gives figures for the HGV segment in relation to 
petrol engines. Given that HGVs (heavy goods vehicles) tend to be powered by diesel 
engines, this is presumably a mistake and the figure given refers to diesel engines. 
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Table 1-5 : Unit costs (€ct/vehicle km) of road transport and difference 
between minimum and maximum value estimates, CE data 
Passenger car  HGV 
  Min  Max 
Proportion of 
lower value  Min  Max 
Proportion of 
lower value 
Urban  0.8  3.4  425%  7  31  443%  Noise 
Interurban  0  0  N/A  0.1  0.2  200% 
Urban  2  28  1400%  6  84  1400%  Congestion  
Interurban  0  15  N/A  0  7  N/A 
Urban  4.2  4.8  114%  3.2  11  344%  Accidents  
Interurban  0.3  7.2  2400%  0.3  2.8  933% 
Urban Petrol  0.1  0.3  300%  4.7  18  383% 
Urban Diesel  0.3  1.5  500%       
Interurban 
Petrol  0.1  0.4  400%  2.1  7.5  357% 
Air pollution  
Interurban 
Diesel  0.3  0.6  200%       
Urban  0.6  2.3  383%  2  7  350%  Climate change 
Interurban  0.3  1  333%  1.2  4.3  358% 
Urban   0  0  N/A  0  0  N/A  Nature & landscape 
Interurban  0  0.4  N/A  0  1.2  N/A 
Peak, urban  7.7  39  506%  23  150  652% 
Peak, 
interurban  3.1  38  1226%  10  103  1030% 
Off Peak, 
urban  5.7  26  456%  17  73  429% 
Total 
Off Peak, 
interurban  1.1  25  2273%  4.5  26  578% 
 
As an aside, it is difficult to see how, based on this Table, the CE study can 
claim that each and every of these cost categories is a “most important” cost 
category (which in itself is nonsensical) with regard to road transport (see 
Table  12  on  page  46).  The  above  table  would  suggest  that  the  most 
important cost categories are accidents and congestion.  
In any case, the numbers presented appear to be inconsistent with the total 
cost  figures  presented.  Based  on  the  unit  cost  figures,  it  is  possible  to 
calculate  the  proportion  of  external  costs  accounted  for  by  different 
categories  such  as  climate  change,  accidents  etc.,  and  to  compare  these 
proportions with those given for the total cost estimates. Given that road 
transport  accounts  for  the  large  majority  of  external  costs,  it  should  be 
possible to find a similar distribution of cost across the different categories. 
However, this is not the case, as Table 1 6 shows. It gives the total unit cost 
for the two vehicle types and the two transport settings, using minimum and 
maximum cost figures from Table 7 of the CE study, excluding congestion 
costs,  and  the  corresponding  shares  of  these  totals  accounted  for  by  the 
different cost categories. There does not seem to be any traffic pattern (split 
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between passenger cars and HGVs and urban and interurban traffic) capable 
of  producing  the  distribution  of  costs  in  the  UIC  study,  which,  excluding 
costs for up  and downstream processes, are as follows:  
•  climate change: 32% 
•  air pollution: 29% 
•  accidents: 26% 
•  noise: 8% 
•  nature and landscape: 5% 
Table 1-6 Proportion of external costs in different categories as implied by 
the unit cost figures for road transport 
Passenger car  HGV 
Urban  Interurban  Urban  Interurban 
  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max 
Total costs, excluding 
congestion  5.8  11.4  0.8  9.1  16.9  67  2.65  12.25 
Share of these accounted for by: 
Climate change  10%  20%  38%  11%  12%  10%  45%  35% 
Air pollution  3%  8%  25%  5%  28%  27%  79%  61% 
Accidents  72%  42%  38%  79%  19%  16%  11%  23% 
Noise  14%  30%  0%  0%  41%  46%  4%  2% 
Nature and landscape  0%  0%  0%  4%  0%  0%  0%  10% 
Notes: calculations based on the numbers given in Table 7 of the CE study; air 
pollution costs for urban/interurban traffic settings for passenger cars are assumed 
to be the unweighted average of the corresponding cost figures for petrol and diesel 
cars 
Taken together, these findings suggest that little reliance can be placed on 
the cost figures presented in the CE study as a basis for internalisation. No 
attempt  is  made  to  investigate  potential  reasons  for  the  substantial 
differences  and  to  potentially  narrow  down  the  range  by  examining 
differences in the underlying methodologies   and, as we discuss below, no 
implications are drawn from the fact that the large variations might indicate 
substantial  uncertainty  about  the  absolute  and  relative  magnitude  of 
external costs. 
1.4  The CE study lacks a coherent framework for internalisation 
Even if one were to ignore the concerns about the notion of external costs 
on which the CE study is based, and to accept the cost estimates presented 
in the study at face value, the CE study would fail to provide any reliable 
guidance with regard to the choice of potential internalisation scenarios, let 
alone help in relation to the assessment of their relative costs and benefits 
(which  we  understand  to  be  a  crucial  part  of  the  final  report).  This  is 
because  a  proper  analysis  of  potential  policies  has  to  be  based  on  an 
understanding  of  what  ought  to  be  achieved,  what  tools  are  available  to 
44 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2008,  Paper 1
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2008/iss1/art1From the polluter pays to the cheapest cost avoider principle  
  30 
achieve the objective, how these tools can be expected to perform, and how 
they  interact  with  other  policies.  However,  the  CE  study  does  not  put 
forward  a  consistent  set  of  criteria  against  which  one  could  judge  the 
relative  merits  of  different  internalisation  options.  It  seems  to  be  unclear 
about the effects of various instruments, does not seem to take into account 
the problems that arise from the fact that any practical internalisation policy 
will face substantial limitations, and – as briefly discussed above – does not 
properly consider the interplay between internalisation policies and existing 
charging schemes.  
Before  proceeding  to  set  out  the  critique  with  regard  to  these  aspects  in 
more detail, it is however helpful to provide a brief definition of what we 
mean by “internalisation”, not least because no attempt to provide such a 
definition is made in the CE study.  
1.4.1  What is internalisation? 
In  very  general  terms,  internalisation  can  be  regarded  as  an  intervention 
that leads to the decision maker facing the full social costs of his actions. 
This means that costs that would otherwise be “external” are now taken into 
account by the decision maker and affect his behaviour. In an ideal setting, 
internalisation restores the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria. Pareto 
optimality  requires  that  no  actor  can  be  made  better  off  without  making 
someone else worse off. This implies that there is no waste of resources. 
There are many different ways in which internalisation can be achieved, but 
normally  internalisation  refers  to  interventions  that  rely  on  the  price 
mechanism.  Pigovian  taxes  are  one  particular  form  of  internalisation,  and 
the following simple diagram is helpful in terms of illustrating a number of 
important points. 
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Figure 1-1 Internalisation through a tax - a simple 
example
 
Figure 1 1 depicts a situation in which the consumption of a particular good 
has an impact on the utility or production options of other economic agents. 
The downward sloping line depicts demand for the good, and the horizontal 
line at p reflects the (perfectly elastic) supply, i.e. the price at which any 
particular amount of that good can be made available. As consumers have to 
pay this price for any unit they consume, p also reflects the marginal private 
cost of increasing consumption. The dashed upward sloping line shows the 
marginal external cost associated with particular levels of consumption, and 
the  continued  upward  sloping  line  (which  is  obtained  by  adding  up  the 
external  cost  and  the  price)  reflects  marginal  social  cost.  Ignoring  the 
external costs associated with their decisions, consumers would demand an 
amount q’, where willingness to pay equals price. By contrast, the socially 
optimal consumption level would be given by q*, where marginal social cost 
equals willingness to pay. This is because for any increase above q*, the 
additional social cost,  given by the  sum  of  marginal private and marginal 
external costs, exceeds the marginal social benefit, given by the willingness 
to pay for the additional unit as represented by the demand curve. The fact 
that consumption causes an external effect results in over consumption by 
an  amount  equal  to  q’ q*.  The  welfare  loss  associated  with  this  over 
consumption is represented by the shaded triangle, indicating the difference 
between marginal social cost and marginal social value for all units between 
q* and q’. By levying a tax of t – which corresponds to the level of marginal 
external costs at the optimum q*   consumers can be made to choose the 
socially optimal consumption level q*. 
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This  simple  example  allows  us  to  highlight  a  number  of  insights  that  are 
relevant for the assessment of internalisation scenarios, but that are not at 
all discussed in the CE study: 
•  First, optimality does not imply complete avoidance of external costs, 
but is defined with reference to the marginal social cost being equal to 
marginal  valuation.  The  tax  on  consumption  at  the  optimum 
consumption level q* is equal to marginal external costs at that level of 
consumption,  and  drives  a  wedge  between  the  price  paid  by  the 
consumer (p + t) and the price received by the supplier (p). 
•  Second, the welfare loss associated with over consumption is smaller 
than the external costs resulting from this over consumption, which in 
the above example are represented by the area between the solid line 
and the price from q* to q’. 
•  Third,  marginal  external  costs  are  equal  to  marginal  avoidance  costs 
only  at  the  optimum,  but  not  elsewhere.  In  the  above  example, 
avoidance  costs  are  reflected  by  the  loss  in  consumer  surplus  that 
would be associated with a reduction in the activity causing the external 
effect, i.e. the level of consumption. This is measured by the difference 
between the demand curve and price at any given consumption level 
(and thus increases as consumption is reduced further and further). In 
any case, it is inappropriate to use avoidance costs as a proxy for the 
external cost (as the CE study does for the cost of climate change
29) 
without considering whether it is likely to be optimal to incur the cost of 
avoiding emissions, how much avoidance should be undertaken in the 
optimum, and by whom. 
•  Fourth, optimality requires that consumers face the marginal external 
costs of their behaviour at the margin. Any non decreasing tax schedule 
that yields a tax rate of t at q* will induce optimal behaviour. This also 
implies that optimality does not necessarily require that those “causing” 
the externality exactly bear the total social costs associated with their 
behaviour. In the above example, the total tax burden at the optimum 
(which is given by t  q*) exceeds the total external costs associated 
                                            
29 See pages 8, 9 (table 2) and 19 of the CE study. It is worth noting that the CE 
study further appears to confuse avoidance costs with shadow prices, stating that 
“[a]n alternative approach which avoids the uncertainties associated with assessing 
damage costs of climate control is to assess the costs of avoiding CO2 emissions. 
These are often referred to as avoidance costs or mitigation costs, and are expressed 
as so called shadow values” (p 19). However, shadow prices generally refer to the 
amount by which an objective function (e.g. social welfare) changes if a constraint 
(e.g.  the  amount  of  CO2  that  firms  are  allowed  to  emit)  is  changed.  Thus,  the 
shadow price of CO2 emissions would correctly be measured as the welfare impact of 
allowing  an  increase  in  emission  volumes  from  a  particular  level.  Requiring  the 
shadow price of CO2 emissions to equal the cost of reducing emissions is a condition 
that needs to hold at the optimal emission level rather than in general, and thus 
considering avoidance costs and shadow prices to be the same would seem to be a 
clear methodological flaw. 
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with this level of consumption (which is given by the area between the 
thick  line  and  the  price,  from  0  to  q*).  Indeed,  optimality  does  not 
require that those who cause the externality make any payment at all. 
For example, rather than taxing consumption, internalisation might be 
achieved by subsidising non consumption, i.e. by paying consumers for 
reducing their consumption levels. 
•  Fifth,  although  one  might  refer  to  any  intervention  that  is  aimed  at 
achieving a consumption level of q* as internalisation, it is worthwhile 
to distinguish the effects of price and non price mechanisms. Consider, 
for  example,  an  intervention  that  limits  the  amount  each  individual 
consumer is allowed to consume so that the aggregate level is q*. This 
is  not  guaranteed  to  lead  to  q*,  however,  because  some  consumers 
may not wish to exhaust their allowance at the prevailing price. Even if 
all consumers wanted to consume up to their limit, the overall outcome 
may  not  be  welfare  maximising,  because  there  is  no  guarantee  that 
total consumption is shared out amongst those that value it most. Put 
differently,  consumers  may  differ  with  regard  to  their  marginal 
valuation  at  their  individual  limits,  which  would  be  reflected  in  gains 
from  trade.  Unless  consumers  are  allowed  to  trade  allowances, 
however, these gains from trade would remain unexploited.
30 
1.4.2  The objectives of internalisation in the CE study are unclear 
As the CE study notes, in order to discuss the relative benefits of different 
policy proposals for internalisation of external effects, it is necessary to be 
clear about the underlying policy objectives. However, clarity about policy 
objectives  cannot  be  obtained  by  listing  the  different  motives  for 
internalisation,  and  then  –  as  the  CE  study  does  –  suggesting  that  in 
practice the objective underlying internalisation may be a bit of everything, 
and  that  in  practice  “implementation  of  pricing  policies  will  generally 
contribute  to  more  than  one  potential  aim”(p  36).  This  is  because  the 
potential  objectives  may  not  only  be  poorly  aligned,  but  may  actually  be 
conflicting. 
This  is  obvious  when  one  considers  the  first  and  second  of  the  three 
potential motives for internalisation put forward in the CE study, namely the 
aim to influence behaviour in order to reduce environmental impacts and to 
allow a freer flow of traffic, and the aim of generating revenues. Obviously, 
the more successful an internalisation scenario is in terms of affecting the 
                                            
30  Handing  out  tradable  consumption  permits  allowing  consumption  of  q*  in  total 
would lead to a market price equal to t. It is worth noting that this would also be the 
price for ‘consumption rights’ if those who are affected by the consumption decision 
were given the alienable right to be free from external effects and those wishing to 
consume the good had to obtain the right to do so, or the compensation for avoiding 
consumption if consumers were given the right to ‘cause’ external effects, and agree 
not to exercise this right in exchange for compensation, provided that there are no 
transaction costs (and income effects). For a comparison of different internalisation 
mechanisms see Varian 1992, Chapter 24, or Laffont 1987. 
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behaviour of those who are faced with a particular charge or tax, the less 
revenue one can expect to be generated from such charges. Or, conversely, 
the more likely a particular charge is to generate revenues because those 
who will have to pay it have little or no alternative, the smaller the impact of 
such a charge will be on behaviour. Such charges can either raise revenue or 
the price of undesirable behaviour, but not both.  
Some  of  the  conceivable  aims  have  potentially  conflicting  definitions.  For 
example, increasing fairness in the sense of “making the polluter pay” may 
conflict with ensuring a fairer income distribution. This is because who pays 
the internalisation charge (or Pigou tax) in the first instance tells us little or 
nothing about who will ultimately foot the bill: tax incidence is quite different 
from  tax  collection.  For  example,  an  internalisation  charge  increasing  the 
cost of road transport may ultimately be reflected in higher grocery prices, 
which would disproportionately be paid by consumers on lower incomes who 
spend a greater proportion of their income on groceries. This suggests that 
the  “fairness”  objective  put  forward  in  the  CE  study  is  at  the  very  least 
ambiguous, and there are indeed a number of notions of fairness which can 
lead  to  different  conclusions  with  regard  to  the  costs  and  benefits  of 
particular internalisation scenarios.  
More worryingly than ignoring the potential conflicts amongst the objectives 
of internalisation put forward in the CE study, however, is that there does 
not  seem  to  be  an  explicit  reference  to  the  one  overarching  objective 
commonly  associated  with  the  internalisation  of  externalities,  namely  to 
remove  inefficiencies  and  increase  welfare.  Although  efficiency  shines 
through in some places (and the CE study claims to take the objective of a 
“more efficient economy” as the “primary aim of internalisation”, p 37), it is 
not included in the list of potential aims of internalisation. The “influencing 
behaviour” motive can be read as a proxy
31 – but if it were meant to refer to 
economic efficiency, it would have to acknowledge that it cannot be an aim 
in  itself  to  reduce  environmental  impacts  or  allow  a  freer  flow  of  traffic, 
because the welfare impact of doing so also depends on the associated cost. 
As  the  discussion  of  externalities  as  a  reciprocal  problem  above  has 
highlighted, any reduction in environmental impacts comes at a cost, and a 
freer flow of traffic implies that some users are being priced off and thus 
face  the  cost  of  having  to  look  for  alternatives.  Ignoring  these  costs  will 
inevitably lead to recommendations that fail to maximise welfare (and may 
even lead to welfare losses compared with the status quo). There is little in 
the  CE  study  to  suggest  that  such  costs  would  be  properly  taken  into 
account.  
Starting from the notion of economic efficiency would clearly have helped in 
the  identification  of  potential  conflicts  in  objectives,  and  would  certainly 
have  highlighted  the  cost  of  pursuing  certain  objectives  which  are 
                                            
31  As  stated  in  the  CE  study,  the  primary  objective  of  achieving  efficiency  is 
“particularly  related  to  influencing  behaviour  by  providing  optimal  incentives  (…) 
[although] other motives may be politically relevant and will be taken into account, 
but less central” (p 37). 
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incompatible with economic efficiency. It would have shown, for  example, 
that  raising  revenues  is  often  incompatible  with  achieving  efficiency, 
because  it  would  be  best  achieved  by  charging  those  who  have  little 
flexibility rather than those who can easily avoid the activity on which the 
tax has to be paid. This is likely to lead to a situation in which less external 
harm  is  avoided  at  a  much  higher  cost  than  would  be  the  case  if 
internalisation had been aimed at efficiency without any consideration of tax 
revenues  –  and  in  which  therefore  welfare  is  lower than  it  could  be,  and 
potentially lower than in the absence of intervention.  
It would also have become clear that there is a notion of fairness that is 
perfectly  aligned  with  the  notion  of  economic  efficiency,  namely  the 
objective  of  avoiding  competitive  distortions  between  different  modes  of 
transport.
32  Any  such  distortion  can  be  expected  to  result  in  inefficient 
outcomes, and thus reduce overall welfare. This notion of fairness – which 
appears to be the one underpinning Directive 2006/38   would a priori rule 
out  internalisation  schemes  that  disadvantage  some  transport  modes  and 
favour others, or internalisation schemes that limit flexibility in terms of how 
particular reductions in environmental impacts are achieved. By contrast, an 
alternative  notion  of  fairness,  namely  the  notion  of  corrective  justice,  is 
potentially conflicting with efficiency. If internalisation were aimed at making 
those  who  “cause”  harm  pay  for  the  damage  suffered  by  those  suffering 
from pollution, it might seem natural to use revenues from internalisation 
charges to compensate the pollution victims.
33 This might seriously distort 
the incentives of those receiving compensation, who would not obtain any 
benefit from trying to mitigate their losses. 
In  summary,  the  CE  study  fails  to  put  forward  a  clear  objective  for 
internalisation  which  would  allow  one  to  assess  different  internalisation 
proposals, to recognise potentially conflicting objectives and to establish the 
welfare losses that would be associated with the pursuit of such objectives. 
1.4.3  The CE study does not provide a comparative assessment of 
internalisation tools 
The  CE  study  also  appears  to  be  unclear  about  the  potential  instruments 
that  are  available  for  the  internalisation  of  external  effects.  It  states  that 
“[i]n  general,  internalisation  relates  to  market  based  instruments,  and 
pricing instruments in specific [sic]” (p 37), but the internalisation scenarios 
specified include a mix of instruments (including, for example, a tightening 
and extension of Euro standards), and there seem to be clear preferences 
for  alternative  tools,  e.g.  in  relation  to  noise  (which  “may  be  better 
addressed by regulation and standards”, p 56).  
                                            
32 For a discussion of the concepts of fairness and efficiency, see section 2.6.4. 
33 Note that if revenues from internalisation charges were used to fund additional 
infrastructure investment, this might have the perverse effect of increasing the level 
of activity that is regarded as responsible for the external effect in the first place, 
and which would thus increase the harm suffered. 
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What is missing is a comprehensive list of instruments that can be used, and 
a  comparison  of  these  different  instruments  with  regard  to  their 
effectiveness  and  their  error  tolerance  (which  is  of  particular  importance 
given the substantial uncertainty about external costs implied by the vastly 
differing estimates collated in the CE study). For example, there seems to be 
a basic choice between imposing a carbon tax and putting in place a carbon 
emission  trading  scheme.  Both  of  these  systems  are  likely  to  differ  with 
regard to their setup and operating costs and the ease with which they can 
be  extended.  The informational requirements  are likely to be different: in 
order  to  set  the  correct  level  of  a  carbon  tax,  it  is  necessary  to  have 
relatively good information about abatement costs and the damage caused 
by greenhouse gas emissions. By contrast, a carbon trading scheme requires 
one to take a view over the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions that 
is sustainable. Both schemes differ with regard to the uncertainty faced by 
polluters – where tax rates may not change frequently, the price of emission 
permits can fluctuate considerably in the short run.  
All of these factors need to be considered and analysed in order to make 
recommendations about appropriate internalisation scenarios. The CE study 
appears to be largely devoid of any such consideration, and merely notes 
that different instruments “differ to the extent that they allow consumers to 
make  their  own  decisions,  and  to  the  extent  that  the  results  can  be 
predicted  beforehand.  They  also  differ  to  the  extent  that  they  may  be 
related  to  particular  government  motives  and  aims.  For  example, 
communication  &  information  may  influence  consumer  behaviour,  but 
cannot be related to generating revenue” (p 37).  
In  addition,  the  CE  study  appears  to  be  confused  about  the  nature  of 
particular instruments. For example, emission trading is listed as one of the 
most relevant other instruments in Table 13 of the CE study, even though it 
is  clearly  a  market based  instrument  relying  on  the  pricing  mechanism. 
Similarly,  auctioning  of  airport  slots  is  listed  in  the  category  of  other 
instruments,  together  with  speed  limits,  emission  standards,  zoning  and 
other typical regulatory instruments, even though the former is clearly an 
intervention based on price signals. It is also worth noting that even though 
these  other  instruments  figure  prominently  in  the  various  scenarios 
developed  in  the  CE  study,  they  are  not  the  subject  of  any  detailed 
investigation. 
Last  but  not  least,  there  seems  to  be  some  general  confusion  in  the  CE 
study  about  who  would  pay  internalisation  charges  –  sometimes  it  is 
transport  users,  sometimes  operators.  Given  that  the  effects  of 
internalisation charges may be very different, the apparent lack of detailed 
analysis  of  these  effects  should  be  of  concern.  For  example,  in  order  to 
affect end user demand, internalisation charges will have to be reflected in 
end user  prices.  This  might  be  problematic  if  end  user  charges  are 
differentiated by vehicle kilometres, for example, and internalisation charges 
are  levied  on  the  basis  of  some  other,  more  appropriate  variable  and 
payable by transport operators. Even if the additional costs are fully passed 
through to transport users in the form of higher per kilometre charges, the 
impact of demand may be different from the impact that has been assumed 
when setting the internalisation charges. These imperfections and frictions 
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can have a substantial impact on the effectiveness of various instruments, 
and would need to be considered. 
1.4.4  Second best issues, implementation costs and regulatory failure 
The CE study notes that marginal cost pricing methodologies might not be 
“appropriate  because  they  are  only  optimal  under  certain  theoretical 
assumptions that are not satisfied in practice”, namely that “marginal social 
cost  pricing  is  applied  through  the  whole  network  considered,  the  whole 
transport sector and even throughout the economy” and that “governments 
use lump sum taxes to pursue any redistribution targets they may wish to 
meet” (p 39). In economic terms, this means that marginal cost pricing will 
only maximise welfare if the presence of the externality which it is meant to 
internalise is the only deviation from the textbook model of a competitive 
equilibrium. Where there are other market imperfections (such as distortive 
taxes,  information  asymmetries,  or  market  power),  there  is  no  guarantee 
that marginal cost pricing will increase social welfare.  
While this insight is correct, the CE study fails to identify the implications for 
the assessment of different policy options. What form (and what level) of 
intervention  to  address  externalities  would  be  appropriate  in  a  so called 
“second best” world (where some of the optimality conditions that define the 
“first best” competitive equilibrium in which social welfare is maximised are 
violated)  is  far  from  clear,  and  would  require  detailed  analysis,  which 
appears to be completely lacking from the CE study.  
For  example,  one  of  the  concerns  raised  in  the  CE  study  with  regard  to 
marginal  cost  pricing  schemes  –  namely  that  revenues  might  not  be 
sufficient to cover infrastructure costs – is a typical problem analysed in a 
second best framework: if it is not possible to use two part tariffs to cover 
total  costs,  the  appropriate  solution  would  be  to  charge  mark ups  over 
marginal  cost  that  are  inversely  related  to  price  elasticities  in  order  to 
minimise the welfare losses associated with a deviation from the first best 
solution.
34 The CE study, by contrast, argues that “one might want to use 
the  revenues  of  external  cost  pricing  of  one  mode  to  cover  the  fixed 
infrastructure  costs  of  other  modes”  (p  40),  without  providing  any 
justification  as  to  why  this  might  be  better  than  two  part  tariffs  or  some 
average  cost  pricing,  and  indeed  without  even  mentioning  these 
alternatives.  
More generally, the CE study seems to mix reasons for why it might not be 
desirable to use marginal cost pricing and reasons for why it might not be 
possible to do so, and to conclude – without much, if any analysis – that the 
two potential problems with marginal cost pricing are of a similar nature and 
may even cancel each other out. At the risk of oversimplification, the view 
                                            
34 This principle is known as Ramsey Boiteaux pricing; where the pricing principle is 
applied to more than one product or activity, the relevant elasticities have to take 
into account substitutabiltiy or complementarity, i.e. one has to use the appropriate 
super elasticities.  
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underpinning the CE study appears to be that it does not matter that much 
that we cannot practically apply marginal cost pricing because it might not 
be optimal to do so anyway.  
The CE study claims that, owing to the limited scope of a pricing scheme, 
pricing measures “could lead to much less positive welfare effects” (p 39), 
but does not seem to consider the possibility that intervention could actually 
lead to welfare losses relative to not intervening at all. Given concerns about 
second best  issues  and  the  practical  limitations  to  internalisation 
mechanisms, however, such an outcome is not inconceivable. Unlike in the 
world of textbook models, in the real world it is not sufficient to diagnose a 
problem  such  as  the  presence  of  external  effects  in  order  to  justify 
intervention. The case for intervention also needs to consider that available 
instruments  may  not  work  perfectly,  that  there  is  substantial  uncertainty 
and  that  there  are  implementation  costs  of  intervention,  which  taken 
together may mean that intervention makes matters worse. 
 The discussion of “Options for incentive base” (p 46 ff) certainly does not 
include any systematic assessment of the impact that the different options 
can be expected to have on the likely benefits that would be created if they 
were implemented. 
The  CE  study  is  equally  naive  about  the  implications  of  system 
requirements. It does note that marginal cost pricing would require charges 
to be differentiated according to cost drivers, which is unlikely to be feasible 
in practice, where “a limited number of easy measurable parameters as a 
proxy  of  cost  drivers”  (p  40)  have  to  be  used.  It  does,  however,  fail  to 
assess to what extent the use of such proxies may lead to inefficiencies, in 
particular given the considerable uncertainty about external cost functions 
and levels (as reflected in the wide range of estimates presented in the CE 
study),  and  simply  assumes  that  welfare  gains  can  be  achieved  by  using 
internalisation measures that are “built on good proxies for cost drivers” and 
are “[n]ot too complex so as to limit implementation and transaction costs.”  
There is no detailed analysis of implementation costs. The discussion of the 
potential  need  for  a  toll  system  for  passenger  cars,  for  example,  simply 
notes  that  “it  may  not  be  worthwhile  to  introduce  sophisticated  (and 
relatively expensive) systems for kilometre charging that apply to the whole 
network for the purpose of reducing external effects” (p 61). Given that road 
transport is assumed to account for the large majority of external costs, and 
that  passenger  cars  are  responsible  for  a  substantial  proportion  of  the 
external  costs  of  road  transport
35,  it  is  entirely  unclear  how  such  a 
conclusion  can  have  been  reached  without  a  detailed  assessment  of  the 
relative  performance  of  such  a  comprehensive  toll  system  compared  with 
other internalisation proposals, including the cost of the different solutions. 
                                            
35 According to the CE study, two thirds of the external cost of road transport are 
caused  by  passenger  transport  (p  27),  the  majority  of  which  is  presumably 
accounted for by individual car use. 
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Overall, the CE study appears to be infused with the belief that intervention 
can only lead to welfare gains, which may admittedly be larger or smaller 
depending  on  how  internalisation  takes  place,  but  that  intervention  will 
never lead to welfare losses. This is an inappropriate starting point for the 
analysis  of  policy  options  based  on  an  assessment  of  costs  and  benefits, 
which has to consider the possibility that intervention could actually lead to 
welfare losses. It should by now be well understood that, in order to justify 
policy intervention, it is not sufficient to diagnose market failure, but that 
one  also  has  to  demonstrate  that  the  risk  of  regulatory  failure  (or  non 
market failure) is sufficiently small to make sure that the cure is not worse 
than the disease.
36 
As  the  brief  description  of  internalisation  provided  above  has  shown,  if 
internalisation is to be based on anything other than a tax schedule which 
sets  taxes  equal  to  marginal  external  cost  at  every  possible  activity  or 
consumption  level  (i.e.  a  tax  schedule  that  exactly  tracks  the  marginal 
external cost function
37) it is necessary to know the value of external costs 
at  the  optimal  activity  level  (i.e.  the  marginal  external  cost  at  q*).  If 
internalisation  were  based  on  setting  a  constant  tax  rate,  for  example, 
choosing the wrong rate may not only lead to welfare gains that are lower 
than those that could be achieved through the correct tax rate (namely if 
the tax rate is set too low), but can actually lead to welfare losses (namely if 
the  tax  rate  is  set  too  high,  and  thus  too  much  of  the  activity  causing 
external harm is priced off). There is nothing in the CE study to suggest that 
this consideration has been taken into account, even though the CE study 
acknowledges  that  external  cost  measures  are  imperfect  and  subject  to 
substantial uncertainty. Attempts to internalise external effects on the basis 
of some arbitrarily defined unit cost figure may do more harm than good – 
and proposals to internalise on the basis of cost figures that are not only 
unrelated to any consideration of optimality, but also vary by a wide margin, 
seem positively dangerous. 
The  failure  of  the  CE  study  to  take  into  account  the  potential  welfare 
losses  that  could  arise  from  intervention  as  a  result  of  uncertainty  about 
the  underlying  external  costs,  the  fact  that  it  is  costly  to  avoid  external 
effects (which is at the heart of the cheapest cost avoider principle), and 
the  implementation  cost  of  any  intervention  is  particularly  surprising  as 
the need for regulatory impact assessments and a careful weighing of costs 
and  benefits  is  an  explicit  principle  of  Commission  policy.  The 
Commission's White Paper on European Governance of 2001 stresses that 
policy proposals “must be prepared on the basis of an effective analysis of 
whether  it is  appropriate  to  intervene  at  EU  level and  whether  regulatory 
intervention  is  needed.  If  so,  the  analysis  must  also  assess  the  potential 
                                            
36 For an early, but comprehensive discussion of non market failure, see Breyer 1979 
and Wolf 1979. 
37  Even  a  tax  that  exactly  tracks  the  marginal  external  cost  function  may  not  be 
sufficient to ensure optimal behaviour if the external cost function is not convex (see 
Varian, 1992, chapter 24). 
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economic,  social  and  environmental  impact.”
38  The  Commission's  Impact 
Assessment  Guidelines  of  June  2005  stress  that  a  full  assessment  of  the 
impact  of  proposed  policies  demonstrates  the  “Commission’s  openness  to 
input from a wide range of external stakeholders, and shows its commitment 
to transparency. Further, by providing a careful and comprehensive analysis 
of  likely  social,  economic  and  environmental  impacts,  both  direct  and 
indirect,  it  also  contributes  to  meeting  the  specific  commitments  of  the 
Lisbon and Sustainable Development Strategies”
39, and acknowledge the risk 
of  regulatory  failure,  including  examples  of  environmental  regulation  or 
intervention  that  is  capable  of  distorting  competition.  The  Guidelines  also 
explicitly  refer  to  “compliance  costs”  as  one  important  category  in  the 
assessment of non expenditure measures. Consideration of such compliance 
costs  would  directly  lead  to  the  recognition  of  the  costs  incurred  by  the 
polluter, and would suggest that it is important to balance avoidance costs 
and benefits   or, in different terms, an acknowledgement that intervention 
should be based on the cheapest cost avoider principle. Given that the need 
for  a  careful  assessment  of  costs  and  benefits  associated  with  any  policy 
intervention is a well established principle of community policy, it is difficult 
to understand why the CE study fails to undertake such an assessment. 
1.4.5  Interrelation with other policy instruments 
The CE study includes a discussion of how existing charges and taxes should 
be  treated  in  relation  to  proposed  internalisation  methods  (albeit  in  an 
unsystematic manner), and how revenues raised by internalisation charges 
could  be  used,  but  it  does  not  provide  a  systematic  and  comprehensive 
analysis of the interrelation between potential internalisation measures and 
other  policy  instruments.  In  particular,  the  CE  study  considers  whether 
existing  charges  already  imply  some  internalisation
40,  how  they  might  be 
differentiated, and whether some of them should be reduced in response to 
the introduction of new charges, but it does not consider that there may be 
other  policy  instruments  in  place  that  are  aimed  at  internalisation,  which 
should therefore be taken into consideration, or that existing charges may 
be the cause of distortions. 
                                            
38 COM 2001, 428. 
39 European Commission 2005. 
40 It is worth noting that the way in which existing charges are treated is haphazard 
and not supported by analysis. For example, the CE study simply assumes that “if 
the revenues of fuel excise duties of a mode exceed the variable infrastructure costs 
of  that  mode  (…)  the  external  climate  costs  are  (partly)  internalised  by  the  fuel 
excise duties. To make this more transparent, we label this part of fuel excises duties 
in the scenarios as CO2 taxes” (p 52). There is no justification for this assumption. 
There is no explanation as to why any difference between total revenues and total 
costs should be considered to give rise to partial internalisation, nor why it should be 
the internalisation of external climate costs rather than other external costs. There is 
also no explanation why infrastructure costs should be covered by revenues from fuel 
duties in the first place, given that the amount of fuel consumed is not a good proxy 
for the drivers of variable infrastructure costs, and there is no consideration of the 
fact that infrastructure costs may be covered by other charges. 
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•  An  example  for  the  first  category  are  policies  to  subsidise  public 
transport,  which  could  potentially  be  aimed  at  internalisation  by 
increasing the opportunity cost of using cars
41   although such subsidies 
may also have the effect of making transport too cheap overall. 
•  An  example  for  the  second  category  are  specific  tax  differentiations, 
such as for example the exemption of jet fuel from excise duties. This 
makes  air  travel  too  cheap  relative  to  other  forms  of  transport, 
distorting  not  only  competition  between  the  modes  of  transport,  but 
potentially also increasing the total amount of emissions. 
Recognising this interrelationship with existing policies is important for two 
reasons: 
•  First,  the  option  of  changing  existing  policies  should  be  considered 
alongside  potential  internalisation  scenarios,  in  particular  where 
existing  policies  are  responsible  for  distortions  of  incentives  and  the 
potential source of externalities. Removing the cause of distortions is 
likely to be a better option than treating the symptoms, but should in 
any case be considered alongside potential additional intervention. 
•  Second,  internalisation  measures  may  conflict  with  existing  policies. 
Where such conflicts arise, internalisation will have costs that have to 
be  considered  when  assessing  different  policy  options.  For  example, 
where  certain  forms  of  transport  are  subsidised  for  particular  public 
policy reasons (e.g. public transport in rural areas may be subsidised as 
part  of  regional  policy),  internalisation  that  increases  the  cost  of 
transport  will  counteract  or  undo  the  effects  of  such  subsidies  and 
jeopardise the achievement of these policy objectives.
42 
These  effects  would  have  to  be  taken  into  account  in  order  to  properly 
identify the most appropriate internalisation scenario. They do not seem to 
have been considered in the CE study. 
Last but not least, the CE study does not discuss the potential impact that 
the  use  of  revenues  from  internalisation  charges  will  have  on  behaviour. 
Although the CE study purports to consider the efficiency effects associated 
with using such revenues, this consideration is limited to a few remarks on 
whether, and in what way, transport projects might be funded. It does not 
consider,  however,  what  effect  the  use  of  revenues  might  have  on  the 
incentives of transport users, nor whether the use of revenues for transport 
investments might not actually increase the level of external effects. There 
would seem to be no reason to expect that spending income from charges 
                                            
41 As noted above, internalisation can be achieved in many ways, with taxes being 
only one possible solution, and subsidies being another one.  
42 Of course, one response might be to increase the level of subsidies in order to 
maintain the regional policy objective. However, in this case there would be no price 
impact for end users, and thus no impact on behaviour. The only effect would be that 
the amount made available for subsidisation would have to increase, which might 
imply further efficiency losses if as a result distortive taxes were to increase. 
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aimed at internalising climate change costs on additional infrastructure, for 
example, would improve welfare rather than reduce it – and equally there is 
no  reason  to  expect  that  limiting  such  investment  to  money  raised  from 
internalisation charges would be meaningful.  
In summary, the CE study would not appear to be a sound and reliable basis 
for the evaluation of potential internalisation scenarios and policy options. 
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2  The polluter pays vs. the cheapest cost avoider principle  
2.1  Introduction 
The previous section shows that the CE study is in many respects flawed. Its 
fundamental weakness is however its failure to consider the cheapest cost 
avoider principle. Instead, it adopts a “polluter pays” approach. Using the 
example  of  road  transport,  this  part  of  the  study  provides  a  theoretical 
analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the “polluter pays” and 
the “cheapest cost avoider” principles. 
Road  transport  causes  many  types  of  external  costs:  environmental 
pollution,  road  accidents,  noise  and  congestion.  It  is  generally  held  that 
these negative externalities give rise to a misallocation of resources which 
requires corrective measures from the government. The polluter pays and 
the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principles  prescribe  alternative  ways  for 
governments to react to this problem. 
According to the polluter pays principle the polluter (i.e. the generator of the 
externality)  should  pay  the  bill  of  the  external  costs  he  produces.  The 
government should impose a so called “Pigovian tax” on the polluter in order 
to  provide  the  necessary  incentives  for  the  latter  to  internalise  the 
externality.  Alternatively,  in  order  to  prevent  damage  from  occurring,  the 
government can follow a command and control approach and restrict activity 
levels (e.g. through speed limits, or prohibiting certain types of vehicles at 
specific  times),  or  prescribe  the  installation  of  avoidance  and  abatement 
devices or alterations in the mode of operation. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  requires  that  the 
party  which  can  prevent  the  damage  at  the  lowest  cost  take  action
43. 
According to this principle, if there are any preventive measures which cost 
less than the benefit of the damage that they avoid, then they should be 
undertaken, whether by the polluter or by the pollutee, and on the condition 
that  they  are  the  least  costly  means  available  to  accomplish  such  a 
reduction.  Means to  reach this end can be financial charges, taxes, fines, 
liability  or  even  command  and  control  measures,  such  as  regulated 
standards or zoning.  
As  will  be  outlined  in  detail  below,  the  underlying  economic  logic  of  the 
polluter pays principle, i.e. the Pigovian way of economic thinking, turns out 
to  be  fallacious.  As  demonstrated  by  Ronald  Coase  in  his  1960  seminal 
article, the mere existence of externalities does not, of itself, provide any 
reason  for  governments  to  induce  polluters  to  take  action,  because  the 
polluters  might  well  be  the  highest  cost  avoiders.  Thus  the  full 
internalisation of external costs is not always socially useful in that it does 
not  necessarily  maximise  social  welfare.  There  exist  other  institutional 
                                            
43 See Calabresi and Hirschoff 1972, p 1060 f.; Demsetz 1972, p 28. 
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solutions to which society can resort, for example a laissez faire policy or 
business as usual (BAU). 
Moreover, the polluter pays principle does not take into account the fact that 
externalities  are  caused  jointly,  and  that  the  externality  problem  is  of  a 
reciprocal nature: to avoid harm to the pollutee would inflict harm on the 
polluter. The real problem is to avoid the most serious harm.
44  
As  Donald  Wittman  puts  it:  “Until  Coase,  people  talked  about  a  driver 
causing harm to a pedestrian or factory smoke damaging laundry hung out 
to  dry.  After  Coase’s  article,  people  realised  that  cause  is  an  outmoded 
concept.  Rather,  the  appropriate  insight  is  to  see  that  there  are  several 
inputs into the production of damage. In the automobile accident case, the 
care  by  the  driver  and  choice  by  the  pedestrian  are  both  inputs  into  the 
accident.  The  question  becomes,  which  combination  of  inputs  is  optimal? 
This,  of  course,  depends  on  the  marginal  productivity  of  the  input  in 
reducing expected damage and the marginal cost of the input”.
45  
We will see that in the cheapest cost avoider framework, “polluter pays” is 
one  possible  outcome  of  the  analysis,  but  not  a  generally  applicable 
principle.  
Whereas  Coase’s  teachings  have  had  a  considerable  influence  on  the 
economic  analysis  of  law,  the  theory  of  externalities  and  the  New 
Institutional  Economics  in  general,  this  does  not  apply  to  the  fields  of 
transport  economics  and  transport  policy,  where  the  Pigovian  way  of 
thinking still dominates. As will be shown below, designing transport policies 
from this perspective can violate both efficiency and fairness.  
The remainder of this part is organised as follows. Section 2.2 deals with the 
Pigovian tradition on which the polluter pays principle is based. This section 
also explains some fundamental terms and concepts. Section 2.3 presents 
the paradigm shift induced by the Coasean way of economic thinking and 
identifies  the  flaws  of  the  Pigovian  tradition.  Section  2.4  discusses  the 
cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  and  its  application.  Sections  2.5  and  2.6 
adopt  a  comparative  institutions  approach  to  compare  the  cheapest  cost 
avoider and polluter pays principles. 
2.2  Coase versus Pigou 
2.2.1  The Pigovian tradition and the polluter pays principle 
According  to  Pigou,  when  faced  with  actions  that  entail  external  costs, 
policymakers should develop mechanisms to internalise the externality. This 
implies forcing the polluter to consider in his individual cost benefit calculus 
all the costs associated with his activity, including those that are imposed on 
others.  Pigou  believed  that  this  internalisation  could  best  be  achieved  by 
                                            
44 The reciprocal nature of the externality and the problem of joint causation will be 
discussed further on. 
45 Wittman 2006, p 54. 
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imposing a tax equal to the external costs on the polluter. The latter then 
has an incentive to conduct his activities up to the point at which his net 
benefit  equals  the  tax.  The  external  costs  would  thereby  reach  a  Pareto 
efficient state: there exists no other feasible allocation which would make all 
individuals  in  the  economy  at  least  as  well  off,  and  at  least  one  strictly 
better  off.
46 Imposing a Pigovian tax is also considered as  contributing to 
fairness as corrective justice, i.e. the polluter is held liable for the effects 
imposed on others.  
To  illustrate  this  point,  consider  the  case  of  vehicles  using  a  particular 
stretch of road, and assume that the noise caused by driving along this road 
harms local residents, which we will call the pollutees (or, taken as a group, 
the pollutee). Let the horizontal axis measure the scale of activity of road 
transport (for example the number of heavy duty vehicles using that stretch 
of road), and let the vertical axis measure the costs and benefits associated 
with various quantities (see fig. 2 1).  
All actors are assumed to be risk neutral.  
Figure 2-1 Demand and supply of road transport 
 
 
In  fig.  2 1,  the  demand  curve  slopes  downwards:  the  higher  the  price  of 
road transport, the less demand there is. The demand curve represents the 
marginal value of road transport to society: the more there is, the less one 
extra activity is worth to society. 
The upward sloping curve represents the marginal private cost to the road 
transport  industry,  including  wages  and  payments  for  petrol  (we  abstract 
from fixed costs). The marginal private cost curve slopes upward because 
                                            
46 See definition of Pareto efficiency in Lockwood 1987. 
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the  more  road  transport  takes  place,  the  more  one  extra  unit  costs  the 
transport industry.  
Assume that the transport industry is perfectly competitive. In the short run, 
the  firms’  marginal  private  cost  curves  are  their  supply  curves.  Firms 
maximise  profits  by  producing  until  private  marginal  cost  equals  marginal 
revenue (= price) in E1.  
If the industry were to produce more units, then the additional cost would 
be greater than its additional revenue and profits would fall. On the other 
hand,  if  the  industry  produced  less  than  E1,  the  lost  revenue  would  be 
greater than the cost savings, also leading to a decline in profits. Hence, E1 
is the point at which the industry’s profits are the greatest. 
Thus,  in  equilibrium,  the  transport  industry  produces  Q1  units.  Total 
revenues  are  price  P1  multiplied  by  Q1,  i.e.  the  rectangle  0Q1E1P1;  total 
private cost is measured by the area under the private marginal cost curve, 
i.e. 0Q1E1P0. The total profits are total revenues minus total cost, i.e. the 
triangle P1P0E1.  
 
Figure 2-2 Marginal social cost and external cost 
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Road  transport  is  a  source  of  noise,  which  harms  local  residents.
47  The 
upward  sloping  marginal  external  cost  curve  in  fig.  2 2  indicates  the 
marginal cost to the residents of this pollution for each quantity measured 
on the horizontal axis. Since this cost is only borne by the residents, it is not 
part  of  the  transport  industry’s  cost  calculation.  It  is  a  marginal  external 
cost. In fig. 2 2 it is assumed that the marginal external cost increases with 
the quantity of road transport.  
The bold printed upper curve represents the “marginal social cost” or “full 
marginal cost” of producing a supplementary unit of transport services. It is 
equal to the sum of the marginal private cost of the transport industry and 
the marginal external cost.  
 
Figure 2-3 Social optimum 
 
In  fig.  2 3,  the  efficient  outcome  is  at  E2,  with  Q2  the  efficient  scale  of 
activity,  where  the  social  marginal  costs  equal  the  marginal  benefits 
(demand).  Beyond  E2,  the  additional  cost  of  transport  is  greater  than  its 
additional  benefits  for  society;  up  to  E2,  the  extra  benefit  of  a  unit  of 
transport is greater than its cost, and the quantity of transport should be 
increased  in  order  to  maximise  welfare.  Note  that  from  society’s  point  of 
view the optimal amount of pollution is not equal to zero. 
                                            
47 Noise is representative of any pollution causing harm. It is interchangeable with 
any other type of pollution. 
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Figure 2-4 Private and social optima 
 
However, as fig. 2 4 shows, the private optimum is not equal to the social 
optimum. From society’s point of view, the scale of activity of the transport 
industry is too high when determined privately (Q1 > Q2). When the external 
costs  are  taken  into  account,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  industry  should 
reduce  its  scale  of  activity  from  Q1  to  Q2.  This  requires  some  kind  of 
intervention, which can take the form of centrally fixing the scale of activity 
to  Q2.  Alternatively,  the  regulator  can  modify  the  transport  industry’s 
incentives by means of a Pigovian tax.  
The Pigovian solution to the overproduction depicted in fig. 2 4 is to make 
the firms operating in the transport industry pay a pollution tax (generally 
labelled Pigovian tax) which has the effect of internalising the externality. 
This tax is a marginal pollution tax in the sense that at the socially efficient 
quantity  of  transport  services  its  amount  equals  the  vertical  distance 
between the social and the private marginal cost curves, i.e. the marginal 
external  cost  (see  shaded  area  in  fig.  2 5).  The  industry’s  total  tax  bill 
consists  of  the  sum  of  marginal  taxes  for  all  infra  marginal  units,  i.e.  all 
units up to Q2   1, plus the marginal tax for the last unit (at Q2).  
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Figure 2-5 Pigovian tax 
 
Assume that the government imposes a marginal tax that exactly matches 
the external costs for each quantity of road transport. Thus, the marginal 
tax curve tracks the marginal external cost curve. As a consequence, the 
industry’s  marginal  cost  is  equated  to  social marginal  cost;  the  industry’s 
supply curve is now the social marginal cost curve.  With such a pollution 
tax, the transport industry produces the amount Q2, at which marginal cost 
(now including the tax) equals marginal revenue
48. Below Q2, the additional 
revenue  is  greater  than  the  additional  cost  to  the industry  –  the  scale  of 
activity expands, and beyond Q2, the additional revenue is lower than the 
extra cost – the scale of activity diminishes. The Pigovian tax thus solves the 
externality problem.
49 
                                            
48 Note that the same efficient quantity Q2 can be realised if the government pays 
subsidies  to  the  transport  industry  in  order  to  make  it  reduce  its  production  of 
emissions. From the point of view of the decision maker paying a marginal tax of, 
say, 10 is equivalent to foregoing a marginal subsidy of 10. 
49  The  government  can  reach  the  same  result  with  measures  belonging  to  a 
command and control system. For example, one solution is to have the transport 
industry  install  noise  reducing  devices  which  would  increase  the  private  marginal 
costs such that the industry’s marginal cost curve intersects the demand curve at 
quantity Q2.  
Robert  Cooter  pointed  out  a  conceptual  difference  between  taxes  and  regulatory 
measures. Whereas taxes are prices, regulatory prescriptions are accompanied by 
sanctions. According to Cooter, the price is the amount of money – here the tax – 
required by law for an allowed activity, while the sanction is a negative consequence 
associated  with  a  prohibited  activity  (see  Cooter  1984,  p  1523).  For  Cooter  only 
prices reflect the logic of an internalisation of external cost.  
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2.2.2  The Coase theorem: optimality without government intervention 
Consider  the  following  case:  a  rancher’s  cows  stray  onto  a  neighbouring 
farmer’s land and trample the farmer’s corn. If the rancher is liable for the 
damage to the farmer, will there be less damage to the farmer’s corn than if 
the rancher is not liable, i.e. implying that he is entitled by law to let his 
cows  stray?  This  question  was  addressed  by  Coase  in  what  later  became 
known as the Coase theorem. 
Two  initial  property  rights  assignments  can  be  distinguished:  the  rancher 
can be entitled to let his cows stray without being held liable by the farmer. 
Alternatively, the farmer can have the right not to have his corn damaged 
by acts or omissions of others.  
If  the  rancher  holds  the  initial  property  right,  he  can  make  a  contract  in 
which the farmer agrees to pay the rancher for not using his initial right to 
let his cows stray into the corn field. 
Conversely, if the farmer holds the initial property right, in exchange for a 
payment, he can allow the rancher’s cows to stray onto the farmer’s land 
without holding him liable for the damage. Again, such an exchange is based 
on a contract between the rancher and the farmer. 
Before moving onto the Coase theorem, it is necessary to define the crucial 
concept  of  transaction  costs.  A  transaction  can  be  considered  as  an 
exchange of property rights. Transaction costs are the costs of making and 
enforcing a transaction.  
 
Transaction costs are differentiated into: 
1)  The costs of finding the holder of a property right. 
2)  The costs of negotiating an agreement. It costs the actors to bargain, 
since  the  efforts  invested  in  the  negotiation  cannot  be  used  for  an 
alternative purpose (opportunity costs of time). If more than two people 
are  involved  (many  participants  on  both  sides)  and  unanimous 
agreement is required, then the bargaining costs increase dramatically 
and the likelihood of a successful agreement falls towards zero. This in 
turn  produces  costs  in  form  of  the  lost  opportunity  to  reap  mutually 
beneficial gains from trade. 
3)  Since people can try to avoid respecting the contract, it is necessary to 
oversee their behaviour. This involves monitoring costs. 
4)  If  a  party  to  an  agreement  fails  to  honour  the  agreement,  the  other 
party  has  to  find  a  way  to  enforce  the  contract.  This  generates 
arbitration or litigation costs. 
5)  Finally, costs can be incurred when one or both parties try to renege on 
the agreement. 
In  his  seminal  article  “The  Problem  of  Social  Cost”,  Ronald  Coase 
demonstrates that the Pigovian analysis is fallacious. In this section we will 
discuss two of Coase’s arguments and apply them to the diagram. 
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If transaction costs are zero, then the upper curve in fig. 2 5 is the transport 
industry’s “implicit” marginal cost curve, even if the transport sector is given 
the  right  to  pollute
50.  The  harm  inflicted  on  third  parties  by  a  subject’s 
activity  constitutes  a  cost  for  the  actor  since  it  represents  a  lost  benefit 
(gain)  obtainable  through  a  bargain  struck  with  the  victim.  The  victim  is 
willing  to  pay  a  sum  equal  at  the  most  to  the  harm  he  would  otherwise 
suffer  if  the  harmful  action  were  carried  out.  If  the  actor  carries  out  the 
harmful  action,  he  loses  this  benefit.  The  activity  thus  comes  at  an 
opportunity cost. A rational actor will add this cost to his out of pocket costs 
when deciding whether to carry  out the action or  whether to come  to an 
agreement  with  the  victim.
51  There  is  no  Pareto  relevant  externality
52, 
because  the  cost  to  the  residents  is  internalised  by  the  transport  sector. 
There will be an efficient solution even without a tax. This is stated in what 
is called the “Coase theorem”. 
We will take up both points in turn. 
One can state the Coase theorem as follows:  
 
If  transaction  costs  are  negligible,  then  whatever  the  initial 
allocation of property rights,  
a) The outcome will be efficient and  
b)  The  outcome  will  be  the  same  provided  that  the  changing 
distribution of wealth does not affect consumption patterns.  
Put differently, “with zero transaction costs, private and social costs 
will be equal” and “the value of production would be maximised”.
53  
 
The  logic  behind  the  Coase  theorem  is  very  simple.  If  there  are  no 
transaction costs or no costs of exchange, an agreement will be found and 
all mutual gains from exchange will be exploited. The property right ends up 
with  the  person  who  values  it  most  highly.  More  precisely,  the  right  is 
“double sided”: “One may have the right to perform a certain activity, or the 
right  to  keep  that  activity  from  being  performed.  Coase’s  theorem  states 
that,  in  the  absence  of  transaction  costs  and  regardless  of  the  initial 
attribution of claims, the right will always appear in the form that has the 
greatest value”.
54 The outcome will be Pareto optimal, i.e. there is no way to 
make one person better off without making another worse off. 
                                            
50 See also Wittman 2006, p 51. 
51 See Baffi 2007, p 9. 
52 For this concept see section 2.3.4. 
53 Coase 1988, p 158. For a discussion of the Coase theorem, see also Cooter 1987 
and Medema and Zerbe 2000. 
54 Baffi 2007, p 10. 
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2.2.3  A simple illustration 
Let us illustrate the essence of the Coase theorem with a simple example. 
Suppose Adam has a theatre ticket but cannot go. Consider the following 
three scenarios: 
1)  Adam auctions off the ticket to Eve, who outbids Abel; 
2)  Adam gives the ticket to Eve; 
3)  Adam gives the ticket to Abel. 
In scenario one the ticket ends up with the person who values it most. It is 
unlikely that a bargain could be struck in which Abel pays Eve to give up the 
ticket. The same holds for the second scenario. As for the third scenario, 
given that Eve would have outbid Abel in an auction, Abel should be able to 
sell the ticket to Eve. 
This simple example shows that, whatever the original property right, the 
person  with  the  highest  willingness  to  pay  gets  the  ticket.  The  final 
allocation is  the  same  (part  (b)  of  the  theorem)  and  it is  Pareto  efficient 
regardless of the initial allocation. The total surplus is maximised – the ticket 
goes  to  the  person  who  is  willing  to  pay  the  most  for  it  (part  (a)  of  the 
theorem). 
2.2.4  The zero transaction costs scenario 
Why analyse a world of zero transaction costs? Several pertinent answers to 
this question can be given. 
•  “Economists, following Pigou whose work has dominated thought in this 
area, have […] been engaged in an attempt to explain why there were 
divergences between private and social costs and what should be done 
about  it,  using  a  theory  in  which  private  and  social  costs  were 
necessarily  always  equal.  It  is  therefore  hardly  surprising  that  the 
conclusions reached were often incorrect. The reason why economists 
went wrong was that their theoretical system did not take into account 
a  factor  which  is  essential  if  one  wishes  to  analyse  the  effect  of  a 
change in the law on the allocation of resources. This missing factor is 
the existence of transaction costs.”
55  
•  In order to understand the crucial role played by transaction costs, one 
should  analyse  a  world  with  zero  transactions  costs.  Studying  this 
mirror image of reality provides valuable insights into the functioning of 
a world in which this assumption does not hold. 
•  Policy proposals are usually based on a theory implicitly assuming zero 
transactions  costs.  However,  if  this  assumption  were  true,  Pigovian 
taxes would be superfluous. As Coase put it: “If there were actions that 
could be taken which cost less than the reduction in damage that they 
would  bring,  and  they  were  the  least  costly  means  available  to 
                                            
55 Coase 1988, p 175. 
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accomplish such a reduction, they would be undertaken.”
56Suppose that 
the  transport  industry  has  the  property  right  of  the  use  of  the 
environment. Suppose further that both the transport industry and the 
residents who are negatively affected by the pollution it causes can be 
organised into groups that can be considered as unitary actors. This is 
possible  if  the  costs  of  organisation  –  in  essence  these  are  also 
transaction costs, but transaction costs within a non market setting – 
are assumed to be low. 
Consider again the figures presented in section 2.2.1. Fig. 2 6 is a slightly 
different representation of the same case. 
Figure 2-6 Trading rights 
 
The marginal external cost curve describes the extra cost incurred from a 
one unit increase of the scale of activity (see also fig. 2 2). The other curve 
describes the abatement costs, i.e. what it would cost the industry to reduce 
the scale of its activity by one unit. At Q1 it incurs no extra cost: the industry 
is  at  its  optimum.  A  reduction  of  the  scale  of  activity  from  Q1  however 
implies  opportunity  costs  because  the  industry  is  not  at  its  optimum.  In 
other words, the area below the abatement cost curve describes how much 
of its rent the industry has to give up for a given scale of activity. His rent 
consists  of  the  difference  between  what  a  factor  of  production  earns  in  a 
given activity and what it could earn in the best alternative activity.
57 
                                            
56 Coase 1988, p 175. 
57 See Coase, 1988, p 163 – 170. 
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This  curve  is  derived  by  subtracting  the  marginal  private  cost  from  the 
demand  curve.  Where  demand  equals  marginal  cost,  i.e.  at  the  private 
optimum Q1, this difference is equal to zero. At a lower scale of production, 
demand is superior to marginal cost. The industry could increase its rents by 
satisfying the extra demand; if it does not do so, this implies opportunity 
costs (foregone rents and profits). 
At E3, the marginal external costs equal the marginal abatement costs: the 
extra cost of abatement equal the extra avoided external cost. Under the 
condition that transaction costs are negligible, this is a market solution, and 
it  leads  to  the  socially  optimal  scale  of  activity  Q2.  Indeed,  any  solution 
above  Q2  would  imply  that  the  external  costs  suffered  are  higher  than  it 
would  cost  to  abate.  Below  Q2,  the  abatement  costs  would  exceed  their 
benefit, i.e. the reduction in external costs. The price of the trade in rights 
that  leads  to  Q2  is  P3,  which  equals  P2  –  P1  and  also  corresponds  to  the 
Pigovian tax. 
Figure 2-7 Trading different rights 
 
 
Suppose that the inhabitants hold the right to noise (left hand side, fig. 2 7). 
Then the marginal external cost is a supply curve, because it represents the 
marginal costs of the pollutee allowing pollution. The abatement cost curve 
represents the demand by the polluter to be allowed to pollute. Pollutee and 
polluter  agree  on  the  socially  optimal  quantity  Q2,  where  demand  equals 
supply, at price P3. 
The pollutee gains the dotted area on the left hand graph in fig. 2 7. His 
rent equals his benefit, minus his cost, i.e. the external cost. The polluter 
gains  the  striped  area  in  the  same  graph.  Indeed,  instead  of  paying  a 
unitary price for the right to pollute, he would have been willing to pay up to 
his  marginal  abatement  cost.  Any  price  he  pays  that  is  inferior  to  the 
marginal abatement cost implies a rent. 
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Now  assume  that  the  entitlement  lies  with  the  polluter  (see  right  hand 
graph, fig. 2 7). Now the abatement cost is the supply curve, to be read 
from right to left: it shows the marginal cost of supplying a reduction in the 
scale  of  activity.  The  marginal  external  cost  curve  is  the  demand  by  the 
pollutee  for  pollution  reduction.  Again,  pollutee  and  polluter  agree  on  the 
socially optimal quantity Q2, where demand equals supply, at price P3. 
The pollutee’s rent, which corresponds to the dotted area, is the difference 
between what he would have been willing to pay and the price he has to pay 
for a reduction in the scale of activity. The polluter’s rent (striped area) is 
equal to his income from the sale of his rights (Q1   Q2)*P3, minus the cost 
of giving up the right, i.e. the abatement costs. 
Note that whoever holds the entitlement, both parties gain from the trade. If 
the polluter holds the right, he can anticipate the trade, and will adjust to 
Q2.  The  opportunity  cost  of  renouncing  from  the  trade  is  added  onto  his 
private marginal cost, leading to a quasi, or implicit, private marginal cost 
curve that equals the social cost. 
Figure 2-8 Opportunity cost from renouncing the trade 
 
 
To illustrate this point, consider output M in figure 2 8. The pollutees are 
willing to pay up to an amount of AB to prevent the transport industry from 
producing  the  M
th  unit.  Not  accepting  this  payment  implies  incurring  an 
opportunity cost which has to be added to the out of pocket costs of MB, and 
so on up to Q2. 
We have given a diagrammatic presentation of the Coase theorem, showing 
that when there are no transaction costs, the final allocation of the property 
right  will  be  the  same  whatever  its  initial  allocation.  There  is  no  Pareto 
relevant externality because the cost to the residents is internalised by the 
transport  industry.  Thus,  allocative  efficiency  (maximum  welfare)  can  be 
realised even without a tax. 
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2.2.5  The high transaction costs scenario 
Road transport involves a high number of both polluters and pollutees. Thus, 
the analysis should not be based on the assumption that two unitary actors 
try to strike a bargain. Rather, we have to consider a multi party bargaining 
situation.  Haggling  about  the  division  of  the  gains  from  trade  and  about 
sharing the costs of payment is likely to prevent a solution to the problem. 
This  implies  that  transaction  costs  can  be  prohibitively  high.  Hence,  the 
participants cannot easily sell and buy property rights. The initial distribution 
of property rights is likely to be also the final distribution.  
Giving the transport industry the entitlement results in too many transport 
services being produced (Q1), causing too high levels of pollution. Giving the 
residents  the  right  to  a  pollution  free  environment  results  in  too  few 
transport  services  being  produced  (0),  and  in  an  inefficiently  low  level  of 
pollution. Both property rights endowments fail to reach the efficient solution 
to the problem at hand. 
In this case, the use of a Pigovian tax can make sense. Transforming the 
private marginal cost curve into the marginal social cost curve would lead 
the profit maximising transport industry to produce output Q2, which is the 
socially optimal amount of transport services and pollution. 
However, the graphical representation of the Pigovian tax solution can be 
very misleading, since there is nothing in the diagram to suggest that not 
only the polluter can take action, but that the pollutee might also be able to 
reduce pollution damage. Of course, the transport industry can reduce the 
external  costs  by  decreasing  production  or  by  investing  in  noise  avoiding 
devices,  but  the  pollutees  can  also  make  investments  to  fight  noise,  like 
installing  double  glazing  or  moving  elsewhere.  The  diagram  does  not 
illustrate  that  it  takes  two  to  “produce”  damage.  It  concentrates  on  the 
behaviour of the polluter by indicating his costs, his benefits, and the costs 
that  he  imposes  on  the  pollutees.  The  behaviour  of  the  pollutees  is  only 
implicitly assumed in the cost curve of the pollutees
58. Only if the residents’ 
cost curve is calculated correctly does the Pigovian diagram yield an efficient 
solution.  However,  the  diagram  does  not  focus  on  the  possibility  that  the 
pollutees might be in a better position than the polluters to reduce or avoid 
the  external  costs.  Instead,  it  puts  the  burden  on  the  behaviour  of  the 
polluters. Modelling a symmetrical situation in a way that hides this aspect 
can induce policy makers to commit serious mistakes. 
It is now a generally accepted view that the most important message to be 
derived from Coase’s seminal paper is not the so called Coase theorem but 
rather its insistence on the fact that to reach efficiency it can be necessary 
to encourage the optimal behaviour of all parties involved in the production 
of  damages.  This  insight  is  at  the  heart  of  the  cheapest  cost  avoider 
principle. 
                                            
58 See Wittman 2006, p 53. 
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Box 2 1 offers an example which illustrates that one possible solution to an 
externality  problem  can  be  for  the  residents  to  move  rather  than  for  the 
polluter to reduce the pollution. Of course, before studying all the data of a 
case  in  question,  it  is  not  possible  to  say  that  this  would  be  the  optimal 
solution in a different case. 
Box 2-1 Buying out a town 
“According  to  the  February  8,  2004  edition  of  the  New  York  Times, 
sulphuric  acid  emissions  from  the  massive  coal  burning  power  plant  in 
Cheshire, Ohio, caused sore throats, burning eyes, and blisters. Sometimes 
the smog was so thick that cars drove through the streets at noon with the 
headlights on. In a series of town meetings in the spring of 2002, lawyers 
presented an offer from American Electric Power to buy all of Cheshire for 
$20 million. The 200 odd residents would have to move, their houses would 
be  razed,  and  their  community  would  cease  to  exist –  and in  exchange, 
they  would  each  receive  about  three  times  the  assessed  value  of  their 
property.  Though  a  few  dissenters  stood  up  and  said  they  would  rather 
fight  than  leave,  they  could  not  sway  their  neighbours.  In  the  end, 
everyone accepted the offer and waived their right to sue.”
59  
2.2.6  The Coase theorem, Pigovian taxes and welfare with zero transaction 
costs 
In this subsection, we will demonstrate that a Pigovian tax can decrease or 
increase  welfare  depending  on  the  circumstances.  There  is  also  a  third 
possibility, i.e. to leave welfare unaffected. Remember, a rent consists of the 
difference between what a factor of production earns in a given activity and 
what it could earn in the best alternative activity. The latter amount is called 
the opportunity cost of the engagement of the factor of production in the 
activity  under  consideration.  In  fig.  2 1  the  opportunity  costs  of  the 
transport industry at producing Q1 are the total private costs of production 
Q1. The rent corresponds to the area between the y axis, the marginal cost 
curve and P1, i.e. P0E1P1. In the words of Coase: “The factors engaged in an 
activity would be willing to pay an amount of money up to slightly less than 
the sum of their rents to allow their employment in that activity to continue. 
Even after taking this payment into account they would be better off than if 
they had to move to their best alternative. Similarly, they would be willing to 
abandon an activity in return for any payment greater than the sum of the 
rents, since, including this payment, they would be better off by moving to 
their best alternative than by continuing in this activity.”
60 
The concept of economic rent can also be applied to residents. Their rent of 
living  in  the  location  is  the  difference  between  the  value  of  the  current 
location  and  the  value  of  the  best  alternative  location.  If  necessary,  they 
would be willing to pay an amount of money up to slightly less than the sum 
                                            
59 Wittman 2006, p 53. 
60 Coase 1988, p 165. 
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of  their  rent  to  be  allowed  to  continue  living  in  that  location.  Even  after 
taking this payment into account, residents would be better off than if they 
had  to  move  to  their  best  alternative.  Note  that  the  residents’  best 
alternative is not necessarily to move: they could for example change their 
profession from the tourist industry to cow farming and thus avoid a specific 
damage  from  pollution.  In  what  follows,  we  will  stick  to  the  alternative 
location story. 
Similarly,  residents  would  be  willing  to  move  in  return  for  any  payment 
greater  than  the  sum  of  their  rents  (see  box  2.1). For  simplicity,  we  call 
welfare the sum of the rents properly defined of all factors engaged in an 
activity.
61 Welfare is maximised if the sum of the rents of all factors involved 
in an activity is maximised. As Coase put it: “Since the rents represent the 
increase in welfare (and therefore in income) from undertaking a particular 
activity rather than the best alternative, it follows that welfare, as measured 
on the market, is maximised when rents are maximised”.
62 
If residents live in their particular location and there is no road transport, 
welfare corresponds to the rents of the residents. If the transport industry 
operates  and  there  are  no  residents  living  at the  particular location,  then 
welfare  resulting  from  road  transport  is  measured  by  the  rents  of  the 
transport industry. If there are both the transport industry and residents, 
but  no  damage  to  the  residents,  welfare  is  measured  by  the  sum  of  the 
rents  of  the  transport  industry  and  the  residents.  Finally,  if  both  the 
transport industry and the residents are present and if there is damage to 
the  residents,  welfare  is  measured  by  the  sum  of  the  rents  of  both  the 
transport industry and the residents, minus the external costs. 
In  what  follows,  we  define  several  scenarios  and  show  for  each  scenario, 
firstly,  that  with  zero  transaction  costs  the  Coase  theorem  holds,  and 
secondly, what impact on welfare can be expected from the imposition of a 
Pigovian tax. We define the different scenarios by drawing on figures used 
by Coase
63. Note that while the chosen value of the variables is arbitrary, 
the relative values of the rents follow a logical structure. Indeed, they reflect 
all  possible  constellations  of  all  crucial  variables.  As  a  consequence,  the 
following scenarios are exhaustive. Depending on the relative level of the 
rents of the transport industry and the residents, damage and the costs of 
other measures, it is shown that the maximisation of social welfare (the sum 
of the rents) can require action on the side of either the transport industry 
or the residents. Which of the two parties should hold the right to continue 
their activity (pollution or residence) depends on who can obtain the highest 
rent. 
Table  2 1  summarises  the  rents,  or  the  net  benefits,  of  the  actors. 
Emphasised  rents  designate  that  the  rent  is  indeed  obtained,  i.e.  the 
                                            
61 See also Coase 1988, p 165. 
62 Note that a situation in which welfare is maximised is also Pareto efficient. See 
Coase 1988, p 165. 
63 Coase 1988, p 166 170. 
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transport industry continues operating, or the residents continue to live in 
the same place. Damages (d) and the cost of erecting a wall (w) (modified 
scenario) always cost 50 and 5, respectively. A wall reduces the damage to 
20.  Highlighted  scenarios  are  those  in  which  a  Pigovian  tax  can,  under 
certain circumstances, be inefficient. 
Table 2-1 Rents 
Scenario/ 
Rents 




100  100  25  40  30 
Residents (r
R)  100  25  100  30  40 
Structure  d < r
T = r
R  r









Scenario 1: d < r
T = r
R 
If  the  transport  sector  is  liable  for  the  damage  to  the  residents,  it  could 
compensate the residents and continue its operation and still be better off 
(by an amount of 100   50 = 50) than if it abandoned production. If the 
transport  sector  is  not  liable,  the  residents  are  unable  to  induce  the 
transport industry to stop operating. Whatever the property right allocation, 
the transport industry continues to operate and the residents remain at their 
location. Welfare is 100 + 100   50 = 150, which is more than the 100 if 
either  the  transport  industry  discontinued  their  operation  or  the  residents 
moved to another location. 
Consider now a slightly modified version of scenario 1. Suppose that it costs 
5 a year to build and maintain a wall alongside the road, thereby reducing 
damages to residents by 30 a year. If the transport industry is liable for the 
damage to the residents it would pay for building and maintaining the wall. 
If  the  transport  sector  holds  the  property  right,  the  residents  pay  for 
building and maintaining the wall. 
It follows that whatever the property right, the transport industry continues 
to operate and the residents remain at their location. Welfare is 100 + 100   
(5  +  50     30)  =  175,  which  again  is  more  than  the  100  if  either  the 
transport industry discontinued or if the residents would want to relocate. 
Next  consider  the  imposition  of  a  Pigovian  tax.  In  the  first  variant  of 
scenario 1 the tax would amount to 50. The transport industry would pay 
the tax and continue operating, and the residents would suffer 50 from the 
damage, but they would not move to another location. The tax would not 
have any real effect on the economy. It would simply redistribute rents from 
the  transport  industry  towards  the  government.  The  same  holds  for  the 
second variant of scenario 1. Here the Pigovian tax would be 20 (again a 
pure transfer of rents from the transport sector to the government), and the 
residents would pay for building and for maintaining the wall. 
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Scenario 2: r
R < d < r
T 
Assume first that the transport industry is liable for the damage it causes. 
Under  these  circumstances,  a  bargain  would  be  struck  by  which  the 
residents would be induced to move to another location in exchange for a 
payment by the transport sector that is greater than the residents’ rents, 
but  less  than  the  damage.  The  residents  would  be  better  off  since  the 
payment  would  be  greater  than  the  rent  from  their  original  location.  The 
payment being lower than its damage liability, the transport sector  would 
also gain. 
Now  assume  that  the  transport  industry  holds  the  property  rights  on  the 
environment,  which  means  no  liability  on  its  side.  Since  the  rents  of  the 
transport  industry  from  continuing  its  activities  are  greater  than  the 
residents’ rents, the latter would be unable to make a payment that would 
induce the transport industry to cease operating. Therefore, the residents 
would move to their next best location. It follows that a change in the legal 
position has no effect on the allocation of resources. 
The resulting allocation maximises welfare. If both sides do not change their 
behaviour,  welfare  is  75  (100  +  25     50).  If  the  transport  industry 
discontinues  operating,  welfare  is  equal  to  the  rents  of  the  residents 
amounting  to  25,  while  if  the  transport  industry  alone  continues  to  be 
present welfare would be 100 (the rents of the transport industry). 
Again,  consider  a  slightly  modified  scenario  that  allows  for  a  wall  that 
protects  the  residents  from  part  of  the  noise.  By  investing  5  a  year  for 
setting up a wall alongside the road, external costs can be reduced by 30. 
Whatever the property right, the wall will be set up and welfare will increase 
to 100 (100 + 25   (5 + (50   30))), making both sides better off compared 
to the first variant of scenario 2. 
Finally, consider imposing a Pigovian tax. In the first variant, the tax would 
amount to 50. As in scenario 1, the tax results in a simple transfer of rents 
from the transport industry to the government. The tax does not have any 
allocative impact; the situation is equivalent to a legal position in which the 
transport  industry  is  not  liable.  The  residents  move  to  their  next  best 
location and welfare is maximised. 
In variant 2 of scenario 2 the value of the production is maximised by a tax 
of 50. If the tax equalled the damage after having invested in the wall, the 
transport  industry  would  pay  the  investment  cost  of  5,  since  this  would 
make it better off compared to a situation in which tax equals 50: 100   5   
20 = 75 > 50 = (100   50). The residents will not move to their next best 
location because their payoff is not negative: rent = 25 and damage = 20; 




If  the  transport  industry  is  liable  for  the  damage,  the  amount  that  the 
industry would have to pay to compensate the residents is higher than its 
rents. The transport industry would cease operation and the residents would 
remain  at  their  location.  Welfare  would  be  100.  If  the  transport  industry 
were not held liable for the damage, i.e. if it had the entitlement to pollute, 
an  agreement  would  be  found,  according  to  which  the  transport  industry 
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would cease operation and the residents would remain at their location. It is 
willing to do this in return for a payment that is higher than its rents. The 
residents would be willing to offer such a payment, provided that it is lower 
than the damage (which happens to be the case). Welfare would be 100. It 
follows  that  whatever  the  legal  position,  the  outcome  remains  the  same. 
Welfare is maximised, as the following reasoning reveals: 
If the transport industry maintains its operations, and if the residents do not 
move  to  their  next  best  location,  welfare  is  75  (25  +  100     50).  If  the 
residents  do  move,  the  increase  in  welfare  would  be  25  (rents  of  the 
industry), while if residents do not move and the transport industry ceases 
operating, welfare would be 100 (rents of the residents). 
Again, consider a slightly modified scenario 3, in which a wall alongside the 
road – costing 5 – would reduce damage by 30. With liability on the side of 
the transport industry, it would be willing to pay 5 for a reduction of damage 
liability to 20. With no liability on the side of the transport industry, it would 
be in the interest of the residents to make this investment. Compared to the 
first variant of scenario 3 welfare remains the same: 100 (100 + 25   5   
(50   30)).  
Finally, consider the imposition of a Pigovian tax. In the first variant it would 
amount to 50. Since the rents in the transport industry are 25, operation 
would cease. Welfare is maximised. In the second variant the tax would be 
20.  The  transport  industry  would  invest  5  in  setting  up  the  wall,  thus 
reducing the tax bill from 50 to 20. Its payoff would amount to 25   5   20 = 




If the transport industry is liable for the damage caused by its operation, it 
does not cease operating. Instead, it would be willing to pay the residents 
an amount greater than their rents (but less than its own rents) to induce 
the residents to move away from the damage to their next best location. 
This  payment  would  leave  both  the  transport  industry  and  the  residents 
better  off.  If  the  transport  industry  were  not  liable  for  the  damage,  the 
residents could try to induce the transport industry to cease operation. But 
since they can offer at the maximum slightly less than their rents and since 
their  rents  are  lower  than  those  of  the  transport  industry,  they  cannot 
induce  the  transport  industry  to  stop  operating.  It  is  thus  best  for  the 
residents to leave their initial location. 
It follows that the outcome would be the same whatever the legal position. 
Furthermore,  the  outcome  would  maximise  welfare.  If  both  the  transport 
industry and the residents are present, welfare is 20 (40 + 30   50). If the 
transport industry stops operating, welfare would be of 30 (the rents of the 
residents). If the transport industry continues operating while the residents 
leave  their  location,  welfare  would  be  40  (the  rents  of  the  transport 
industry). 
Again consider a slightly modified case, in which a wall alongside the road – 
costing 5   would reduce the damage by 30. With liability on the side of the 
transport industry, it would be willing to pay 5 for a reduction of its damage 
liability to 20. Since (30   20) > 0, the residents would not move. 
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With  no  liability  on  the  side  of  the  transport  industry,  it  would  pay  the 
residents to make the investment and to remain in their current location. 
Whatever the legal position, welfare would be 45 (40 + 30   5   (50   30)). 
Again, consider the imposition of a Pigovian tax. Confronted with a tax of 
50,  the  transport  industry  would  cease  operating  (40     50  <  0),  the 
residents would remain in their location, and welfare would be 30 (rents of 
the residents). It is inferior to the social rent of 40 that is obtained by giving 
the rights to the transport industry. 
With an option to finance a wall, the transport industry would do so, thereby 
reducing  its  tax  bill  to  20.  The  residents  would  remain  in  their  current 




Assume first that the transport industry were liable for the damage caused 
by its operation. Since it would be willing to offer the residents to leave their 
current  location  (thereby  reducing  damage  to  zero)  a  maximum  sum  of 
slightly less than its rent, and since the residents would not be willing to 
leave unless they received slightly more than their rents (which are greater 
than the rents of the industry), the transport industry would be unable to 
compensate the residents for a move to their next best alternative. Thus the 
transport industry should compare its rents of 30 to the damage liability of 
50. Obviously, it would decide to stop operating, which is efficient. 
Now assume that the transport industry were not liable. In this case, the 
residents  could  avoid  the  damage  by  making  a  payment  to  the  transport 
industry  for  ceasing  to  operate  which  would  be  slightly  higher  than  the 
industry’s rents, but below the value of the rents of the residents. Residents 
would still be better off than if they decided to leave. 
It follows that whatever the legal position, the outcome would be that the 
transport industry would cease operating and that the residents remain in 
their location. A calculation similar to that in scenario 4 would reveal that 
the outcome would be such as to maximise welfare. 
Again consider a slightly modified case, in which a wall alongside the road – 
costing 5 – would reduce the damage by 30. With liability on the side of the 
transport industry, it would be willing to pay 5 for a reduction of its damage 
liability to 20. Since (40   20) > 0, the residents would not move to their 
next best location. 
With no liability on the side of the transport industry, it would pay for the 
residents to make the investment and to remain in their current location. 
Welfare would be 45 (40 + 30   5   (50   30)) whatever the legal position. 
Finally, consider the imposition of a Pigovian tax. Confronted with a tax of 
50,  the  transport  industry  would  cease  operating  (30     50  <  0),  the 
residents would remain in their location, and welfare would be 40 (rents of 
the residents) . 
With an option to finance a wall, the transport industry would do so, thereby 
reducing  its  tax  bill  to  20.  The  residents  would  remain  in  their  current 
location. Welfare would be 45 (40 + 30   5   (50   30)). 
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Summing  up,  the  examination  of  these  five  scenarios  leads  to  conclusive 
results.  In  each  scenario  the  allocation  of  resources  remains  the  same 
whatever  the  legal  position.  Furthermore,  the  outcome  in  each  scenario 
maximises welfare, i.e. the sum of the rents of the transport industry and 
the residents minus the damage to the residents. In the originally defined 
scenarios, damage will only persist if it is valued at less than the rents of 
both the transport industry and the residents. If the damage is greater than 
the rents of either the transport industry or the residents, but not of both, 
the activity in which the rents are lower than the damages will be stopped. If 
the damage is greater than the rents of both the transport industry and the 
residents, the activity which yields the lower rent will not be undertaken. In 
the modified scenarios the damage will never persist; however, this result is 
due  to  the  figures  assumed  in  the  analysis.  Pigovian  taxes  can  also 
maximise welfare, but they do not do necessarily so. They are imposed on 
the  polluter,  inducing  him  to  take  action  to  prevent  the  damage  to  the 
pollutees.  This  is  inefficient  and  reduces  welfare  if  the  pollutees  are  the 
cheapest cost avoiders. We will address this problem in more detail later on. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  results  derived  from  the  preceding  examples 
remain  essentially  unchanged  if,  instead  of  the  question  being  solely 
whether the transport industry will operate or not or whether the residents 
will  move  to  their  next  best  location  or  not,  one  also  allowed  for  the 
possibility that there could be more or less road transport activity or that 
there could be more or fewer residents living near the stretch of road. 
2.2.7  Pigovian taxes and welfare with high transaction costs 
When  transaction  costs  equal  zero,  it  makes  no  difference  for  society 
whether  the  law  makes  the  transport  industry  or  the  residents  liable, 
because the same efficient outcome will result. However, we have seen that 
when transaction costs are high, the initial assignment of property rights is 
likely to be the final allocation. Since not all allocations maximise welfare, 
law  makers  must  be  very  careful  when  deciding  how  to  allocate  property 
rights  in  the  first  place.  This  is  –  as  Coase  explicitly  stated  –  the  most 
important message that his seminal article was intended to provide: “The 
world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasian world. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the world of modern economic 
theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave. I argued 
that in such a world the allocation of resources would be independent of the 
legal position.”
64  
With high transaction costs, the law should endow the party that is likely to 
end up with the property right if there were no transaction costs. We have 
seen  that  transaction  costs  are  usually  high  if  more  than  two  people  are 
involved  in  a  transaction  and  if  unanimous  consent  is  required.  In  these 
scenarios  it  would  be  virtually  impossible  for  each  firm  in  the  transport 
industry to purchase the right to emit noise from each resident, even if the 
                                            
64 Coase 1988, p 174. See also ibid. p 15 16. 
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firm valued it more than the residents. If unanimous agreement is required, 
every  resident  would  try  to  extract  all  the  value  for  himself  (what 
economists call the hold up problem). On the other hand, if the transport 
industry has the right to pollute without being held liable, agreements would 
most likely break down even if the residents valued a damage free situation 
sufficiently high as to compensate the transport firms for ceasing operation. 
Each resident would hope that the others would pay the transport firms to 
cease operating and would adopt a free rider position.  
Thus, if it is efficient to avoid damage to the residents (and if there were no 
technical devices like walls, sound proof windows and so on), it would make 
sense to give the right to no damage to the residents (an approach called 
mimicking the market). In accordance, the Pigovian tax assumes that the 
property rights lie with the pollutees.  
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  socially  optimal  decision  is  not  to  limit  the 
transport industry, then we would want to allow the transport industry to 
inflict damage on the  residents without holding it liable.  In this case, the 
imposition of a Pigovian tax is no longer equivalent to the optimal allocation 
of the entitlement.  
This is the basic flaw in the polluter pays principle. As will be shown below, 
in all situations in which welfare is greater if the polluter is not liable, the 
imposition of a Pigovian tax diminishes social welfare. To illustrate this point, 
we analyse the above scenarios assuming high transaction costs. What the 
analyses will show is that whether or not welfare is maximised through the 
imposition of a Pigovian tax depends on the circumstances of the particular 
case. 
Table  2 2  summarises  the  scenarios.  Bold  scenarios are  those  in  which  a 
Pigovian tax would lead to an inefficient outcome. 
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Table 2-2 Scenarios summary 
Scenario / 
Rents 




100  100  100  25  25  40  40  30  30 
Residents r
R  100  25  25  100  100  30  30  40  40 
Damage d 
(with wall) 
20  20  20  20  30  20  20  20  20 
Cost of wall 
w 
5  5  10  5  5  5  25  5  20 
Structure                   
 
Table 2-3 Relative rents 
Scenarios  Relative rents 
Scenario 1  w < d < r
T = r
R 
Scenario 2  w < d < r
R < r
T 
Scenario 2a  w < d < r
R < r
T 
Scenario 3  w < d < r
T< r
R 
Scenario 3a  w < r
T< d < r
R 
Scenario 4  w < d < r
R < r
T 
Scenario 4a  d < w < r
R < r
T 
Scenario 5  w < d < r
T < r
R 





Assume that the transport industry’s rent is 100, the residents’ rent is 100, 
and the damage inflicted on the residents is 50. Welfare reaches a maximum 
of  150  in  the  status  quo.  Whether  the  polluter  is  held  liable  or  not,  and 
whether there is a Pigovian tax, the outcome is the same.  
In the slightly modified scenario in which damage can be reduced to 20 by 
setting up a wall costing 5, the imposition of a Pigovian tax would induce the 
transport sector to invest in the wall, thereby increasing welfare to 175 (100 
+ 100   5   (50   30)). 
However, doing nothing would result in the same increase of the value of 
production, since the residents would make the investment. 
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Scenario 2 
Suppose that the damage to the residents were valued at less than the rents 
of the transport industry, but at more than the rents of the residents. The 
following  figures  represent  the  case:  rents  of  the  transport  industry  are 
equal to 100, damage to the residents is 50, and the rents of the residents 
are 25. 
We have seen that the residents should move to their next best alternative 
location  in  order  to  maximise  welfare.  They  do  this  whether  or  not  a 
Pigovian  tax  is  imposed  on  the  transport  industry.  The  welfare,  i.e.  100, 
would be realised. 
In  the  slightly  modified  scenario,  the  imposition  of  a  Pigovian  tax  would 
induce  the  transport  industry  to  install  the  wall.  The  residents  would  not 
move, and welfare would remain at 100 (100 + 25   5   (50   30)) which is 
the maximum. Without a tax the same result would be obtained since the 
residents would set up the wall, making them as well off as if they moved to 
their next best alternative location. Thus, whether or not the Pigovian tax is 
imposed, the outcome remains the same. 
However, note the inefficiency of a Pigovian tax if the figures are slightly 
modified (scenario 2a). Assume that setting up the wall costs 10 instead of 
5. Welfare would amount to 100 without a tax. With a tax, a wall would be 
set  up,  reducing  welfare  to  95.  (100  +  25     10     (50     30)).  Thus,  the 
imposition of a Pigovian tax clearly violates efficiency. 
Scenario 3 
Assume that the rents of the transport industry are 25, the residents’ rents 
are 100, and the damage is 50. We have seen that in order to maximise 
welfare, the transport industry should cease operating. This would lead to 
welfare  of  100.  With  a  Pigovian  tax  of  50,  the  transport  industry  would 
decide  not  to  operate.  Thus  a  Pigovian  tax  contributes  to  efficiency. 
However,  mimicking  the  market  by  allocating  the  property  rights  to  the 
residents would produce the same result.  
In the slightly modified scenario, the imposition of a Pigovian tax can induce 
the transport industry to set up the wall on the condition that the industry 
acts according to its group interests. Welfare would be 100 (100 + 25   5   
(50   30)). But again, mimicking the market by allocating the property rights 
to the residents would lead to the same outcome. Why, then, impose a tax? 
Note  the  possibility  of  an  inefficient  outcome  from  imposing  a  tax  if  the 
figures  are  slightly  modified  (scenario  3a).  Assume  that  the  damage  is 
reduced to 30 instead of 20. The investment in the wall is made, but welfare 
is reduced compared to allocating the property rights to the residents: 90 
(100  +  25     5     (50     20)).  Thus  it  depends  on  the  circumstances  of  a 
particular  case  whether  or  not  the  Pigovian  tax  is in  accordance  with  the 
goal of efficiency.  
Scenario 4 
Assume that the rents of the transport industry are 40, the residents’ rents 
are  30,  and  the  damage  is  50.  Mimicking  the  market  would  require 
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allocating the property right of the environment to the transport industry. 
The residents would move to their next best alternative location. Welfare is 
40, which is a maximum. 
A Pigovian tax, however, induces the transport industry to cease operating. 
This is clearly inefficient, since welfare is only 30. 
In the slightly modified scenario with a Pigovian tax, the transport industry 
would set up the wall and continue to operate, and the residents would not 
move.  Welfare  amounts  to  45  (40  +  30     5     (50     30)),  which  is  a 
maximum. Note that, whatever the legal position, the same welfare would 
be realised.  
Again, there is a possibility of a Pigovian tax creating an inefficient outcome 
if the figures are slightly modified (scenario 4a). Assume that the reduction 
of  the  damage  by  way  of  setting  up  a  wall  cost  25.  In  this  case,  the 
transport industry would stop operating, leading to welfare of 30. Here, it 
depends on the circumstances of a particular case whether the Pigovian tax 
furthers efficiency or violates it. 
Scenario 5 
Assume that the rents of the transport industry are 30, the residents’ rents 
are  40,  and  damage  is  50.  From  an  efficiency  point  of  view,  the  market 
should be mimicked, and residents’ rents should be protected by allocating 
them  the  property  rights.  The  transport  industry  would  cease  operating, 
which leads to welfare of 40, which is a maximum. Obviously, a Pigovian tax 
would  lead  to  the  same  result.  But  then,  why  use  a  tax  instead  of  an 
entitlement? 
In  the  slightly  modified  scenario,  whatever  the  entitlement,  the  same 
amount of welfare would be created, i.e. 45 (40 + 30   5   (50   20)). A 
Pigovian  tax  would  induce  the  transport  industry  to  invest  in  the  wall, 
leading to welfare of 45 (40 + 30   5   (50   30)). But again the question 
arises, why use a Pigovian tax?  
A tax can also result in inefficiency (scenario 5a). Assume that the wall cost 
20. The transport industry would cease operating, which implies welfare of 
40. 
In summary, we find that the real effects of a Pigovian tax can be neutral in 
the  sense  that  they  can  be  equivalent  to  an  adequate  allocation  of  the 
property  right.  Depending  on  the  circumstances  of  a  particular  case,  a 
Pigovian  tax  can  lead  to  an  inferior  result  in  terms  of  social  welfare 
compared to an adequate allocation of property rights. In no scenario is the 
Pigovian  tax  superior  to  an  allocation  of  property  rights  that  mimics  the 
market, i.e. which would result if transaction costs were zero. 
Consider the case in which the Pigovian tax neither violates nor improves 
efficiency. Why use a Pigovian tax if designing an optimal tax requires the 
same information as necessary for optimally allocating property rights? An 
answer can be found in the literature on public versus private enforcement 
of law. Tax laws can be cheaper to enforce than private laws. 
The preceding analysis has identified some flaws in the application of the 
“polluter pays” principle. To avoid this and other flaws of the “polluter pays” 
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principle,  a  general  cost benefit  methodology  has  to  be  applied.  That  is 
exactly what the “cheapest cost avoider” principle amounts to.  
2.2.8  The joint cause of damage 
Consider the following situation
65: The transport industry earns a rent of 100 
and generates noise, but there is no damage, since no residents are located 
near  the  stretch  of  road.  Of  course,  because  we  have  no  damage,  the 
Pigovian tax would be equal to zero. 
Now suppose that residents move to locations in the vicinity of the stretch of 
road, generating rents of 100, and that as a consequence the value of the 
damage created by the noise becomes 50 per annum. Residents may move 
because they count on the transport industry to install a noise prevention 
device costing 40 per annum. The noise prevention device may also consist 
in changing transport routes. The transport industry would install the noise 
prevention device, since this would enable it to avoid a tax of 50. Residents 
would not suffer any damage from noise, because it will be avoided. But this 
situation may not be efficient. 
Suppose  that  for  an  additional  cost  of  20  the  residents  had  been  able  to 
settle at another location that is equally satisfactory and noiseless. If there 
were no tax, the transport industry would continue to emit noise and welfare 
be greater by 20 (180   160). Welfare with a tax is 160 (100 + 100   40). 
Welfare without the tax is 180 (100 + 100   20). 
Note  that  the  residents  generate  a  harmful  effect  of  40  on  the  transport 
industry (the costs of installing the noise protection device). In such a case, 
the institution of a double tax system would be desirable
66: If the transport 
industry  is  to  be  made  to  pay  a  tax  equal  to  the  damage  caused,  the 
residents should be made to pay a tax equal to the additional cost incurred 
by the transport industry. Thus, the transport industry would have to pay 50 
if the damage occurred, and the residents would have to pay 40. 
Clearly, the residents would move to the alternative location, earning a rent 
of 80 (100   20). Consequently, there would be no installation of the noise 
prevention device (saving 40 per annum), no damage and no tax (to be paid 
by the transport industry).  
Note that a double tax system would be required only if the Pigovian tax 
imposed on the polluters were based on damage.
67 However, if the tax is 
based on the fall in welfare elsewhere occasioned by the noise, the Pigovian 
tax would result in a maximised value of production.
68 
As we will see in the following section, this joint cause of damage approach 
is at the heart of the Coasean approach to externalities. 
                                            
65 For the basic idea, see Coase 1988, p 180 – 183. 
66 See Coase 1960, pp 151 152; Coase 1988, p 181. 
67 Coase 1988, p 181. 
68 Coase 1988, p 183. 
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2.3  Paradigm shift  
In  order  to  better  understand  why  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  is 
superior to the polluter pays principle, we will outline up to date economic 
reasoning in more detail. The cheapest cost avoider principle approach will 
offer a more general view on the problem of the internalisation of external 
costs. 
Modern economic theory on the efficient treatment of negative externalities 
goes  back  to  Coase’s  1960  seminal  article  where  the  problem  created  by 
externalities  is  not  perceived  as  one  of  a  polluter  imposing  costs  on 
pollutees, but rather as a consequence of two or more actors competing for 
the same scarce resource. This reciprocity is now acknowledged to be at the 
heart of the problem of negative externalities.  
In his 1960 article, Coase also undermines widely accepted notions about 
causation  and  corrective  justice.  Moreover,  we  are  lead  to  question  the 
generally held view that state action in form of regulation, financial charges 
or taxes is necessary for solving the externality problem. 
As  Ogus  aptly  puts  it:  “There  is  no  a  priori  reason  for  assuming  that, 
because the polluter’s activity involves a physical interference, her claim on 
the environment is less valuable than that of the pollutees”
69.  
Taking full account of the fact that the predicament of the parties involved in 
a negative externality is of a reciprocal nature, two further propositions can 
be derived. 
•  First: Any conflict about the use of the same scarce resource should be 
resolved according to which of the two conflicting uses has a greater 
social value. If, for example, the transport industry values the emission 
capacity  of  the  environment  higher  than  the  residents  value  an 
emissions  free  environment,  then  the  transport  industry  should  have 
the  right  to  emit  pollutants.  Vice  versa,  if  the  residents  place  higher 
value on their use of the environment than the transport industry, then 
they should have the right to an emissions free environment. In section 
2.4 we will show that this prescription is an alternative formulation of 
the cheapest cost avoider principle.  
•  Second: The perception that, for every harmful action, a mechanism or 
institution is needed to ensure that the inflictor considers external costs 
as  his  own,  i.e.  to  force  the  actor  to  internalise  the  externality,  is 
fallacious. Instead, it can be preferable for social welfare to authorise a 
harmful activity without using devices to internalise external costs. 
•  It follows that negative externalities can be the result of the allocation 
of rights. The actor  who holds the right is allowed to inflict harm on 
third parties. For example, he is allowed to drive, although the polluting 
effect of this activity is proven to cause harm. Thus, the whole logic of 
the necessity of internalisation must be questioned.  
                                            
69 Ogus 2006, p 167 
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In  this  section  we  describe  the  fundamentals  of  the  paradigm  shift  in 
modern economic reasoning.  
The new paradigm is organised around eight principles:  
1)  There is no negative externality without rivalry over the use of a scarce 
resource.  
2)  The problem of negative externalities is of a reciprocal nature.  
3)  Some  externalities  are  the  result  of  exclusive  rights:  only  one  of  the 
parties has the right to the resource. 
4)  Only Pareto relevant externalities are socially desirable to eliminate. 
5)  Harm  is  not  caused  unilaterally  by  the  polluter  but  is  always  jointly 
caused.  
6)  Efficiency requires double responsibility at the margin.  
7)  If  transaction  costs  are  zero,  no  mechanism  is  needed  to  ensure  the 
internalisation of external costs. The solution of the problem can be left 
to the involved parties. The bargain they strike will be efficient. 
8)  If transaction costs are high, property rights should be assigned to the 
party who values them highest, which implies that harm is inflicted on 
the cheapest cost avoider.  
It should be noted that these principles are mostly neglected by the polluter 
pays  principle,  but  fully  taken  account  of  in  the  cheapest  cost  avoider 
principle. We now discuss principles 1 6 in greater detail. Principles 7 and 8 
do  not  need  to  be  elaborated  upon;  they  have  already  been  treated  in 
section 2. 
2.3.1  There is no negative externality without rivalry  
As already mentioned in section 2.2, the Pigovian tax diagram (see fig. 2 5) 
misleadingly suggests that the origin of the externality problem lies in the 
unilateral infliction of costs by one economic actor on another. The action of 
the polluter is considered as the cause of the negative externality. Inflictors 
of  damage  should  be  required  to  compensate  victims,  or  to  pay  a  tax  or 
financial charge, thus internalising the externality.  
The polluter pays principle is based on the paradigm that since the polluter 
is  the  unique  cause  of  the  damage,  he  must  be  held liable.  However,  as 
Coase demonstrated in 1960, this view is based on an obsolete concept of 
cause. Since Coase’s article we perceive the  problem created by negative 
externalities  not  to  be  that  of  a  polluter  imposing  costs  on  pollutees,  but 
instead as the consequence of two or more actors competing for a resource. 
It  is  the  existence  of  conflicting  demands  on  the  use  of  the  same  scarce 
resource  which  causes  negative  externalities.  There  can  be  no  negative 
externality without this rivalry of use.  
To illustrate: as a by product of her smoking activity, a smoker sharing a 
room with a non smoker needs the air to deposit smoke, whereas the non 
smoker wants to breathe smoke free air. A rancher wants to use a piece of 
land to allow the cattle to stray, while a farmer wants the land free from 
cattle to grow crops. The transport industry wants to use the environment to 
deposit  noise  and  other  pollutants  as  by products  of  its  activity,  whereas 
residents want the environment to be free from those emissions.  
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Again,  one  cannot  grasp  the  concept  of  negative  externalities  without 
realising  that  they  are  caused  by  contradictory  claims  on  the  use  of  the 
same scarce resource. Each side wishes to use the scarce resource in ways 
which maximise its utility or profit.  
2.3.2  The reciprocal nature of the externality problem  
Probably  the  most  important  part  of  the  Coase  paradigm  goes  back  to  a 
criticism  stating  that  the  traditional  Pigovian  approach  neglects  the 
“reciprocal nature of the problem”.  
In the words of Coase: “The traditional approach has tended to obscure the 
nature of the choice that has to be made. The question is commonly thought 
of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how 
should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a 
reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A. The real 
question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should 
B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the most serious harm.”
70 
To illustrate, consider the previous example (see also the model in part I of 
this study).  
Giving the transport industry the right to emit noise (or more generally, to 
pollute) allows it to inflict harm on the residents. But avoiding this damage 
would necessarily inflict harm on the transport industry.  
It follows immediately that if there are competing claims on the use of a 
scarce resource, it is impossible to avoid all harm. Society is confronted with 
a situation usually referred to as a tragic choice. Whatever the decision, i.e. 
the allocation of property rights, harm will be produced. Thus, the problem 
of  dealing  with  negative  externalities  becomes  more  complicated.  The 
solution to the problem cannot simply be to prohibit harmful activities, since 
this  would  necessarily  result  in  creating  harm,  measured  as  the  loss  in 
benefits that such activities yield.  
As Coase points out, because it is inevitable to generate harm, the solution 
to the problem of correcting harmful externalities can only be to avoid the 
most serious harm.  
As the analysis of the different scenarios in section 2 reveals, this can mean 
not  to  interfere  with  the  activities  of  the  parties  involved,  but  instead  to 
invest in devices suitable to reduce the harmful effect.  
2.3.3  Some externalities are the result of exclusive rights  
We normally think of a negative externality as the result of an activity that 
the actor does not have the right to carry out. But this is not correct.  
Taking  the  insight  of  the  “reciprocal  nature  of  the  problem”,  i.e.  that 
externalities  are  the  result  of  exclusive  rights
71,  seriously,  implies  that 
                                            
70 R. Coase, 1960, p 2. 
71 See Baffi 2007. 
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authorising  the  transport  industry  to  emit  noise  allows  it  to  harm  the 
residents.  On  the  other  hand,  recognising  the  residents’  rights  to  be  free 
from noise allows the residents to harm the transport industry.  
The difference lies only in the fact that, in the first case, the externality is a 
by product of action taken by the transport industry, whereas in the second 
case, the externality derives from the right to prevent the transport industry 
from carrying out activities that are beneficial to it.  
Thus,  Coase’s  reflections  highlight  flaws  in  the  conception  of  externalities 
that scholars and politicians usually adopt, i.e. that externalities only arise 
when  an  actor  invades  the  physical  space  of  another  person’s  property 
(physical  things,  life,  and  mental  condition  (Hume)),  or  the  “protected 
domain”,  as  Hayek  calls  it.  However,  there  is  a  tendency  to  neglect  the 
negative externality imposed on those whose actions are prevented. This is 
all  the  more  surprising  since  the  theory  of  property  rights  tells  us  that 
property,  which  is  the  very  right  to  exclude  others  from  using  an  item, 
always involves a negative externality in the form of a sacrifice borne by the 
subjects who might have otherwise utilised the item.
72 
2.3.4  It is socially desirable to eliminate only the Pareto relevant negative 
externalities 
One occasionally encounters petitions in favour of the absolute prohibition of 
actions causing harmful effects, or of the internalisation of all external costs. 
Even  from  the  point  of  view  of  Pigovian  tradition,  these  proposals  are 
flawed.  
Consider Fig. 2 5. A Pigovian tax leads the transport industry to adopt the 
activity  level  Q2.  However,  at  Q2,  there  remain  Pareto irrelevant  external 
costs amounting to the shaded area up to Q2. Moreover, note that a Pigovian 
tax equal to the marginal external costs at the activity level of status quo, 
i.e.  Q1,  would  lead  to  an  inefficiently  low  activity  level  of  the  transport 
industry.  A  Pigovian  tax  should  equal  the  marginal  external  costs  at  the 
optimum.  
In  order  to  correct  this  problem,  one  should  distinguish  between  “Pareto 
relevant externalities” and “Pareto irrelevant externalities”.
73 
According to Buchanan and Stubblebine, a Pareto relevant externality exists 
when the marginal costs inflicted on third parties are greater than the net 
marginal  benefit  obtained  by  the  actor.  An  externality  is  called  Pareto 
irrelevant if the opposite holds. Put differently, a Pareto relevant externality 
exists whenever its removal results in a Pareto improvement. It would be 
inefficient to eliminate Pareto irrelevant externalities.  
This lesson also applies to optimal action in the Pigovian tradition. However, 
the Pigovian tradition focuses only on one side of the medal and neglects the 
other. As Baffi puts it:  
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73 See Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962. 
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“Where the law gives a subject the right to prohibit a certain activity, the 
problem  of  externalities  arises  as  it  would  in  any  other  case,  and  it  is 
possible that the private cost which the holder of the veto power manages to 
avoid by  exercising his power is in fact lower than the lost utility for the 
subject who sought to carry out a certain action. Pigou seems to be referring 
in fact only to activities that cause harm to third parties.”
74 
However,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  previous  sections,  giving  someone  the 
right to prevent harmful activity can result in an inefficient outcome. Since 
exercising  this  right  implies  imposing  harm  on  another  person,  this  right 
should only be bestowed if the costs that the holder of the right otherwise 
would have to bear are greater than the net benefit forgone on the side of 
the party whose action is prevented.  
2.3.5  All harm is jointly caused  
The  polluter  pays  principle  is  tied  to  a  naive  predetermined  concept  of 
causation  which  assumes  that  only  activities  can  cause  harm.  However, 
harm is jointly caused.
75 We will call this approach the enlightened concept 
of causation, as opposed to the naive principle of causation.
76  
The consequences of the enlightened concept of causality are far reaching: if 
it is  correct  that  the  amount  of  harm  derived  from a  certain  activity  also 
depends on the activity carried out by the victim, then an efficient solution 
would also require the victim to take precautionary measures.  
In the example used for the scenarios, both the transport industry and the 
residents can take action. Can it really make sense to say that the presence 
of the residents is as much a “cause” of their damage as the behaviour of 
the firms in the transport industry? At the first glance, this sounds odd. The 
traditional and naive analysis of causation, based for example on instinctive 
notions of corrective justice, would deny the responsibility of the resident. 
But as Ogus reminds us: “further reflection should lead us to recognise that 
there  are  many  situations  where  traditional  causation  analysis  and 
instinctive  notions  of  corrective  justice  are  insufficient  to  address  the 
complexity of the issues and interests at stake. The determination of when 
                                            
74 Baffi 2007, p 8. 
75 See Coase 1960, p 11. 
76 In economic models the naive principle of causation is represented by a variable 
controlled  by  one  person  that  appears  in  the  utility  or  production  function  of 
someone else (see Cooter and Ulen 1995, p 266 267).  
Let UA = UA(S,X) be the utility function of A, where S denotes the amount A smokes, 
and X indicates all other variables affecting A’s utility. B’s utility depends upon his 
health (H) and wealth (W), written in functional form UB = UB(H,W). Assume that B’s 
health is affected by A’s smoking, thus UB = UB(H(S),W). As one can see, variable S, 
controlled by A, appears in both utility functions, which means that both functions 
are  interdependent.  Interdependent  utility  functions  are  a  suitable  example  to 
represent both the idea of cause and externality formally. Similar interdependencies 
can exist between utility functions and production functions or between production 
functions. 
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individuals should be held liable for negligent omissions, that is a failure to 
act, rather than positive acts, provides an excellent specific example”.
77 
That both the transport industry and the residents are simultaneously the 
cause  of  the  externality  can  be  proven  by  drawing  on  the  “but  for”  test 
which is generally applied in tort law.  
Let A be an action and B an event. To decide whether action A is the cause 
of  event  B,  the  test  requires  asking  the  following  question
78:  “But  for  A, 
would B have occurred?” If the answer to this question is a No, then A is 
considered being the cause in fact of B. Is the answer to this question a Yes, 
than A is not the cause in fact of B.  
To illustrate: If the residents were not present, the noise would not harm 
anyone; if the transport industry did not operate, there would not be any 
harm either. Hence, both parties satisfy the “but for” test: The externality 
would not have occurred but for the presence of both the transport sector 
and the residents.
79  
Legal scholars use a limited version of the “but for” test in order to avoid 
endless causal chains. We will see in what follows that there is an economic 
equivalent to the “but for” test that defines the limits of the application of 
the concept. 
2.3.6  Efficiency requires double responsibility at the margin  
Cases  in  which  both  the  inflictor  of  a  harmful  effect  and  the  victim  are 
required to take action for getting an efficient outcome are usually termed 
“cases  of  bilateral  precaution”.
80  In  these  cases  the  efficiency  condition is 
called double responsibility at the margin.  
Robert Cooter puts it this way: “When each individual bears the full benefits 
and costs of his precaution, economists say value is internalised. When an 
individual bears part of the benefits or part of the costs of his precaution, 
economists  say  that  some  social  value  is  externalised.  The  advantage  of 
internalisation is that the individual sweeps all of the values affected by his 
actions into his calculus of self interest, so that self interest compels him to 
balance all the costs and benefits of his actions. According to the marginal 
principle,  social  efficiency  is  achieved  by  balancing  all  costs  and  benefits. 
Thus, the incentives of private individuals are socially efficient when costs 
and benefits are fully internalised, whereas incentives are inefficient when 
some costs and benefits are externalised. In situations when both the injurer 
and the victim can take precaution against the harm, the internalisation of 
                                            
77  Ogus  2006,  p  8;  see  also  p  168 178,  dealing  with  the  issues  of  liability  for 
negligent omissions and coming to a nuisance. 
78 See Cooter and Ulen 1995, p 265. 
79  In  some  cases  the  “but  for”  test  to  determine  causation  can  be  useless  or 
misleading. Pertinent examples are situations with multiple causes, redundant causes 
and sequences of events (see Cooter and Ulen 1995, p 265 266; Miceli 1997, p 9, 
22 25; Friedman 2000, p 191 197.)  
80 See Baffi 2007, p 12. 
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costs requires both parties to bear the full cost of the harm. To illustrate, 
suppose  that  smoke  from  a  factory  soils  the  washing  at  a  commercial 
laundry, and the parties fail to solve the problem by private negotiation. One 
solution is to impose a pollution tax equal to the harm caused by the smoke. 
The  factory  will  bear  the  tax  and  the  laundry  will  bear  the  smoke,  so 
pollution  costs  will  be  internalised  by  both  of  them,  as  required  by  social 
efficiency.  In  general,  when  precaution  is  bilateral,  the  marginal  principle 
requires  both  parties  to  be  fully  responsible  for  the  harm.  The  efficacy 
condition is called double responsibility at the margin.”
81 
The  problem  is  how  to  make  this  efficacy  condition  work.  For  those  who 
think along the lines of corrective justice, the solution is simply to hold the 
inflictor of the harm liable, for example by following a rule of strict liability. 
This rule states that the inflictor of external costs should fully compensate 
the victim for the damage, without reference to a level of care
82. However, 
in cases of bilateral causation, the application of such a liability rule does not 
produce the optimal incentives for the victim and gives rise to what Cooter 
called  the  “paradox  of  perfect  compensation”.  This  paradox  refers  to  a 
problem  known  in  the  literature  on  insurance  as  “moral  hazard”:  perfect 
compensation means that the victim is fully insured against any damage. He 
does thus not have any incentive to take suitable actions in order to mitigate 
the damage. On the contrary, he has incentives to act carelessly. Only if he 
victim  has  no  influence  on  the  occurrence  of  the  damage,  i.e.  in  the 
unilateral case, can perfect compensation lead to an optimum. 
Double  liability  at  the  margin  can  be  achieved  through  various 
mechanisms
83: a system of fault liability or strict liability with a defence of 
contributory  or  comparative  negligence.  However,  these  systems  do  not 
achieve the complete internalisation of external costs
84.  
Interestingly, Pigovian taxes do achieve the complete internalisation. They 
create a system of decoupled liability, which is characterised by the fact that 
the payment the generator of the harmful activity must make differs from 
the  payment  received  by  the  victim.
85  In  the  Pigovian  system  the  injurer 
pays  a  tax  and  the  injured  receives  nothing.  This  asymmetry  solves  the 
problem efficiently, since both the injurer and the injured bear the costs of 
their  harmful  activity:  the  injurer  compares  his  marginal  tax  with  his 
marginal avoidance costs, whilst the injured bears the harm, and thus has 
an incentive to take action in order to mitigate the damage if the costs of 
                                            
81 Cooter 1985, p 3. 
82  We  use  the  expressions  “care”  and  “precaution”  indeterminately  to  designate 
actions that can be undertaken by the actors in order to reduce the damage caused 
by the externality. 
83 See Baffi 2007, p 14. 
84 See Baffi 2007, p 14. 
85 See Baffi 2007, p 15, n. 25. 
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these actions are less than the harm.
86 Thus, a Pigovian tax can solve the 
two sided moral hazard problem.  
2.4  The logic of the cheapest cost avoider principle  
When damages  can be avoided  or mitigated by either of two parties, the 
“cheapest cost avoider” principle (CCAP) suggests that the party which could 
have  prevented  or  mitigated  the  damage  at  the  lowest  cost  should  take 
action, on the condition that the cost  of preventing or mitigating harm is 
lower  than  the  benefit.  This  is  the  ex  ante  version  of  the  cheapest  cost 
avoider  principle.  The  ex  post  version  refers  to  a  situation  in  which  a 
damage  has  already  occurred.  According  to  the  cheapest  cost  avoider 
principle, if either of two parties can reduce the occurred damage, the party 
which is able to do so with the lowest cost should act, as long as this cost is 
lower than the benefit.
87  
The application of the cheapest cost avoider principle requires four steps:  
•  The  first  step  consists  in  identifying  the  possible  actors  who  can 
influence  the  outcome.  Possible  actors  can  be  the  polluters,  the 
pollutees, or a third party, like government.  
•  The second step identifies alternative ways in which the outcome can 
be altered.  
•  In the third step the minimum costs of the various methods figured out 
in step two are calculated.  
•  In the fourth step the least cost method and the actor connected to it is 
chosen.
88  
Note that if the benefits of taking action are lower than the costs of the least 
cost  method,  nothing  should  be  done.  To  see  why,  refer  to  scenario  2a 
above.  
One  can  distinguish  between  joint  care  and  alternative  care.
89  With  joint 
care, the care expenditures of the parties are complements, i.e. both must 
incur  costs,  either  in  fixed  or  in  variable  proportions,  to  reach  the 
appropriate care. This problem is known from team production theory.  
In the alternative care case expenditures are substitutes, i.e. more care by 
one party makes care by the other party less productive.
90 In this model two 
                                            
86 See Baumol 1972. 
87 The cheapest cost avoider principle was proposed by Calabresi 1970, taking up 
ideas from Coase 1960 and Demsetz 1972, 1974; see also Calabresi and Hirschoff 
1972.  
88 After the implementation of the chosen method it must be checked whether the 
results are as expected and whether a revision of the policy is required. Note that 
this four step procedure fits well with the key analytical steps in impact assessment 
(see European Commission 2005, p. 4). 
89 See Dari Mattiacci and Garoupa 2007, p 3. 
90 See Brown 1973, p 223 – 349. 
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care expenditures can be perfect substitutes or imperfect substitutes. In the 
case of perfect substitutability the socially optimal care level of one party is 
zero if the other party takes care.  
Often the least cost avoidance problem is seen to be present exclusively in 
cases of strict substitution, i.e. both parties can take care but only one of 
them – the cheapest cost avoider – should do so.
91  
We do not follow this restrictive course, since a least cost avoidance problem 
also  exists  at  the  margin,  i.e.  in  cases  of  imperfect  substitution  of  care 
expenditures.  
Identifying the cheapest cost avoider is one thing; it is another problem to 
make  sure  that  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  rather  than  the  highest  cost 
avoider has the incentive to behave in an optimal manner, or, in case that 
both should take care, that the optimal combination is realised. We will take 
up this issue after having analysed the working properties of the cheapest 
cost avoider principle. We start with a discussion of cases in which the level 
of care is a strictly binary variable, followed by a case where it is continuous. 
2.4.1  Cheapest cost avoidance: care as a strictly binary variable  
To illustrate the implications of the cheapest cost avoider principle and at 
the same time to provide the necessary information for a comparison of the 
strengths and weaknesses  of the polluter pays principle and the cheapest 
cost avoider principle, we take up the scenarios described earlier on.  
Scenario 1  
Avoiding the damage of 50 – the benefit from taking action – is less than the 
costs  of  100,  i.e.  the  rents  foregone  either  on  the  side  of  the  transport 
industry or the residents. Thus the cheapest cost avoider principle suggests 
to do nothing. Welfare reaches a maximum of 150 in the status quo.  
In the slightly modified scenario in which damage can be reduced to 20 by 
setting up a wall costing 5, the wall should be set up. This would increase 
welfare to 175 (100 + 100 – 5 – (50 – 30)), which is a maximum given the 
circumstances of the particular case. It is of no importance who sets up the 
wall. 
Scenario 2  
Clearly, the residents are the cheapest cost avoiders. The maximum value of 
production,  i.e.  100,  would  be  realised.  In  the  slightly  modified  scenario, 
there are two lowest cost methods to realise the benefit, i.e. avoidance of 
the  damage  of  50:  moving  the  residents  and  setting  up  the  wall.  Both 
methods lead to the maximum welfare of 100.  
In the slightly modified scenario 2 a, in which setting up the wall costs 10 
instead of 5, moving the residents remains the lowest cost method.  
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Of course, the benefit of having a wall is greater, i.e. 50, than its cost, i.e. 
10. However, using this method would reduce welfare to 95.  
Scenario 3  
The  analysis  is  symmetrical  to  that  of  scenario  2.  Now,  the  transport 
industry is the cheapest cost avoider; it should cease operation.  
In  the  slightly  modified  scenario  3,  both  setting  up  the  wall  as  well  as 
ceasing operation are lowest cost methods. If the cost of the wall were 10 
instead of 5, ceasing operation would be the lowest cost method to avoid the 
damage of 50. The same conclusion holds for scenario 3 a, in which cost of 
the wall is assumed being 5, but the damage is reduced to 30 instead of 20.  
Scenario 4  
Here, the cheapest coast avoiders are the residents; they should move to 
their best alternative location. Welfare would be 40, which is a maximum.  
In  the  slightly  modified  version  of  scenario  4,  the  least  cost  method  is 
setting up the wall, resulting in a welfare of 45, which is a maximum.  
If  the  cost  of  the  wall  were  25,  as  assumed  in  scenario  4  a,  and  the 
reduction of the damage is 30, the residents are the cheapest cost avoiders; 
they should move to their best alternative location. Welfare is 40, which is a 
maximum.  
Scenario 5  
This scenario is the mirror image of scenario 4. Now, the transport industry 
is  the  cheapest  cost  avoider;  ceasing  operation  generates  welfare  of  40, 
which is a maximum.  
In  the  slightly  modified  scenario,  setting  up  the  wall  is  the  least  cost 
method. Welfare is 45, which is a maximum.  
If,  as  in  scenario  5  a,  it  is  assumed  that  the  cost  of  the  wall  is  20,  the 
transport  industry  is  the  cheapest  cost  avoider,  and  it  should  cease 
operation.  
Table  2 4  summarises  these  results.  The  highlighted  rents  indicate  the 
cheapest cost avoider. 
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Table 2-4 Summary rents 




100  100  100  25  25  40  40  30  30 
Residents r
R  100  25  25  100  100  30  30  40  40 
Damage (with 
wall) d 
20  20  20  20  30  20  20  20  20 
Cost of wall w  5  5  10  5  5  5  25  5  20 
 
Table 2-5 Relative rents 
Scenarios  Relative rents 
Scenario 1  w < d < r
T = r
R 
Scenario 2  w < d < r
R < r
T 
Scenario 2a  w < d < r
R < r
T 
Scenario 3  w < d < r
T < r
R 
Scenario 3a  w < r
T < d < r
R 
Scenario 4  w < d < r
R < r
T 
Scenario 4a  d < w < r
R < r
T 
Scenario 5  d < w < r
T < r
R 




2.4.2  Cheapest cost avoidance: care as a continuous variable  
In  the  previous  section,  only  two  levels  of  care  are  possible,  i.e.  zero 
precaution  or  precaution  through  abandoning  one  of  the  damage  causing 
activities, thereby sacrificing the whole rent flowing from it. In contrast, we 
now consider the case in which care is a continuous variable.  
This  means  that  care,  measured  as  forgone  rents  or  the  cost  of  the 
measures  taken  to  prevent  damage,  can  take  values  from  zero  to  the 
maximum rent. Thus, the higher the level of care, the lower the rent that 
flows from the activity. Furthermore, we assume that for both parties the 
higher the level of care, the lower the expected damage. Note that a similar 
analysis can be made for a situation in which damage has already occurred. 
Just substitute care (or avoidance) by abatement – the results would not be 
altered.  
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The residents as well as the transport industry can take care to reduce the 
expected costs of pollution. It makes sense to interpret the reduction of the 
damage as an output produced by two inputs, namely care by the transport 
industry  and  care  by  the  residents.  The  question  becomes  which 
combination  of  inputs  is  optimal.  The  answer  depends  on  the  marginal 
productivity  of  the  inputs  to  reduce  expected  damage,  compared  to  the 
marginal cost of the input. 
To minimise the total cost of damage and damage prevention requires that 
both the residents and the transport industry should increase spending on 
damage prevention until the last Euro they spend reduces damage by one 
Euro. 
Figure 2-9 Efficient avoidance of an externality 
 
Figure 2 9 represents this idea. Let x and y be the costs (or sacrificed rents) 
of  the  transport  industry  and  the  residents,  respectively,  and  let  D  be 
damage. The more the transport industry spends on damage prevention, the 
lower  the  expected  damage,  i.e.  Dx<0.  We  assume  that  marginal 
productivity  decreases,  which  means  that  additional  amounts  spent  on 
damage prevention reduce expected damage at a decreasing rate. The same 
applies  to  the  damage  prevention  activities  of  the  residents.  Under  the 
assumptions made, the transport industry is not as productive in damage 
prevention as the residents.
92  
                                            
92 Of course, in the case in which the figures for y belong to the transport industry 
and those of x to the residents, the opposite would hold. 
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The horizontal line represents the marginal costs of damage prevention. For 
simplicity, we assume that the marginal costs are constant and equal to one 
for  both  the  transport  industry  and  the  residents.  The  areas  below  the 
downward  sloping  curves   Dx  and  –Dy  measure  the  amount  of  damage 
reduced  by  investing  respectively  X  and  Y.  Thus,  these  curves  depict  the 
marginal benefit of care. In equilibrium, parties should contribute to damage 
prevention to the point where marginal cost equals marginal benefit: x* for 
the transport industry, and y* for the residents. Both parties contribute to 
the prevention of the damage. The transport industry reduces damage by 
the sum of areas E + A. Since A measures the costs of damage reduction, E 
is  the  net  benefit  of  the  transport  industry’s  investment  in  damage 
reduction. The residents reduce damage by the sum of areas A + B + E + F. 
Since  A  +  B  measures  the  costs  of  damage  reduction,  E  +  F  is  the  net 
benefit  of  the  residents’  investment  in  damage  reduction.  The  net  benefit 
created by the investments of both the transport industry and the residents 
amounts to E + (E+F) = 2E + F, which represents a maximum increase in 
welfare. 
In this case, efficiency requires that the residents should bear the greater 
burden; in other cases, it is possible that the opposite holds, or even that 
one of the two parties should not contribute at all. The latter is the case 
when  the  marginal  costs  of  prevention  for  one  party  are  higher  than  the 
marginal benefits for all levels of care.
93 
 
2.4.3  Putting the cheapest cost avoider principle into practice 
In this section we develop a formal analysis of the efficiency of a number of 
methods for controlling externalities according to the cheapest cost avoider 
principle.  After  having  identified  the  cheapest  cost  avoiders,  the  question 
arises how to create an incentive structure that induces optimal care by the 
parties in a Nash equilibrium. 
In  Nash  equilibrium,  each  party
94  maximises  its  own  objective  function, 
taking the decision of all the other actors as given. Let x denote the cost of 
prevention  measures  to  the  transport  industry  and  y  to  the  residents.  In 
equilibrium, given the other party’s decision, no party has an incentive to 
change its decision. Thus, in a Nash equilibrium each party’s behaviour is an 
optimal  response  (or  “strategy”  in  game  theory)  to  the  behaviour  of  the 
other  players.
95  We  assume  that  the  parties  choose  their  precaution 









                                            
93 For an a simple formal treatment of the continuous case, see appendix. 
94 Also called “player” in the game theory literature. 
95 See Watson 2002, p 82 86. 
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We  discuss  the  following  four  mechanisms  with  regard  to  their  ability  to 
induce optimal behaviour: 
•  The tax–subsidy approach 
•  The strict liability rule 
•  The no liability rule 
•  The negligence rule 
 
The tax–subsidy approach 
According to this approach, the government imposes a tax on the polluter 
(or it pays him a subsidy) in order to make him internalise the externality 
and choose the optimal level of care. Let tx be the marginal tax. The polluter 
is given optimal incentives when the marginal tax is equal to the marginal 
external damage, i.e. tx = Dx*. The same outcome can be accomplished by 
paying  a  marginal  subsidy  denoted  s’  to  the  polluter.  s’  is  equal  to  the 
negative of the marginal external damage, i.e. sx =  Dx
* at the optimal care 
level.
96 
Damage  is  D(x,y),  where  x  continues  to  be  the  avoidance  cost  of  the 
transport industry and y the avoidance cost of the residents. Now, the tax 
(or  subsidy)  faced  by  the  transport  industry  is  t(x,y).  As  long  as  the 
marginal tax is such that tx = Dx*, the transport industry will choose the 
optimal level of precaution x
*, given the level of precaution chosen by the 
residents. The residents will also choose their optimal level of precaution y
*, 
provided that they do not receive compensation for their damages (or that 
the  compensation  is  independent  of  their  choice  of  y).
97  The  reason  why 
such  a  tax  produces  an  equilibrium  outcome  (x
*,  y
*)  is  that  both  the 
transport industry and the residents are fully liable at the margin.
98 
Consider fig. 2 9. With a marginal tax of tx = 1, the transport industry is 
induced to choose x
* = 4. The residents still suffer the damage of area (A+E 
+F+B). Up to y = 64, the marginal gain from investing in damage reduction, 
i.e. –Dy, is greater than the marginal cost of 1. Thus, residents will choose y 
= y
*, which is efficient. 
If the optimal solution is one in which only the residents should take action, 
i.e. x
* = 0, and y
* > 0, the tax should be zero tx = 0. The residents have the 
incentive to ensure that the choice is y = y
*, which is efficient. If on the 
other hand x
* > 0, and y
* = 0 were optimal, the tax should be set at tx = 
Dx*. 
 
The Strict liability rule 
Under a rule of strict liability, the transport industry is held liable for all the 
damage suffered by the residents. It is well known that the victim has no 
                                            
96 See Miceli 1997, p 119 and Polinsky 1979. 
97 See Miceli 1997, p 122. 
98 See Miceli 1997, p 122. 
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incentive to undertake  any precaution when a polluter is liable for all the 
damage  he  generates.  Thus,  if  optimality  requires  the  victim,  here  the 
resident, to undertake precautions, the rule of strict liability is inefficient. 
To  prove  this  assertion,  a  little  formalism  is  necessary.  Let  C
xs  and  C
ys 
respectively stand for the avoidance costs of the transport industry and the 




xs = y+D (x,y)–D (x, y) = y. 
The  residents  only  pay  for  their  own  measures  of  damage  prevention.  Of 
course,  they  suffer  damages,  D(x,y),  but  they  are  fully  compensated  for 
them. The residents want to minimise their costs, which, implies y
* = 0. 
The  transport  industry  also  wants  to  minimise  its  costs.  The  first  order 
condition for a minimum is  
Cx
xs = 1+Dx(x,y) = 0, 
which is equivalent to  
  Dx(x,0) = 1. 
The transport industry chooses x = x
*(0). 
 
If the optimal amount of prevention by the residents is greater than zero, 
i.e.  y
*  >  0,  then  the  Nash  equilibrium  under  a  rule  of  strict  liability  is 
inefficient. This result holds whether there is independence of care, i.e. Dxy 
= 0, or substitutability, i.e. Dxy > 0. In the case of substitutability, lowering 
y  would  result  in  an  outward  shift  of  the  curve  labelled   Dx  in  fig.  2 9, 
thereby  increasing  x
*.  If  the  transport  industry  invested  x  =  64  in 
precaution, the social cost would increase to 132. 
As is well known from the law and economics literature, adding a defence of 
contributory negligence to the strict liability rule can achieve the optimum 
solution in equilibrium.
100 A defence of contributory negligence would allow 
the transport industry to avoid liability if the residents are negligent, i.e. if 
they choose y < y
*. 
The  simple  rule  of  strict  liability  achieves  efficiency  in  equilibrium  if  the 
optimal amount of damage prevention by the residents y is zero, i.e. y
* = 0. 
Damage from a nuclear power plant explosion or damage from an airplane 
crashing  onto  a  house  roughly  approximate  these  situations;  it  is 
foreseeable  that  damage  prevention  by  the  residents  is  too  costly  to  be 
efficient. In fig. 2 9, this implies an outwards shift of the  Dx curve, resulting 
in x > x
* (= 4). 
 
                                            
99 See Wittman 2006, p 137. 
100 See Miceli 1997, p 19. 
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The no liability rule 
Under this rule the residents are liable for their damages and the transport 
industry would face prevention costs. It is in effect a rule of strict liability for 
the  residents.  Obviously,  the  rule  of  no  liability  is  the  mirror  situation  to 
strict liability for the transport industry.  The  result is straightforward: the 
transport industry chooses x = 0 for all y. Therefore the residents’ problem 
is to minimise y + D(0,y), which yields y
*(0). 
If x
* = 0, then the equilibrium of the transport industry under no liability is 
efficient. However, if x
* > 0, then the rule of no liability yields an inefficient 
equilibrium. Both with independence  of precaution, i.e. Dxy = 0, and with 
substitutability,  i.e.  Dxy  >  0,  the  residents  invest  too  much  in  damage 
prevention, i.e. y
*(0) > y
*, and the transport industry too little, i.e. x < x
*. 
In terms of fig. 2 9, substitutability would imply an outwards shift of the –Dy 
curve, resulting in y > y
* (= 64). 
 
The negligence rule 
We will restrict our attention to one sided negligence, which means that only 
the  transport  industry  will  be  held  liable,  and  this  only  happens  if  the 
precautions undertaken are less than a predefined due standard of optimal 
precaution.
101 
Assume  that  the  due  standard  of  care,  denoted  z,  is  set  equal  to  the 
transport industry’s optimal care level, i.e. z = x
*. It can easily be shown 
that (x
*,y
*) is a Nash equilibrium.
102 
Suppose that y = y
*. Then the transport industry can choose between two 
options: 
x ≥ z = x
* and 
x < z = x
*. 
With x < z, the transport industry is held liable. Thus its cost of this option is 
x + D (x, y
*). With x ≥ z, the transport industry is not held liable. Its cost is 
x. Rationality would require it to set x = x









*) ≤ min(x < z) x + D(x,y
*). 
 
Let us now consider the residents’ problem and let x = x




*) it is free from liability; however, there are still 
damages for which the residents are strictly liable in the sense that they are 
responsible  for  the  damages  they  suffer.  Thus,  the  residents  choose  y  to 
minimise y + D(x
*,y), which yields y
*( x
*) = y
* and which is efficient. To 
illustrate, consider fig. 2.9. With z = x
*, the transport industry chooses x
* = 
4. It is optimal for the residents to choose y
* = 64. 
                                            
101 For a general discussion of negligence rules, see Wittman 2006, p 142 151 and 
Miceli 1997, p 18 20, 123. 
102 See Miceli 1997, p 18 19. 
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Summing up, we can say that the tax subsidy approach induces both the 
transport industry and the residents to choose the optimal actions, i.e. which 
induce cheapest cost avoidance, to control externalities, since both are fully 
liable for the damages at the margin. A simple rule of strict liability is only 
efficient in the special case where the residents should not undertake any 
level  of  precaution.  This  setting  corresponds  to  making  the  polluter  pay. 
However, the reasons are different from those in the polluter pays principle: 
the polluter is made to pay not because he causes the harm, but because he 
can reduce it most efficiently. The polluter pays outcome is thus a special 
outcome  of  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle.  The  existence  of  other 
possible outcomes shows that it should not be made a principle. 
A rule of no liability is only efficient in the corner case where the transport 
industry should not undertake any precaution. If however both the transport 
industry  and  the  residents  should  undertake  precautionary  measures,  the 
simple rules of strict liability or no liability are in general inefficient, i.e. they 
do  not  implement  cheapest  cost  avoidance.  However,  negligence  rules 
encourage  the  optimal  levels  of  precaution  if  the  due  standard  of  care  is 
chosen appropriately. 
At which level should the cheapest cost avoider principle be applied? 
The  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  is  applied  in  court  rulings;  if  not 
explicitly,  then  implicitly.
103  In  part  III,  we  will  give  two  examples  where 
courts balance the interests of the involved parties.
104 
However, even in the presence of a properly working judiciary, there are a 
number of arguments which speak in favour of centralisation, i.e. regulation. 
As  Esty  (2001)  puts  it:  “(C)ommand  and  control  regulations,  based  on 
government  defined  pollution  control  technologies  or  emissions  standards, 
represent  a  way  to  overcome  individual  analytic  incapacity,  achieve  scale 
economies in the technical dimensions of environmental protection, and fill 
by  fiat  the  information  gaps  (and  related  doubts  about  causal 
connections)”
105.  Also,  “by  mandating  pollution  control  rules  and 
requirements,  regulatory  strategies  limit  the  institutional  obstacles  to 
recovery that individuals of harms face and the risk that strategic behaviour 
in  negotiations  (by  either  polluters  or  victims)  will  derail  agreement  on 
compensation.”
106  Esty  (2001)  concludes  that  “in  at  least  some 
circumstances,  command  and  control  regulation  offers  a  promise  of  lower 
technical,  political/legal,  and  strategic  costs  yielding  outcomes  that 
                                            
103 See the Law and Economics literature, and especially Posner 1986. Even if court 
judgements do not use the language of economics, but legal terms and concepts, 
judicial reasoning is always concerned with the balancing of antagonistic interests. 
104 For a general discussion of the role of economics in courts see Ogus 2006, p 299 
310; see also Breyer 1993 and the Symposium “Economists on the Bench” 1987. 
105 Esty 2001, p 13. See also Ogus, who discusses similar issues under the heading 
“From private governance to (modifiable?) public governance” (Ogus 2006, p 79 83). 
106 Esty 2001, p 13. 
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internalise externalities, and protect property rights at lower social cost than 
a tort and contract based regime.”
107 
Indeed, insights of the economic analysis of law, which is largely efficiency 
orientated, are increasingly used in policy making and legal reforms. In part 
inspired  by  the  American  model  that  requires  a  fully  fledged  cost benefit 
analysis  to  be  undertaken  for  major  regulatory  proposals
108,  government 
departments in Europe as well as the European Commission, when making 
proposals, have to prepare what has become known as a “regulatory impact 
analysis”,  a  “regulatory  impact  appraisal”,  or  a  “regulatory  impact 
assessment”,  which  includes  some  form  of  cost benefit  analysis.
109  The 
United Kingdom is a good example. To quote Ogus: “The current UK regime 
requires  a  regulatory  impact  assessment  (RIA)  to  be  undertaken  by 
government departments making any proposal for regulation which has an 
impact on business, charities or the voluntary sector. The document must 
include  an  identification  of,  inter  alia,  the  risks  that  the  proposal  is 
addressing and an attempt to quantify them; the different regulatory options 
for meeting them; the benefits and costs of these options and the sectors 
which  will  bear  them;  equity  and  fairness  issues;  and  any  distributional 
impacts  of  the  proposals.  It  should  conclude  with  a  recommendation 
regarding the preferred option, giving reasons based on the elements of the 
assessment, in particular the analysis of the benefit and costs.”
110 
In  case  C 320/03,  discussed  in  part  III,  Commission  of  the  European 
Community vs. Republic Austria, concerned with the sectoral prohibition of 
the movements of lorries of more than 7.5 tonnes carrying certain goods, 
one can read in the summary judgement: “Such a prohibition obstructs the 
free  movement  of  goods  and,  in  particular,  their  free  transit  (…).  Such 
legislation cannot be justified by imperative requirements in the interests of 
environmental protection where it has not been demonstrated that the aim 
pursued could not be achieved by other means less restrictive of freedom of 
movement.” In the vein of a cost effectiveness assessment, the court states 
in §87: ”(…) the Austrian authorities were under a duty to examine carefully 
the possibility of using measures less restrictive of freedom of movement, 
and  discount  them  only  if  their  inadequacy,  in  relation  to  the  objective 
pursued, was clearly established.” 
2.5  Comparative Institutions: the polluter pays principle 
In order to provide the relevant information needed for a comparison of the 
polluter pays principle and the cheapest cost avoider principle, this section 
discusses their strengths and weaknesses. One advantage of the cheapest 
                                            
107  Esty  2001,  p  15.  See  also  Shavell  1987,  p  277 290,  who  suggests  several 
advantages that pertain to a statute based system compared to a tort system, and 
Rose Ackerman 1992 expanding on this theme. 
108 See Ogus 2006, p 282. 
109 See Ogus 2006, p 279 292, European Commission 2001, 2005. 
110 Ogus 2006, p 283. 
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cost avoider principle relative to the polluter pays principle, derived in the 
previous  sections,  is  that  the  polluter  pays  principle  cannot  guarantee 
efficiency,  whereas  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  does.  This  result 
cannot be overstated since efficiency, in the static as well as in a dynamic 
sense implies the avoidance of a waste of valuable resources, an increase in 
the value of production, positive growth rates and an increase in average 
income.  Efficient  transport  furthers  the  international  division  of  labour, 
improves  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market  and  is  a  necessary 
precondition for reaching the “growth and jobs” goals of the Lisbon strategy. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  an  efficient  transport  industry  furthers  the 
common good (i.e. social welfare) and, analogously, that it is necessary to 
maximise the wealth of a society. Wealth can be used as a proxy for social 
welfare.
111  Thus,  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  clearly  beats  the 
polluter pays principle as far as efficiency is concerned. However, one can 
ask whether efficiency is all that matters. What about fairness and the costs 
of administering and implementing both principles?  
For example, there may exist an efficiency equity tradeoff. The question is 
how  to  deal  with  it.  Wealth  maximisation  is  not  the  only  goal  of  state 
activities:  Moral  values  such  as  human  autonomy  and  dignity  and 
distributional justice are of great importance. In many areas policy makers 
need to practice a tradeoff between “economic” and “non economic” goals. 
How should such tradeoffs be carried out?  
In  this  section  we  address  possible  arguments  for  and  against  the 
implementation of the polluter pays principle as well as the cheapest cost 
avoider principle under “non economic” aspects. We will study whether the 
polluter pays principle contributes to the notion of fairness in the sense of 
corrective justice, in the sense of distributive justice (equity), and the sense 
of a level playing field in the transport sector. In addition, we will deal with 
the question whether the costs of administering the polluter pays principle 
relative to those of the handling of the cheapest cost avoider principle could 
make a case for a preference of polluter pays principle over cheapest cost 
avoider principle.  
Regarding the cheapest cost avoider principle, we will take up the fairness 
and  administering  costs  issues  as  well  as  comments  on  the  breadth  and 
soundness of its underpinning concept of welfare economics in section 2.6. 
2.5.1  The polluter pays principle and corrective justice  
In this subsection we will deal with three questions:  
•  What does corrective justice mean?  
                                            
111 Wealth stands for the sum of all goods and services in a society weighted by their 
values. The term “value” refers to value in exchange, value as measured or at least 
measurable in a market, whether explicit or implicit (see Posner 1981, p 60). This 
concept of value is broader than of a price in the sense that it takes all valuations 
into account, and not only the marginal value in equlibrium. For the relation between 
wealth and social welfare, see section 2.6.4 below. 
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•  Why is corrective justice so appealing?  
•  Why the polluter pays principle cannot be founded on corrective justice. 
What does corrective justice mean?  
The classical principle of corrective justice requires a person who wrongfully 
inflicts harm on others to pay for the harm that he has caused.
112 Paying for 
the  harm  can  mean  one  of  two  things.  Either  the  injurer  pays  and  the 
payment goes to the victim (the victim is fully compensated), or the injurer 
pays and the payment goes to a third party, say the government. Whereas 
in  the  second  interpretation  the  notion  of  fairness  is  one  involving 
punishment motivated by the idea of retribution, the first one is driven by 
the desire to rectify the outcome created by the injurer’s action
113. The first 
mentioned  position,  according  to  which  a person  who  wrongfully  harms 
another  should  compensate  the  victim,  is  usually  advanced  under  the 
heading of corrective justice.
114 Here we take a broader view on the term 
and  subsume  both  positions  in  which  the  injurer  has  to  make  amends, 
whether to society or to the victim, under the term “corrective justice”.  
Note  that  it  is  the  physical  interference  or  invasion  into  another  person’s 
protected domain (or property, widely defined) which is the significant factor 
to study. Thus, the notion of causation underlying the principle of corrective 
justice is that of the unilateral infliction of harm; there is only one “causer” 
of harm who is identified in reference to a purely physical relationship.  
Note further that the notion of corrective justice does not require ascribing 
responsibility to those who inflict harm on others in general, but rather it 
assigns responsibility only if a person wrongfully harms another.  
Finally,  note  that  a  fair  treatment  of  individuals  based  on  a  notion  of 
corrective justice only depends on the situational character of an event, and 
does  not  depend  on  how  the  treatment  influences  individuals’  behaviour 
and, in turn, on how such behaviour affects individuals’ well being.
115 Only 
two questions have to be asked: Is a person’s conduct wrongful, and does it 
cause harm – if this is so, then the principle of corrective justice requires 
that person to pay compensation to the victim or to pay a tax. This is not to 
deny that, in reality, a fair treatment in the sense of penalising wrongful, 
harmful conduct will influence behaviour. But as Kaplow and Shavell rightly 
mention:  
“(A)ssessing such effects is not part of an analysis based on the notion of 
fairness (…), because such normative analysis is avowedly independent of 
how the pursuit of fairness will influence the well being of individuals.”
 116  
                                            
112 See Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 41, 87. 
113 See Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 87. 
114 See Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 89. 
115 See Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 41. 
116 See Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 43. 
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It  follows  from  this  characterisation  of  fairness  that  the  polluter  pays 
principle as a fairness based normative analysis is potentially in conflict with 
the cheapest cost avoider principle. The cheapest cost avoider principle is 
concerned exclusively with effects on people’s well being, whereas notions 
of corrective fairness underpinning the polluter pays principle are not at all 
concerned with such effects.
117  
At  the  first  glance,  the  polluter  pays  principle  seems  to  fit  the  notion  of 
corrective justice nicely. The generators  of pollution, the polluters, should 
pay for the costs inflicted on other persons by their activities – the residents 
in the examples used in the previous sections. Thus, striving for corrective 
justice seems to require an adherence to the polluter pays principle rather 
than to the cheapest cost avoider principle.  
In what follows, we will first deal with the question of why corrective justice 
as a goal of public policy is so appealing. Consequently, we will show that 
corrective  justice  is  a  flawed  concept,  and  that  adherents  of  the  polluter 
pays principle cannot hope to use it as an argument to defend the polluter 
pays principle against the cheapest cost avoider principle.  
Why is corrective justice so appealing?  
There  are  several  answers  to  the  question  why  corrective  justice  is 
appealing.  We  offer  some  explanations  for  the  apparent  fairness  based 
analyses.  
Cognitive biases: Notions of corrective justice are typically used “to reach 
conclusions  based  upon  situational  characteristics  of  events”.  The 
assessment  is  frequently  made  from  an  ex  post  perspective  and  often 
ignores important aspects of ex ante behaviour: “This tendency to focus on 
what is salient … is related to familiar and prevalent cognitive biases”, such 
as  the  “hindsight  bias”  or  the  “tendency  of  subjects  to  evaluate  the 
probability of events on the information that is most available or salient”.
118 
Thus,  “insights  from  cognitive  psychology  seem  to  offer  at  least  a  partial 
explanation for the apparent attractiveness of fairness based analysis”.
119 
Fairness  proponents  often  appeal  to  intuitions  or  instincts.  If  the 
intuitions and instincts are grounded on the promotion of individuals’ well 
being, reliance on these sources seems to be adequate. But if intuitions and 
instincts can lead us astray, reliance on these sources of notions of fairness 
is self defeating.
120 It is an important purpose of explicit normative analysis 
of public policy to identify and avoid those situations.  
Social norms: Notions of corrective justice seem to be closely related to 
various social norms that guide ordinary individuals in their everyday lives, 
                                            
117  See  also  Kaplow  and  Shavell  2002,  p  42,  who  compare  a  fairness  based 
normative analysis with welfare economics. 
118 See Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 50, n. 69. 
119 See Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 50. 
120 Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 60. 
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such as not harming others, and being held responsible when one does so. 
Social norms can be inculcated or are the result of evolution in the biological 
sense. They play an important role in channelling individuals’ behaviour in a 
socially desirable manner
121, thereby reducing the costs of private and public 
enforcement of the law.  
A  second  reason  why  social  norms  tend  to  be  valuable  regulators  of 
everyday  behaviour  is  that  “they  may  serve  as  useful  proxy  principles, 
heuristics,  or  rules  of  thumb  that  promote  individuals’  welfare”.
122  In  this 
case, notions of corrective justice are not invoked as evaluative principles in 
their own right
123 but as a proxy principle to help identify legal rules that 
increase social welfare. Accepting norms or following rules is valuable since 
it saves decision making costs and reduces the probability of costly errors
124. 
There  are  however  two  preconditions:  norms  must  be  followed  quasi 
automatically, and norms should be simple and general in application.
125 
Why the polluter pays principle cannot be founded on corrective 
justice  
We propose three reasons why notions of corrective justice cannot support 
the polluter pays principle.
126  
1)  Corrective  justice  is  based  on  an  incomplete  notion  of  causation.  The 
implication is that there is only one causer of damage (the polluter). But, 
as  we  have  seen  in  previous  sections,  all  damage  is  jointly  caused. 
Damage  is  not  the  result  of  the  unilateral  invasion  into  somebody’s 
protected domain, but instead arises from the friction which occurs when 
two or more actors compete for the same scarce resource.  
We know since Coase (1960) that the position of polluters and pollutees 
is symmetrical and reciprocal: “each wishes to use the environment in 
ways  which  are  utility  maximising.  There  is  no  a  priori  reason  for 
assuming  that,  because  the  polluter’s  activity  involves  a  physical 
interference, her claim on the environment is less valuable than that of 
the pollutees. The normative economic proposition which flows from this 
is  not  necessarily  that  the  interference  be  abated  or  paid  for  by  the 
                                            
121 Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 62 65. 
122 Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 88. 
123 Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 44. 
124 See Heiner 1983. 
125 Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 69. 
126 Kaplow and Shavell nicely describe why it should not be applied even if it were 
possible: “As a normative matter, however, if the appeal of notions of fairness (…) 
derives from what amounts to mistakes in judgment, there is no basis for giving the 
notions weight as independent evaluative principles, to be pursued at the expense of 
individuals’ well being”.
 Since an effects based welfare economic approach to policy 
assessment reflects a complete consideration of factors that plausibly seem relevant, 
while the approach based on notions of fairness does not, the former approach would 
seem superior to the latter, a priori. Consequently, “furthering notions of fairness, 
whenever they favor policies different from those endorsed under welfare economics, 
leads to reductions in individuals’ well being”. Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 48 59. 
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inflictor, but rather that the friction between the conflicting resource uses 
be  relieved  at  lowest  cost,  taking  account  both  of  the  value  of  the 
resource uses and the costs of adapting behaviour”.
127 It follows that the 
costly  interaction  between  the  transport  industry  and  the  residents 
cannot be attributed to the actions of either party individually; instead, it 
is “caused” by resource scarcity.  
Consequently,  as  Demsetz  reminds  us,  the  use  of  words  such  as 
“blame”, “responsible”, and “fault” must be treated with care “because 
they have no useful meanings in an economic analysis of these problems 
other  than  as  synonyms  for  the  party  who  could  have  most  easily 
avoided  the  costly  interaction.  Whether  the  interaction  involves  crop 
damage, accidents, soot, or water pollution, the qualitative relationship 
between the interacting parties is symmetrical. It is the joint use of a 
resource,  be  it  geographic  location,  air,  or  water  that  leads  to  these 
interactions.  It  is  the  demand  for  scarce  resources  that  leads  to 
conflicting interests”.
128  
And  most  importantly,  referring  to  court  decisions  (which  can  be 
generalised  to  policy  actions),  Demsetz  points  out:  “If  courts  are  to 
ignore  wealth,  religion,  or  family  in  deciding  such  conflicts,  if  persons 
before the courts are treated with regard only to the cause of action and 
available proof, then, as a normative proposition, it is difficult to suggest 
any criterion for deciding liability other than placing it on the party able 
to  avoid  the  costly  interaction  most  easily”.
129  Notions  of  corrective 
justice  are  insufficient  to  address  the  complexity  of  the  issues  and 
interests at stake.
130  
2)  Wrongful harm cannot be determined by notions of corrective justice 
Instinctive notions of corrective justice and naive causation analysis are 
insufficient  to  address  the  complexity  of  the  issues  and  interests  at 
stake
131.  For  example,  nearly  all  legal  systems,  whether  in  civil  or  in 
common  law  countries,  contain  rules  determining  when  individuals 
should  be  held  liable  for  negligent  omissions,  that  is,  failures  to  act, 
rather than positive acts. In particular cases, wrongdoers get off scot 
free if the other party is proven to have been negligent.
132 
The Coasean view requires an expansion of the parameters to be taken 
into account. As Bruce Ackerman puts it: “Instead of sifting the facts in 
                                            
127 Ogus 2006, p 167. 
128 Demsetz 1972, p 28. 
129 Demsetz 1972, p 28. 
130See Ogus 2006, p 81. 
131 See Ogus 2006, p 8. 
132 “The rule that contributory negligence is a complete defense to a negligence suit, 
the  rule  that  there  is  no  right  of  contribution  among  joint  tortfeasors,  and  the 
substitution  of  heavy  criminal  penalties  for  lighter  penalties  imposed  with  a 
probability of one illustrate the common law’s apparent willingness to allow wrongs 
to go uncorrected in many cases”, Posner 1986, p 243. 
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search  of  the  cause  of  the  trouble,  the  lawyer economist  urges  a 
conception  of  causation  that  recognises  how  a  multiplicity  of  factors, 
operating  over  a  lengthy  period  of  time,  contribute  to  our  legal 
discontents  (…)  Rather  than  beginning  with  the  moment  at  which  the 
actors get into some form of obvious trouble, Coasean assumptions force 
the lawyer to start his story at a much earlier point in time: when the 
parties could have reorganised their activities in a way that could have 
avoided  the  trouble  entirely”
133.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  all  known  legal 
orders  approach  problems  of  causation  and  damage  in  a  more 
sophisticated way than suggested by notions of corrective justice.
134 
It is worth noting that the fact that wrongs go uncorrected is misleading, 
since  it  results  from  a  failure  to  distinguish  ex  ante  (before  the 
occurrence)  from  ex  post  (after  the  occurrence).  Of  course,  ex  post a 
tortfeasor who injures a contributory negligent victim gets off scot free. 
But  ex  ante  a  contributory  negligence  system  generates  correct 
incentives to potential injurers as well as potential victims
135. Of course, 
one could make sure that every wrong is corrected. But the question is 
whether  corrective  justice  is  a  commodity  for  which  society  should be 
willing to pay an infinite price
136. 
3)  Corrective justice is typically a procedural rule rather than a complete 
substantive notion of justice
137. The principle prescribes rectification of 
wrongful  acts  that  cause  injury,  “regardless  of  the  relative  merit  of 
injurer and victim considered apart form the act, but it does not define 
what acts are wrongful; this definition is not itself part of the concept of 
corrective justice.”
138 Thus, corrective justice is incomplete in the sense 
that  in  order  to  make  it  operational,  “one  must  look  elsewhere  for  a 
substantive theory of what counts as wrongful injury”
139. For example, 
following libertarian approaches, one could stipulate as wrongful all harm 
caused by a person’s voluntary actions. Alternatively, one could deem all 
those  acts  as  wrongful  that  are  inefficient  or  that  reduce  social 
welfare
140.  Thus,  the  most  important  message  is:  since  nearly  any 
substantial  principle  could  be  embedded  in  corrective  justice,  this 
principle  cannot  be  used  to  challenge  the  claim  that  policy  analysis 
should be based on the cheapest cost avoider principle. Of course, the 
polluter  pays  principle  can  also  be  embedded  in  corrective  justice. 
                                            
133 Ackerman 1984, p 52 53; as quoted in Ogus 2006, p 9. 
134  See  for  example  ch.  6  in  Ogus  2006,  in  which  the  difficulties  of  articulating 
principles of corrective justice in relation to omissions, i.e. failure to act, coming to 
the  nuisance,  the  requirement  of  damage  and  different  types  of  damages  are 
outlined. 
135 See Posner 1986, p 243. 
136 See Posner 1986, p 244. 
137 See Posner 1981, p 73 74, Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 93 95. 
138 Posner 1981, p 74. 
139 Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 93. 
140 See Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 95. 
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However, the polluter pays principle can provide the foundation for, but 
it cannot itself be founded on, the principle of corrective justice. 
2.5.2  The polluter pays principle and distributive justice (fairness) 
Typically, societies have distributional goals which they rate as least as high 
as efficiency. Thus, from the point of view of maximisation of social welfare, 
efficiency and distribution of wealth or income should be considered together 
for two reasons: firstly, a given distributional goal may involve a sacrifice of 
efficiency,  or,  secondly  and  conversely,  the  attainment  of  efficiency  may 
imply an unacceptable distribution of wealth or income. Since the polluter 
pays  principle  affects  the  distribution  of  wealth  or  income  when  pollutees 
and  polluters  are  legally  distinct  groups  with  different  levels  of  wealth  or 
income,  it  might  appear  that  its  deficits  on  the  efficiency  side  can  be 
outweighed by its contribution to distributive justice. 
To  illustrate  this  point,  suppose  that  firms  in  the  transport  industry  are 
owned by very rich persons and that the residents are very poor. Assume 
further  that  the  residents  are  the  cheapest  cost  avoiders  and  that 
transaction costs are high. Then by letting the polluters pay, the external 
costs will be borne by the transport industry and this may increase social 
welfare, even if efficiency is violated. Thus, a societal preference for a more 
equal distribution of wealth or income would suggest trading efficiency for 
justice.  
But what about the case in which residents are very rich and the owners of 
the firms in the transport industry are poor? Care is required here because 
of what economists call a partial equilibrium analysis: the focus is only on 
the  polluting  activity  and  its  direct  consequences
141.  But  there  may  be 
consequences  for  other  parts  of  the  economy.  As  Stephen  reminds  us, 
regarding  a  context  similar  to  ours  but  assuming  that  a  court  grants  an 
injunction  in  favour  of  the  residents:  “What  if  the  residents  live  in  rental 
houses  and  the  removal  of  the  pollution  raises  the value  of  property  and 
allows  the  rich  landlord  to  raise  rents  and  acquire  all  the  benefits  of  the 
court’s  decision?  The  higher  rents  may  not  even  be  paid  by  the  original 
residents who perhaps cannot afford them. They may therefore move out 
and  be  replaced  by  other,  richer  tenants  whose  interests  might  not  have 
weighed  so  heavily  against  those  of  the  factory  owner  in  the  original 
decision.”
142 
Distributional consequences are likely to be more important in cases where 
the output of the transport industry will be affected by paying for damage: 
“Reducing the output (perhaps to zero) will affect levels of employment and 
incomes of (possibly) relatively poor workers … and the pollution conscious 
residents may in fact be relatively wealthy.”
143 
                                            
141 For this argument see Stephen 1988, p 62. 
142 Stephen 1988, p 63. 
143 Stephen 1988, p 63. 
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In addition, given the importance of the transport industry for the national 
and international division of labour and for the functioning of the internal 
market, we can reasonably expect that there are spillovers to other parts of 
the  economy,  resulting  in  patterns  of  redistribution  which  are  not  in 
accordance with the distributional goals of a society.  
The upshot of this argument is that distributional effects are relevant under 
the aspect  of  social welfare maximisation. However, it is a generally held 
view  among  economists  that  distributional  issues  may  often  best  be 
addressed directly, through tax and transfer schemes.
144 
2.5.3  The polluter pays principle and fairness between transport modes 
According  to  the  CE  study,  the  internalisation  of  external  costs  is  an 
important  precondition  to  “guarantee  fairness  between  transport  modes, 
that means fair prices considering the overall performance and potentials of 
the different transport modes”
145. Fairness in this context means to provide 
a level playing field for all modes of transport
146 and implies the elimination 
of  distortions  of  competition  between  transport  undertakings.  At  the  first 
glance, the goal of levelling the playing field for modes of transport seems to 
strongly support the implementation of the polluter pays principle. However, 
closer scrutiny raises doubts. Three arguments are pertinent here: 
•  Why  can  we  not  also  have  a  level  playing  field  between  modes  of 
transport  without  any  internalisation?  Each  mode  would  have  to 
compete on the basis of its direct operating costs. Of course, whether 
this  would  encourage  sustainable  transport  –  an  important  goal  of 
directive 2006/38/EC – is another question. 
•  If sustainable transport in the EC contributes to maximal welfare, we 
may well wonder whether an internalisation policy concerning all modes 
of  transport  is  adequate,  given  that  maximal  welfare  should  be  the 
ultimate  goal  of  public  policy.  Since  the  modes  of  transport  are 
heterogeneous  in  terms  of  the  type  and  scale  of  external  costs,  the 
transport routes taken and the abatement and avoidance technologies, 
it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  it  is  sustainable  that  each  mode  of 
transport should internalise its external costs. 
Consider  figure  2 9.  Remember  that  x  and  y  represent  the  abatement 
activities of the transport industry and the residents, respectively. For some 
cases,  the  situation  as  depicted  in  figure  2 9  might  be  relevant;  in  other 
cases, x should refer to the residents and y to the transport industry. There 
might  also  be  situations  in  which  it  is  efficient  to  abstain  from  an 
internalisation  at  all,  since  the  residents  are  the  cheapest  cost  avoiders. 
Which scenario is relevant is an empirical question. 
                                            
144 See Kaplow and Shavell 2002 p 33 34, 86, 460. 
145 CE study, p 1. 
146 See CE study, p 36. 
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Thus, we would agree with the quoted statement of the CE study that “the 
overall performance and potentials of the different transport modes” must 
be  taken  into  account  when  considering  the  issue  of  fairness  between 
transport modes from the point of view of maximal welfare. However we do 
not accept that the internalisation of external costs is always an important 
precondition for fairness. In a sense, this conclusion is in accordance with 
the  basic  message  of  second  best  theory  that  deviations  from  marginal 
social cost pricing may be appropriate from a social welfare point of view.
147 
2.5.4  The polluter pays principle and administrative costs 
All  policies  addressing  the  problem  of  external  costs  affect  peoples’  well 
being  not  only  to  the  extent  that  they  influence  their  incentives  and  the 
allocation of risks, but also on account of administrative costs. These costs 
include the setup and operating costs incurred by both the private and the 
public  sector  (legislation,  administration,  courts).  The  administrative  cost 
issues  should  be  addressed  using  a  comparative  institutions  approach.  In 
reality, all institutions – here broadly understood as rules and norms – are 
imperfect in the sense that they do not operate without costs: opportunity 
costs in terms of a misallocation of resources and risks, setup and operating 
costs. Consequently, rationality requires taking all costs into account when 
making an institutional choice. One could be inclined to make a case for the 
polluter pays principle out of this argument. 
We know that the cheapest cost avoider principle is superior to the polluter 
pays  principle  as  far  as  efficiency  is  concerned.  But  if  the  setup  and 
operating costs of the polluter pays principle were much lower than those 
resulting  from  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle,  such  that  the  cost 
differential stemming from the efficiency side is outweighed, society should 
prefer the polluter pays principle from a welfare point of view. 
Indeed, at first glance the polluter pays principle seems to beat the cheapest 
cost  avoider  principle  as  far  as  the  administrative  costs  are  concerned. 
Whereas the cheapest cost avoider principle requires some form of a cost 
benefit  analysis  to  be  undertaken  in  order  to  identify  the  cheapest  cost 
avoider,  the  polluter  pays  principle  simply  requires  information  about  the 
polluter.  
But  having  identified  this  polluter,  the  question  arises  how  to  determine 
what  he  should  pay.  In  order  to  solve  this  problem,  policy  makers  need 
information  on  the  external  costs  and  on  the  abatement  (or  avoidance) 
costs. But if policy makers have all this information, they know all that is 
necessary  to  identify  the  cheapest  cost  avoider.  If  they  do  not,  they  can 
                                            
147 It is well known from the economic literature that the internalisation of external 
costs can reduce welfare if firms have market power. In this case, output is too low 
from  a  welfare  point  of  view;  an  internalisation  policy  would  lead  to  a  further 
reduction of output, which is – over all – detrimental to social welfare. See Perloff 
2004, p 635 637; Just et al. 2004, p 537 538. 
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apply the polluter pays principle; however, whether their policy is efficient 
depends on luck and not on economic reasoning.
148 
However,  if  the  taxes  and  charges  or  the  non  market  instruments  of 
regulation are implemented without this knowledge, the policy variables will 
be  set  wrongly,  resulting  in  welfare  losses.  It  is  an  empirical  question 
whether  the  savings  on  the  information  cost  side  outweigh  the  costs  of 
wrong policy decisions in terms of welfare losses due to the misallocation of 
resources.  We  will  return  to  this  issue  when  discussing  criticism  raised 
against the cheapest cost avoider principle in the next section. 
Before  moving  to  this  discussion,  a  final  argument  weakening  the 
information  problems  mentioned  above  needs  to  be  studied:  We  do  have 
some information concerning the amount and the sources of external costs 
(environmental costs, costs of climate change etc.). We do not necessarily 
need information about the abatement (or avoidance) costs. Instead, we can 
rely on a mechanism, the operating of which creates incentives such that the 
knowledge possessed by the polluters regarding abatement (or avoidance) 
costs is used efficiently in a decentralised manner. Such a mechanism exists 
in the form of trading emission rights. Economists and policy makers are in 
favour  of  this  mechanism,  since  it  can  be  expected  that  a  given  goal  of 
emissions can be reached with least costs. In fact, this mechanism appears 
to  be  based  on  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  reasoning:  the  market 
ensures  that  the  marginal  abatement  costs  are  equalised  among  all 
participants  in  the  market.  The  given  goal  of  emissions  will  be  reached 
efficiently, i.e. with the least costs overall.  
This  result  is  well  in  line  with  what  is  called  cost effectiveness  analysis. 
However, there are two problems associated with such an analysis: the first 
one is to determine the maximum of emissions to be allowed. There is a 
danger  that  this  maximum  does  not  coincide  with  the  optimum.  The 
optimum is defined by the equimarginal principle: marginal abatement cost 
equal marginal external cost. If the maximum is higher than the optimum, 
welfare  losses  occur  due  to  a  too  high  scale  of  activities  generating 
emissions. If it is too low, then welfare losses result due to a too low scale of 
activities.  Thus,  cost effectiveness  analysis  does  not  guarantee  maximum 
welfare.  However,  it  might  be  helpful,  given  a  status  quo,  to  apply  an 
incremental policy asking, in the status quo, what are the incremental costs 
and benefits of a policy trying to restrict pollution. 
The second problem with a cost effectiveness analysis is to determine who 
should participate in this mechanism. Basically, polluters from all sectors of 
the economy should be included. Because the externalities concerned are of 
a  world  wide  order,  the  list  of  the  participants  in  the  market  has  to  be 
adapted to this frame. The problem is to define the relevant market in terms 
of  location  and  the  types  of  the  participants.  As  far  as  pollutees  can  be 
considered as the cheapest cost avoiders, they should also be included. 
                                            
148 Only if per chance the pollutee was already at an abatement optimum would a 
policy based only on information on the polluter be efficient. 
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2.6  Comparative Institutions: concerns about the application of the 
cheapest cost avoider principle  
In this section, we discuss a number of issues that appear to pose difficulties 
for  the  application  of  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle,  ranging  from 
problems  of  evaluation,  omission  of  “soft”  variables  (intangibles)  and 
fairness considerations to the problems  of indeterminacy, efficiency equity 
tradeoffs and the problems involved in predicting individuals’ behaviour. We 
will also deal with concerns that the value of the protection of nature as such 
seems  to  be  forgotten,  and  take  up  the  questions  whether  welfare 
maximisation is the final target of human activities, and whether one can 
compare the “right to pollute” to the “right to a clean environment”. In line 
with Kaplow and Shavell’s defence of the welfare economics framework
149, 
we  will  argue  that  many  of  these  issues  present  practical  challenges  to 
public  policy  analysis,  but  that  these  challenges  are  met  by  the  cheapest 
cost avoider principle.  
To see the difficulties which we examine below as a criticism of the cheapest 
cost avoider principle involves a misunderstanding. Making other criteria, for 
example the polluter pays principle, the basis for policy assessment turns 
out to be easier than a cost benefit analysis only if these alternatives ignore 
complexities  of  the  real  world  concerning  the  effects  of  public  policy  on 
individuals’ well being discussed below.
150  
2.6.1  Valuing non pecuniary factors such as life, pain and suffering 
One might object that the application of the cheapest cost avoider principle 
requires placing a Euro value on life, pain, suffering and other non pecuniary 
factors  that  do  not  seem  readily  convertible  into  such  a  common 
denominator. Indeed, economists quantify everything that is of value to us: 
money, of course, but also friendship, shade, nature, silence etc. Money is 
simply used as a unified measure in order to compare gains and losses. The 
translation into money values is not arbitrary: it is possible to find out what 
something  is  worth  to  a  person  via  his  willingness  to  pay  or  to  accept. 
People pay money in order to live in peace and quiet or in order to obtain a 
seat in the shade. This indicates the value of these benefits. People also give 
up certain privileges in exchange for money: for a sufficiently high salary, 
they are willing to move from their neighbourhood, they are even willing to 
risk  their  lives  (this  is  the  reason  why  security  personnel  in  Iraq  is  paid 
exorbitant  salaries).  There  is  nothing  that  cannot  be  translated  into 
monetary terms by this method. 
Far  from  assuming  that  “money  is  everything”,  economists  recognise  the 
value  of  non  monetary  benefits  and  losses.  They  use  money  simply  as  a 
scale of comparison. 
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Critiques of this practice of finding a common denominator fail to realise that 
it is a prerequisite to a coherent policy assessment: “As a matter of logic, it 
has  long  been  understood  that,  if  any  tradeoffs  are  to  be  made  among 
factors of concern, implicit prices can be used to signify the tradeoffs”.
151 
Kaplow and Shavell explain the tradeoff logic in this context this way: “We 
begin  by  observing  that  any  complete  theory  that  can  be  used  for  the 
evaluation of policy must be able to tell us whether it is desirable to spend 
$1,000,  $1,000,000,  $1,000,000,000,  or  half  the  GDP  to  do  so. 
Furthermore, we presume that any plausible theory will answer affirmatively 
if  the  cost  is  sufficiently  low  (only  $1)  and  negatively  if  the  cost  is 
sufficiently high (half the GDP). (…) Under any such theory, therefore, all 
else being equal, there will be some point – some dollar cost – below which 
it  is  deemed  appropriate  to  make  the  expenditure  and  above  which  it  is 
deemed inappropriate to do so. The concept of a monetary value of life in 
the present context simply refers to that point, whatever it happens to be. 
Moreover,  if  we  do  care  about  saving  lives  and  reducing  pain,  there  is  a 
virtue  in  formal  policy  analysis  being  explicit  about  the  valuations  to  be 
used. If tradeoffs are to be made consistently – which is necessary if one 
wishes, for example, to save more rather than fewer lives – one must know 
what  those  tradeoffs  are.  The  familiar  example  is  that  some  government 
regulations save a statistical life at costs of a hundred thousand dollars and 
others at costs in the billions; if the regulations were rationalised to use a 
consistent implicit valuation and if they continued to require the expenditure 
of  the  same  amount  of  resources, many  more  lives  would  be  saved.  The 
reason is that reallocating expenditures from places where they have a very 
low payoff in terms of saving lives to places where they have a very high 
payoff will greatly increase the number of lives saved.”
152 
The widely held belief that economists use a cold hearted approach or that 
they adopt a narrow view of what truly matters, and that the “antiseptic” 
language of policy analysis obscures what is really at stake
153 is incorrect. As 
Viscusi (1992)
154 indicates, using a common denominator does not deny that 
life, pain and suffering are what really matters.  The numbers assigned to 
costs and benefits are merely analytical constructs in order to represent the 
choice that individuals would make. Despite the public discussions about the 
priceless nature of life, policy makers cannot help but accept the basic point 
that logically consistent choice involves choosing between alternatives that, 
accordingly, have to be compared to each other.
155 
                                            
151 Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 450. 
152 Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 450 452. 
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154 Viscusi 2002, chapter 2. 
155 Note that even the Stern report applies this method. 
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2.6.2  “Soft” variables 
The  objection  here  is  that  economists  tend  to  speak  about  tradeoffs  in 
quantitative terms, and ignore factors that are difficult to quantify.
156 Even if 
this claim has some truth, it should be seen as an argument in favour of 
undertaking a more comprehensive analysis, rather than for substituting an 
inferior principle such as the polluter pays principle, which does not even in 
principle pay attention to the correct variables.
157 
Note the somewhat ironic fact that the objections to the omission of “soft” 
variables  stand  in  tension  to  the  previously  mentioned  criticism  of 
economists’  attitudes  to  quantify  factors  that  seem  least  amenable  to 
measurement. 
2.6.3  Empirical data concerns 
Policy conclusions derived from an application of the cheapest cost avoider 
principle  depend  on  empirical  data.  Even  if  the  analyst  makes  coherent 
judgements, when the available information is insufficient, the judgements 
are  bound  to  be  wrong.  That  is  true,  but  does  not  necessarily  require 
substituting  the  polluter  pays  principle  for  the  cheapest  cost  avoider 
principle, since the polluter pays principle is – as we have seen – affected by 
conceptual  shortcomings.  Substituting  the  polluter  pays  principle  for  the 
cheapest cost avoider principle would mean to substitute a systematic error 
for a practical challenge in public policy.  
There remains the question of how to use the cheapest cost avoider principle 
in  those  cases  in  which  it  yields  uncertain  conclusions.  There  are  two 
answers to this question, one addressing the short run and one the long run. 
When, in the short run, decisions must be based  on incomplete empirical 
information, policy makers should realise that even a proper analysis yields 
tentative conclusions in which they may have little confidence and take into 
account that a subsequent revision of policies may be required. 
In the long run, a proper use of the cheapest cost avoider principle is helpful 
to the formulation of scholarly agendas and government policy supporting 
this research. 
2.6.4  Fairness issues 
Our  analysis  proposes  the  pursuit  of  efficiency  rather  than  focussing  on 
equity. Indeed, there need not be a tradeoff between efficiency and equity. 
To illustrate: “Given a particular social welfare function, society might prefer 
an  inefficient  allocation  to  an  efficient  one.  We  can  show  this  result  by 
comparing  two  allocations.  In  Allocation  a,  you  have  everything  and 
everyone else has nothing. This allocation is Pareto efficient: We can’t make 
others  better  off  without  harming  you.  In  Allocation  b,  everyone  has  an 
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equal amount of goods. Allocation b is not Pareto efficient: I would be willing 
to trade all my zucchini for just about anything else. Despite Allocation b’s 
inefficiency, most people would probable prefer b to a. 
Although  society  might  prefer  an  inefficient  Allocation  b  to  an  efficient 
Allocation a, according to most social welfare functions, society would prefer 
some efficient allocation to b. Suppose that allocation c is the competitive 
equilibrium that would be obtained if people were allowed to trade starting 
from Endowment b, in which everyone has an equal share of all goods. By 
the  utilitarian  social  welfare  functions,  Allocation  b  might  be  socially 
preferred to Allocation a, but Allocation c is certainly socially preferred to b. 
After all, if everyone is as well off or better off in Allocation c than in b, c 
must  be  better  than  b  regardless  of  weights  on  individuals’  utilities. 
According to the utilitarian rule, however, b is preferred to c because only 
strict  equality  matters.  Thus  by  most  of  the  well  known  social  welfare 
functions, but not all, there is an efficient allocation that is socially preferred 
to  an  inefficient  allocation.”
158  Note  that  the  European  Union’s  institutions 
also consider efficiency, and not fairness, as one of its main goals.
159 
The  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  focuses  on  efficiency  or  wealth 
maximisation and interprets these measures as proxies for the maximisation 
of  social  welfare.  Indeed,  fairness  issues,  such  as  corrective  justice, 
distributive justice or the level playing field for competitors do not play any 
role. The neglect of notions of corrective justice cannot be judged a serious 
deficit, since these concepts are not well defined. Distributive concerns are 
more  effectively  addressed  directly,  through  the  income  tax  and  transfer 
system. Justice in the sense of having a level playing field will be realised as 
a by product of the application of the cheapest cost avoider principle, since 
it makes sure that all competitors in a market are confronted with that level 
of abatement (or avoidance) costs which is optimal from society’s point of 
view. 
In his book “The Economics of Justice”, Richard Posner develops the idea of 
wealth  maximisation  as  an  ethical  concept.
160  He  shows  that  “the  wealth 
maximisation principle encourages and rewards the traditional ‘Calvinist’ or 
‘Protestant’ virtues and capacities associated with economic progress” and 
points  out  that  “wealth  maximisation is  a  more  defensible  moral  principle 
also in that it provides a firmer foundation for a theory of distributive and 
corrective justice”.
161 
                                            
158 Perloff 2004, p 345 346, emphasis added. 
159  Conference  of  the  representatives  of  the  governments  of  the  Member  States, 
Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, 5 October 2004, CIG 1/1/07 REV 1, “Article 9 : 1. L'Union 
dispose  d'un  cadre  institutionnel  visant  à  promouvoir  ses  valeurs,  poursuivre  ses 
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As long as mankind does not live in paradise but rather has to struggle with 
the problem of scarcity, it seems morally and ethically imperative to avoid 
wasting resources; that is exactly what the maximisation of wealth means. 
Maximising the size of the pie is morally required, since with a bigger pie 
distributional  goals  and  equity  can  be  realised  more  easily  than  with  a 
smaller pie. In this sense, it is beside the point to talk about an efficiency 
equity  tradeoff.  Indeed,  as  can  be  shown  more  formally,  if  there  are  no 
wealth  effects,  and  there  is  the  possibility  of  side  payments  (taxes  and 
subsidies), everybody in a society is better off with wealth maximisation.
162 
If there are wealth effects, framing effects or a status quo bias, the analysis 
will be much more complicated, but welfare economics does show how to 
deal with these effects.
163 
If  one  can  make  offsetting  adjustments  to  the  income  tax  and  transfer 
system in order to ensure that the overall distribution of income remains the 
same, “the pure efficiency test will be determinate, and, more importantly, it 
will  indicate  which  reforms  raise  individuals’  well being  and  thus  increase 
social welfare”.
164 
2.6.5  Rational individual welfare maximisation 
The  analysis  of  sections  2.2 2.5,  which  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
cheapest cost avoider principle can guarantee efficiency whereas the polluter 
pays principle cannot, is based on the assumption that all actors are rational 
maximisers  of  their  own  welfare.  One  may  find  economic  assessments 
implying  this  assumption  problematic,  since  individuals  do  not  always 
behave strictly rationally. We all know that individuals may be compulsive, 
myopic, inconsistent, confused by uncertainty, irrational in their reactions to 
risk; they often have a preference for fairness and are motivated, at least in 
part, by the desire to  adhere to social norms.
165 Accepting this, however, 
does not force us to accept the implications which are sometimes supposed. 
It is often argued that public policy cannot rely on models (scenarios) based 
on the assumption of rationality because it is not realistic.  
At least four arguments speak against such a conclusion: 
First,  the  standard  assumption  of  rational  maximisation  has  proven  to  be 
useful in a wide range of settings, in particular in studies of the behaviour of 
private enterprises. Rational maximisation is often a good approximation of 
decision making behaviour, and especially in situations characterised by the 
anonymity  of  interacting  parties.  Assuming  a  type  of  bounded  rationality 
would  not  change  the  results  much,  since  even  here  it  is  assumed  that 
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individuals  try  to  do  their  best:  economic  actors  are  assumed  to  be 
“intendedly rational, but only limitedly so”.
166 
Secondly, one cannot reject the cheapest cost avoider principle and favour 
the polluter pays principle on the grounds that the analysis leading to the 
superiority  of  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  assumes  strict  rationality; 
indeed,  the  analysis  used  to  recommend  the  polluter  pays  principle  also 
relies on this assumption. 
Thirdly, it is clear that human behaviour is complex and not always easy to 
predict.  However,  if  one  seeks  to  make  problems  tractable  enough  to 
provide  for  some  illumination,  we  need  to  make  simplifying  assumptions 
which do not capture reality. The optimal scale of a map depends on the 
context that is going to be used in; a map with a scale of 1:1 is clearly of no 
use at all. The same applies to modelling human behaviour. 
Fourthly,  as  it  turns  out  that  predicting  the  effects  of  a  policy  is  very 
sensitive  to  the  behavioural  assumptions  made,  and  because  behavioural 
economics,  cognitive  psychology,  evolutionary  biology,  sociology,  or 
anthropology  yield  valid  insights,  they  should  be  incorporated  into  public 
policy analysis.
167 
2.6.6  The value of the protection of nature 
Is the intrinsic value of the protection of nature neglected? Before assessing 
the validity of this criticism it seems useful to repeat the fundamentals of 
external costs:  
•  External  costs  are  the  result  of  conflicting  interests  in  the  use  of  a 
scarce resource: nature (environment). 
•  Without rivalry there are no external costs. 
•  Consequently  damage  (=  external  cost)  is  jointly  caused  and  the 
treatment of the issue should take the reciprocal nature of the problem 
into account. 
•  Damage is always a loss of value to somebody from a change in the 
state (or quality) of the environment.  
Economists  take  an  anthropocentric  stance.  The  reason  why  the 
environment  (including  animals)  is  in  need  of  protection  is  simply  this:  a 
change in the state (or quality) of the environment is the loss of value to 
somebody. Due to the reciprocal nature of the externality, preventing this 
loss of value is necessarily accompanied by the creation of a loss of value to 
somebody else. Thus, nature is not taken into account as such. Rather, we 
include environmental considerations via their impact on persons. 
Consider the problems of giving nature a separate status, similar to that of 
the actors.  How to evaluate a change? The environment changes through 
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natural and man made factors. If, say, an oak dies and a birch grows in its 
place, would one consider this as damage to the environment? Surely not. If 
an oak is felled and a birch is planted instead, would that be damage? It 
could be, if oaks are considered as more valuable than birches. If not, there 
is no reason to consider the change as damage.   
Consider  another  example.  Man  Friday  is  alone  on  his  island.  His  actions 
have no effect on other islands. He decides to fell all the trees and to plant a 
flower garden instead. If he does so, this implies that he gains from living on 
an island covered in a flower garden instead of trees. No damage is caused 
by  the  replacement  of  the  trees.  Now  consider  the  same  situation  when 
Robinson Crusoe has arrived on the island. Robinson values the shade of the 
trees to protect him from the sun. If Friday fells the trees, this comes at a 
cost to Robinson: damage is done.  
The environment is a scarce resource. There are competing uses for it: some 
benefit from trees, other benefit from felling them; some benefit from clean 
air, others benefit from emitting exhausts into the air. As a consequence, a 
change in the status quo of the use of the environment (or another scarce 
resource) is bound to harm somebody and to profit another. 
Our  framework  makes  it  possible  to  incorporate  environmental 
considerations  into  the  analysis  without  making  an a  priori  judgement  on 
whether it is more important to protect the environment or the economy, for 
example.  As  long  as  people  value  a  clean  environment,  pollution  causes 
damage, and this damage has an impact on the result of the considerations. 
2.6.7  The interests of future generations 
In the analysis of sections 2.2 2.5 (see especially figures 2 1 to 2 8) it is 
implicitly assumed that the benefit function of the polluters and the damage 
function  of  the  pollutees  are  known.  In  addition,  the  relevance  of  the 
cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  is  described  in  terms  of  the  interests  of 
present generations. 
There are two major difficulties with this approach. 
Firstly, the benefit and cost functions for all affected parties cannot always 
be specified. For non market outcomes, shadow prices must be derived. This 
is  not  an  easy  task.  Moreover,  many  externalities, for  example  ecological 
externalities, are largely unforeseen. Human beings and other species exist 
in  a  complex  interaction  with  their  environments.  Changes  in  the 
environment will have repercussions on living species, existing generations 
and future generations, which are not easy to isolate.  
Despite the current campaign to convince the public worldwide that global 
warming and climate change will endanger mankind, the precise nature of 
the many ecological links between humans and their environment and the 
interdependencies  between  environmental  parameters  are  still  not  well 
understood. Indeed, one can question whether even the theory of complex 
systems  allows  predicting  the  state  of  the  environment,  say  in  2050  or 
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2090. This is not to say that we should neglect these possibilities. However, 
it  seems  preferable  to  treat  these  externalities  in  the  context  of 
uncertainty.
168  In  any  case,  cost benefit  analysis  is  capable  of  addressing 
problems  of  uncertainty.  A  policy  governed  by  the  cheapest  cost  avoider 
principle can draw on these insights. 
Many  ecological  changes  will  also  affect  future  generations.  There  are  a 
number  of  competing  ethical  positions  that  one  can  hold  on  how  to  take 
their interests into account, some of which we list here:
169 
•  Intergenerational neutrality represented by a  near zero time discount 
rate
170; 
•  Each generation should have at least as much societal capital (tangible, 
natural, human and technological) as it inherited. A wide array of time 
discount rates would be admitted; 
•  Societies should maximise the well being of the poorest generation. As 
a  consequence,  the  current  consumption  should  increase  sharply  to 
reflect the projected future improvements in productivity; 
•  The  minimax  or  precautionary  principle  implies  that  societies  should 
maximise the minimum consumption along the riskiest path. 
However, none of these approaches can resolve the fundamental problem in 
taking future generations into account, which is that they do not yet exist, 
and  that  therefore  their  preferences  cannot  be  known.  As  Dasgupta  and 
Pearce mention, judgements must therefore be made on two bases: “Either 
the current generation alone must count, or the decision maker must judge 
on behalf of future generations, guessing as to their likely preferences. Cost 
benefit  analysis  tends  either  to  limit  society  to  present  generations,  or  it 
implicitly assumes that future generations will have a want structure very 
much like the existing one. As such, the two approaches tend to produce the 
same answers”.
171 
Four  problems  need  to  be  addressed  before  undertaking  a  cost benefit 
analysis: 
•  Is it reasonable to expect that future generations have a want structure 
very much like the existing one? 
•  How can the future generations be committed to want what we want 
them to want? 
•  What is the weight that the present generation attaches to the interests 
of future generations? The question is that of determining the “correct” 
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social  discount  rate.
172  Who  is  to  decide  upon  this  rate?  Scientists 
cannot do so, since the decision on the value of the social discount rate 
is  necessarily  based  on  value  judgements.  In  a  democracy,  voters 
should possibly make this choice.
173 However, individuals and politicians 
tend  to  be  notoriously  myopic.  In  this  respect,  it  is  of  a  particular 
importance to realise that ecological externalities frequently take on the 
attribute of “irreversibility”, i.e. they cannot be altered. 
•  How to take account of the fact that future generations are probably 
much richer than the present generation?  
The  upshot  is  that  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle,  properly  defined, 
neglects  neither  uncertainty  nor  the  interests  of  future  generations.  To 
define the cheapest cost avoider principle properly means to give it an inter 
temporal  dimension.  This  raises  the  question:  who  is  the  cheapest  cost 
avoider: the present or the future generations? 
2.6.8  Costs of the cheapest cost avoider principle  
Whether a governmental decision procedure is welfare maximising not only 
depends on its theoretical accuracy in tracking overall welfare, but also on 
its decision costs. It might well be the case that a decision procedure is in 
principle welfare maximising compared to available competitor theories, but 
that its decision making costs are so high that, at a first glance, an inferior 
procedure should be chosen after all.
174 
As a form of cost benefit analysis, the decision costs of the cheapest cost 
avoider principle are those of the cost benefit analysis. These include both 
direct  costs,  such  as  wages  for  agency  staff,  the  cost  of  information 
gathering, processing costs of carrying out the procedure, overhead costs, 
fees  for  the  work  of  analysts  and  advisors,  and  the  costs  of  the  delayed 
undertaking  of  beneficial  policies.
175  Cost benefit  analysis  can  entail 
relatively high costs.
176 
To  evaluate  the  soundness  of  this  complaint  one  would  need  concrete 
figures. Morgenstern and Landy have collected estimates of the direct costs 
of  preparing  cost benefit  documents  for  an  Office  of  Management  and 
Budget (OMB) review.
177 As Adler and Posner put it: “These data suggest 
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the evaluation of the costs and benefits of the Californian policy. See Stavins et al. 
2007. 
173 See Sinn 2007. 
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that cost benefit analysis has substantial direct costs, in the vicinity of $1 
million   $2 million on average. More precisely, cost benefit analysis’ direct 
costs, as compared to a decision procedure with zero direct costs – one that 
involves  no  information  gathering,  computation  or  analytic  effort  by  the 
agency, seems to be of $1 million   $2 million on average.”
178 
One can imagine administrative decision procedures with nearly zero direct 
costs, for example if a statute instructs an agency to issue particular rules, 
with the subject matter specified in detail. Of course, such a statute does 
not leave an agency any discretion.
179 As Adler and Posner  rightly put it: 
“although the agency itself incurs no direct costs, the process of information 
gathering  and  analysis  is  simply  shifted  from  administrative  officials  to 
legislative staff”.
180 
Furthermore, the comparative institutions approach is pertinent. As long as 
the competing procedures, such as the polluter pays principle, are general 
devices to structure agency choice in cases where agencies retain statutory 
discretion,  “(a)ll  such  procedures  will  involve  nontrivial  information 
gathering, computation, and analytic effort by agencies”
181. In addition, the 
costs  of  committing  errors  of  type  I  (false  positives),  and  type  II  (false 
negatives), have to be taken into account. 
Even if it turned out that the costs of the cheapest cost avoider principle are 
higher than those of the polluter pays principle, this does not mean that the 
cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  should  be  rejected.  For  sufficiently  large 
projects, the added value of the cheapest cost avoider principle compared to 
the  polluter  pays  principle  can  justify  high  analytical  and  information 
gathering expenditures.
182  
However,  this  is  only one  side  of  the  medal  when  evaluating  cost benefit 
analysis.  There  is  another  side:  “Assuming  cost benefit  analysis  is  more 
accurate  in  practice  than  competitors  (taking  into  consideration  not  just 
intrinsic  accuracy  but  also  agency  mistakes  and  opportunism),  this  direct 
cost will be swamped by the expected benefits of cost benefit analysis”.
183 
The other common objection to cost benefit analysis is that it is bound to 
substantially delay or block agency decision making. As leading opponents of 
cost benefit  analysis  put  it:  cost benefit  analysis  means  “paralysis  by 
analysis”
184. We cannot discuss the delay issue here, which is linked to  a 
more general worry about the structure of administrative decision making, in 
detail. For a short, but careful analysis we refer to Adler and Posner (2006), 
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Posner 2006, p 88 98; for the issue of opportunism see Adler and Posner 2006, p 
101 123. 
184 McGarity 1998 p 50. 
121 Schmidtchen et al.: The Internalisation of External Costs in Transport: From the
Produced by bepress.com, 2011From the polluter pays to the cheapest cost avoider principle  
  107 
who  point  out  “that  existing  evidence  and  the  political  economy  of 
rulemaking call into question the claim that cost benefit analysis produces 
substantial incremental delay, as compared to non welfare focussed, narrow 
welfare  focused,  or  hybrid  procedures  (…)(and  that)  cost benefit  analysis 
can be expected to have small incremental decision costs – both direct and 
delay  costs  –  as  compared  to  its  ‘wide’  competitor,  namely,  intuitive 
balancing.”
185 
2.6.9  Social constraints  
If the cheapest cost avoider principle is clearly the better policy approach, 
why  is  the  polluter  pays  principle  dominant  in  practice?  Three  arguments 
seem particularly pertinent: 
1)  An important part of the answer involves social norms that guide well 
socialised  members  of  society  in  everyday  life.  It  seems  fair  that  he 
whose  action  is  the  source  of  damage  should  be  held  liable.  The 
attachment to social norms, whether due to socialisation or to evolution, 
which tend to have the function of promoting individuals’ well being in 
ordinary  interactions,  does  not  imply  that  analysts  and  policy  makers 
elevate  them  to  the  status  of  independent  evaluative  principles  for 
assessing public policy.
186 As Kaplow and Shavell rightly put it: “Indeed, 
it would be ironic to treat social norms as the basis for giving weight to 
notions of fairness if in fact the purpose of the social norms is to promote 
individuals’ well being in the contexts in which the norms have arisen – 
because the consequences of treating notions of fairness as independent 
principles  for  policy  analysis  can  only  be  to  reduce  individuals’  well 
being.”
187   
Policy makers and analysts should be aware that justifications for relying 
on notions of fairness, depending on our instincts and intuitions and on 
our general sense for what is appropriate, which make sense for many 
choices that individuals confront in everyday life, may be inadequate for 
the design of socially optimal policies.   
Given  our  instincts  and  intuitions,  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that 
scholars,  analysts  and  politicians  will  continue  to  advance  notions  of 
fairness as principles which should guide public policy, and in particular 
environmental policy. If a notion of fairness is to be taken seriously, five 
issues need to be addressed.
188 
•  “First, proponents of a notion of fairness must state the principles 
they are defending with some degree of precision and in a manner 
that is reasonably complete.” 
                                            
185 Adler and Posner 2006, p 87. 
186  See  Kaplow  and  Shavell  2002,  p  467,  discussing  notions  of  fairness  that 
correspond to social norms. 
187 Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 467. 
188 See Kaplow and Shavell 2002, p 470 472. 
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•  “Second,  adherence  to  notions  of  fairness  often  leads  to 
consequences that seem to conflict with the underlying motivations 
of  the  notions,  a  tension  that  the  notions’  proponents  need  to 
resolve.” 
•  “Third, because notions of fairness sometimes result in a reduction 
in individuals’ well being – and in certain cases lead to a reduction 
in  everyone’s  well being  –  when  they  are  given  weight  as 
independent evaluative principles, the manner in which the notion of 
fairness sacrifices welfare should be identified clearly so that it will 
be possible to appreciate what is at stake in adopting the principle.” 
•  “Fourth, the rationale for giving weight to notions of fairness should 
be made clear.” 
•  “Fifth, it is necessary to consider possible alternative explanations of 
the source of the underlying attraction of notions of fairness.” 
2)  Another reason for the tendency to think along the lines of the polluter 
pays principle in the public arena is a one sided view of the problem of 
external  costs.  One  can  observe  much  confusing  rhetoric  in  this  field. 
The environment is seen as a subject that is able to suffer from pollution 
or to be grateful for  a reduction in pollution; it is anthropomorphised, 
giving  it  a  status  of  dignity  and  attaching  intrinsic  value  to  it.  This 
rhetoric  seems  convincing;  however,  it  ignores  fundamentals  of  the 
notion of external cost.   
3)  The last explanation for the dominant role that the polluter pays principle 
plays in the way of thinking about environmental problems that we want 
to mention is the self interest of government decision makers, especially 
politicians and public officials. Of course, as the rhetoric goes, their task 
is to choose policies that best advance the citizens whom they serve. As 
the  economic  theory  of  democracy
189  teaches,  public  officials  who 
compete for votes to be elected or re elected have incentives to promote 
the  policies  which  serve  their  purpose  best.  Of  course,  their  task  is 
complicated by the fact that their constituents may often not be able to 
understand what really matters.   
Consider  the  scenarios  used  in  section  2.2.  There  is  “the  transport 
industry”  on  the  one  hand,  which  is  supposed  to  be  able  to  pass 
additional costs on to its customers, who in turn behave in a similar way. 
Through a trickling down effect, the burden is distributed onto the whole 
economy. On the other hand, there are thousands of residents who are 
potential  voters.  In  this  case,  which  kind  of  policy  probably  has  more 
appeal to a politician: one based on the polluter pays principle or one 
based  on  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle?  Politicians  will  clearly 
prefer the polluter pays principle.   
Nevertheless, in the long run, government decision making may be able 
to make better policy decisions if those who analyse and advise decision 
                                            
189 See the literature on rent seeking, for example, Buchanan et al. 1980, Mueller 
2003. 
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makers  devote  themselves  to  identifying  and  recommending  the  rules 
and principles which best serve the common good. 
 
In summary, part II compares the polluter pays principle with the cheapest 
cost avoider principle. The underlying logic of the polluter pays principle, i.e. 
the  Pigovian  way  of  economic  thinking,  is  fallacious  because  the  mere 
existence  of  externalities  does  not,  of  itself,  provide  any  reason  for 
governments to induce polluters to take action. Indeed, the polluters might 
well  be  the  highest  cost  avoiders.  Thus,  full  internalisation  is  not  always 
socially useful in that it does not necessarily maximise welfare. Moreover, 
the  polluter  pays  principle  does  not  take  into  account  the  fact  that 
externalities are caused jointly, i.e. that both the polluter and the pollutee 
“cause”  the  damage.  Finally,  the  basic  insight  is  that  of  Ronald  Coase’s 
seminal  1960  article  which  states  that  the  externality  problem  is  of  a 
reciprocal nature. 
The real question that needs deciding is: Should the polluter be allowed to 
harm  the  pollutee,  or  should  the  pollutee  have  the  right  to  restrain  the 
polluter? The problem is to avoid the most serious harm, and its solution is 
the cheapest cost avoider principle. 
The  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  requires  policy makers  to  undertake 
some  form  of  cost benefit  analysis  for  major  regulatory  proposals.  They 
have to prepare what has become known as a regulatory impact analysis, 
regulatory  impact  appraisal,  or  regulatory  impact  assessment.  Maximising 
the welfare of society, i.e. the sum of the welfare of its members, requires a 
comparison of the costs and benefits of different regulatory options and the 
choice of the option which promises the highest net benefit to society. 
The cheapest cost avoider principle presents a number of clear advantages 
over the polluter pays principle: 
•  It  guarantees  efficiency,  i.e.  no  waste  of  resources,  which  is  in  turn 
fundamental in the pursuit of the Lisbon goals of jobs and growth.  
•  It is a better means to achieve fairness than the polluter pays principle. 
•  It  studies  a  broader  set  of  options.  In  contrast  to  the  polluter  pays 
principle, it can lead to the choice of innovative projects. 
•  Its  use  of  cost benefit  analysis  in  a  welfare  economics  framework 
makes it take into account a much broader range of relevant variables, 
such as administration costs or values. 
•  The  logic  of  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  helps  to  avoid 
regulatory failure and contributes to the success of the Commission’s 
Better  Regulation  Agenda  at  the  heart  of  which  is  regulatory  impact 
assessment. 
The cheapest cost avoider principle clearly beats the polluter pays principle 
in terms of efficiency. However, one should ask whether efficiency or wealth 
maximisation are all that matters. Of course, notions of corrective justice, 
moral values, distributive justice, fairness between transport modes as well 
as the administration costs should be taken into account when choosing the 
principle to guide public policy. However, we find that the efficiency deficits 
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of  the  polluter  pays  principle  cannot  be  outweighed  by  the  mentioned 
factors. 
There are also a number of concerns about the applicability of the cheapest 
cost avoider principle. However, many concerns mentioned present practical 
challenges to all types of public policy analysis instead of being a criticism of 
the  theory  underpinning  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle.  There  is  no 
criticism that can be made of the cheapest cost avoider principle that is not 
also  valid  for  the  polluter  pays  principle.  Thus,  the  cheapest  cost  avoider 
principle should guide public policy. 
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3  Case Studies 
3.1  Introduction 
In this part, we will apply the cheapest  cost  avoider principle to two real 
world  cases:  the  question  of  the  construction  of  the  missing  part  of  the 
motorway  A44  near  Kassel  in  Germany,  and  the  problem  of  the  sectoral 
limiting of the use of the Inn valley motorway in Austria. These case studies, 
although sketchy, show that it is possible to apply the cheapest cost avoider 
principle  to  such  cases,  that  a  clear  answer  can  be  obtained,  and  that 
judicial decisions are based on the same methodology. 
In the first of the case studies, which we will call the A44 case, there exist 
plans for the motorway A 44 connecting Dortmund to Kassel to be extended 
in the direction Erfurt, Chemnitz and Dresden, via Eisenach (see fig. 3 1). 
However, except for a small section, these plans have never been realised. 
Instead, there is a direct road B7 between Kassel and Eisenach along the 
route  of  the  planned  motorway.  This  route  is  closed  to  trucks,  who  are 
obliged to drive a detour of 42 km via the motorways A7 and A4. In what 
follows, we will make a regulatory impact assessment in order to determine 
whether this is efficient, or whether it would be better for trucks to use the 
B7 or to build the missing motorway link between Kassel and Eisenach.  
Figure 3-1 Map of the A44 case 
 
Source: Google Maps 
Case 2 concerns the prohibition of a 46 km long section of the Inn valley 
motorway for trucks transporting goods belonging to a number of sectors 
(see fig. 3 2). Following the decision of the European Court of Justice, this 
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prohibition is not in force. We will apply the cheapest cost avoider analysis in 
order to determine whether closing the motorway to certain trucks is indeed 
the efficient solution, or whether the externalities can be reduced at a lower 
cost by other means. 
Figure 3-2 Map of the Inn valley motorway 
 
Source: Google Maps 
In the first case, the transport industry loses from the status quo compared 
to alternative scenarios. It would save costs if trucks were allowed to use 
the B7, or if the A 44 were extended to Eisenach. In the second case, the 
concerned sectors would suffer losses if they were prohibited from driving on 
the relevant section on the Inn valley motorway. 
3.2  Methodological considerations 
Transport  traffic  imposes  external  costs  on  residents:  noise,  pollution,  an 
increased  number  of  accidents  etc.  The  polluter  pays  principle  prescribes 
that the transport industry should be made liable for the damages caused. 
This  can  take  the  form  of  a  Pigovian  tax  or,  as  is  the  case  here,  of  a 
regulation forbidding trucks to drive through the affected area. This measure 
reduces the externality to zero; in the case where certain trucks can use the 
motorway  during  limited  time  periods,  the  externality  is  reduced  but  not 
eliminated. 
The preceding part has shown that it is not necessarily the most efficient 
solution to make the polluter pay. Only an analysis following the cheapest 
cost avoider approach can determine where the optimal outcome lies. 
We have also seen that the cheapest cost avoider methodology shares some 
of the polluter pays principle’s downsides, i.e. the difficulty of applying a first 
best  solution  and  incomplete  information.  There  is  no  infinity  of  possible 
regulations: regulators can decide on whether to allow transport traffic or 
not, they can limit it to daytime hours but they cannot limit it to 16 hours 32 
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minutes a day, even if this were the theoretical optimum. Even if they could, 
the enforcement of such a rule might be too costly. The number of scenarios 
is thus limited. 
The same applies to data. It is not always possible to correctly estimate the 
exact  costs  and  benefits  of  possible  scenarios  before  they  are  actually 
realised. Even the real world status quo cannot be correctly evaluated: from 
a data point of view, it is impossible to take into account all externalities to 
every possible person, as well as all costs of reducing the externalities. For 
example,  it  is  sufficient  for  a  resident  to  move  away  from  the  concerned 
area to reduce the externality. A reduction in the price of a good in a distant 
market  can  make  the  concerned  transport  sector  give  up  using  the 
motorway because the goods can no longer be sold at a price that covers 
the transport costs, thus reducing the cost of closing the motorway. These 
are only examples of the huge number of possible changes that can impact 
on the costs. All cost estimations must therefore be treated with caution. 
What is more, some of the necessary data is simply not available, or it is 
flawed. The same arguments hold for the benefit side. 
This does not, however, mean that it is impossible to make a decision. Not 
doing anything, i.e. maintaining the status quo (BAU), is a decision in itself. 
Any  decision  should  be  justified  by  applying  the  cheapest  cost  avoider 
approach to the available data. Even incomplete data can indicate where the 
best solution lies. 
Which data is needed to be able to proceed with the analysis? We need to 
establish  an  estimate  of  how  much  polluter  pays  measures  cost  or  would 
cost  the  transport  industry.  This  is  compared  to  the  externality  costs 
generated in the different scenarios, and to the costs of other actors, i.e. the 
residents,  of  reducing  the  externalities.  Additional  costs,  such  as  public 
investments, are taken into account where necessary. We need to know the 
time frame, the social discount rate and possible future development (risk 
and uncertainty). 
The  social  discount  rate  indicates  the  value  of  future  benefits  and  costs. 
“Global climate change unfolds over a time scale of centuries and, through 
the power of compound interest, what to do now is hugely sensitive to the 
discount rate that is postulated. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that 
the  biggest  uncertainty  of  all  in  the  economics  of  climate  change  is  the 
uncertainty about which interest rate to use for discounting.”
190 The less the 
future is valued, the higher it is, and the less the same face value in the 
future is worth now. The social discount rate is case specific. It is habitually 
set at 5 6%.
191 However, much lower discount rates apply to projects that 
                                            
190 Weitzman 2007, p 705. 
191 HEATCO 2005, p 15 quotes EC DG Regional Policy 2002 as “suggesting the use of 
a  European  discount  rate  equal  to  5%”.  Weitzman  2007,  p  707,  calculates  a 
reasonable discount (= interest) rate at 6%. 
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affect  future  generations  in  order  to  be  able  to  take  their  interests  into 
account (see section 2.6.7).
192 
It is also possible to take growth into account. Growth can compensate the 
discount effect. A social discount rate that is only slightly higher than the 
growth rate leads to a low net discount rate.
193 
3.3  The case of the missing A44 
As stated in the introduction to part III, the case of the missing A44 is one 
in  which  trucks  are  forced  to  make  a  considerable  detour.  They  are  not 
allowed to use the direct road B7. Except for a short stretch, plans to extend 
the A44 motorway to create a direct link between Kassel and Eisenach have 
not been realised. 
3.3.1  Cheapest cost avoider analysis 
The Kassel chamber of commerce (hereafter IHK Kassel) conducted a series 
of  interviews  with  companies.  It  discovered  considerable  adverse 
consequences of the detour, both economic and environmental. 
The economic consequences for the transport industry result from the extra 
time that it takes to make the detour. A truck takes one hour longer to drive 
along the A7/A4 route than it would if the A44 were extended. Per year, this 
implies 780,000 extra driving hours, and 39 million € extra costs at 50 € per 
truck hour. Close to 100% of the interviewed companies estimate that the 
extension of the A44 is urgently necessary. 
Concerning  the  externalities  generated  by  the  detour,  the  IHK  Kassel 
estimates that 3,000 trucks drive the 42 km detour every day, driving 32.76 
million extra kilometres a year (at 260 working days a year). 18 litres of 
diesel  are  needed  to  drive  the  42  km;  as  a  consequence,  14  million 
supplementary litres of diesel are burnt. The resulting extra emissions per 
year are given as 37.627 t of CO2, 213 t CO, 63t HC, 445 t NOX, 9 t particles 
and noise pollution on the 42 extra km. Note that the IHK Kassel study does 
not translate these figures into monetary costs.  
Other studies do provide figures for the externalities. The CE study suggests 
an average load factor of 15t per vehicle. For 32.76 million extra kilometres, 
this implies 491,240,000 extra t per km per year. Using the CE estimates of 
the  total  externalities  for  inter  urban  HGV  traffic,  we  calculate  an 
externalities cost interval between 147,323,000 € and 589,488,000 €
194. The 
HGV €/tkm are estimated between 0.3 and 1.2. The Infras study however 
                                            
192 See for example the Stern report 2007, which applies a discount rate of 1.4%. 
This low interest rate is however considered too low by many commentators; see for 
example Weitzmann 2007, p 705 709. 
193  In  economics,  the  relation  between  the  discount  and  the  growth  rate  is 
summarised in the Ramsey equation: r = δ+ηg, where r is the interest rate, δ is the 
rate  of  pure  time  preference,  η  is  the  elasticity  of  marginal  utility,  and  g  is  the 
growth rate of consumption. See Weitzmann 2007, p 706 and HEATCO 2005. 
194 CE Study, p 32. 
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assumes  only  0.0712  €/tkm.  This  figure  implies  the  much  lower  cost  of 
externalities of 34,878,040 €. Note that this figure represents a seventeenth 
of the upper estimate established with the CE study figures. 
Based on these figures, let us construct 3 scenarios in order to determine 
threshold values that would justify the status quo. 
Table 3-1 Extra costs of the status quo 







Economic  costs  for  the 
transport industry 
39 
Externality costs  34.88  147.37  589.49 
Total  73.88  186.37  628.49 
 
The  values  in  Table  3 1  summarise  the  extra  costs  compared  to  trucks 
driving along the A44. 
However, the A44 still needs to be built. Motorway construction is financed 
by the tax payers. If it costs less than the lowest estimation of the extra 
costs of the detour to extend the motorway, then the cheapest cost avoider 
principle  states  that  it  would  be  socially  optimal  for  the  motorway  to  be 
built. Costs that are engendered in the status quo would be avoided at the 
lesser cost of extending the motorway. 
If, on the other hand, the motorway link from Kassel to Eisenach cost more 
than the highest estimate of the total cost of the detour, then it is socially 
optimal not to build the motorway, in spite of the costs of the detour. 
We have three estimations of the cost of building a kilometre of motorway. 
The German ministry for traffic estimates that 1900 km motorway can be 
built for a total cost of 15 billion €, or approximately 7.7 million €/km.
195 The 
estimates  of  the  costs  of  the  A44  are  of  15  million  €/km.
196  Finally,  we 
assume a “worst case” scenario with high construction costs of 27 million €. 
The  length  of  the  route  of  the  A44  between  Kassel  and  the  A7  close  to 
Eisenach is approx. 63km.
197 Table 3 2 compares the estimated costs of the 
detour  to  the  costs  of  the  construction  of  the  motorway  with  a  one  year 
horizon. 
                                            
195 See Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung 2007. 
196 See Aktionsgemeinschaft Verkehr Nordhessen 2004. 
197 See Aktionsgemeinschaft Verkehr Nordhessen 2004. 
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Table 3-2 Cost-benefit analysis detour – A44, 1 year horizon (Million €) 
Detour cost 
scenario 




Low 7.7  Medium 
15 
High 27  Low 7.7  Medium 
15 
High 27  Low 7.7  Medium 
15 
High 27 
Extra  costs 
of the detour 





485.11  495  17011  485.11  495  17011  485.11  495  17011 
Difference 
detour  – 
motorway 
construction 
 411.22   871.12   1627.12   298.73   758.63   1514.63  143.69   316.21   1072.21 
 
Table  3 2  shows  that  all  other  things  held  equal,  there  is  only  one 
combination  of  figures  that  would  make  building  the  motorway  beneficial 
from its first year. This is the highlighted case, i.e. where the costs of the 
detour  are  very  high,  and  the  costs  of  the  motorway  correspond  to  the 
lowest  of  the  estimates.  It  would  save  143.69  million  €  to  build  the 
motorway in this case.  
In all following years, suppose there are no costs (the motorway is built), 
and only benefits from avoiding the detour. Assume that the decision maker 
considers  a  10  year  horizon  with  no  discount.  Externalities  and  economic 
losses are repeated every year, i.e. they are multiplied by 10. However, the 
motorway  is  only  built  once.  We  assume  that  its  maintenance  costs  are 
negligible,  and  that  the  amount  of  traffic  remains  unchanged.  Table  3 3 
compares the possible different outcomes using this 10 year horizon. 
Table 3-3 Cost-benefit analysis detour / A44, 10 year horizon (Million €) 
Detour  cost 
scenario 




Low 7.7  Medium 
15 
High 27  Low 7.7  Medium 
15 
High 27  Low 7.7  Medium 
15 
High 27 
Extra costs of 
the detour 





485.11  495  17011  485.11  495  17011  485.11  495  17011 
Difference 
detour  – 
motorway 
construction 
252.9  243  -963  1378.6  1368.7  162.7  5799.8  5789.9  4583.9 
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The situation is now inversed: if we consider a 10 year horizon, in all figure 
combinations  but  one,  it  is  preferable  to  go  ahead  with  building  the 
motorway,  because  building  the  motorway  is  less  costly  than  bearing  the 
economic and environmental costs of the detour. Using the 10 year horizon 
makes us arrive at the opposite conclusion to the one year horizon: on the 
condition that we exclude the extreme case, i.e. low detour costs and high 
motorway construction costs, it is inefficient to let the polluter pay, i.e. to 
direct HGV on the detour. Instead, social welfare would be increased if the 
motorway was built. This result is robust although we included a scenario 
with very high motorway construction costs. It therefore takes into account 
and  corrects  the  “optimism bias”,  which  is  the  systematic  ex  ante 
underestimation of costs.
198 
A number of additional considerations accentuate this result. For example, it 
is  plausible  that  HGV  traffic  will  increase  as  a  consequence  of  economic 
growth and of increasing trade between Eastern and Western Europe. In this 
case, the detour costs would rise, and it would again clearly pay to construct 
the  motorway.  On  the  other  hand,  traffic  might  increase  because  of  the 
construction  of  the  motorway.  Then  the  motorway  would  lead  to  extra 
emissions, causing externality costs which would possibly tip the balance in 
favour  of  the  detour.  Generally  speaking,  we  can  say  that  the longer  the 
time horizon, and on the condition that the social discount rate of the detour 
costs  is  not  too  high
199,  the  clearer  it  becomes  that  under  status  quo 
conditions filling in the missing link in the A44 is the least cost option for 
society. 
The status quo is to block truck traffic from using the B7, sending it on the 
A4/A7 detour. Given that the A44 does not yet exist, we use the cheapest 
cost avoider principle to test whether this solution is efficient. How does the 
detour compare to the B7? 
Consider first economic costs. According to Google Maps, the detour takes 
1h23, while the B7 route takes 1h25: while the B7 is more direct, it applies 
stricter  speed  limits.  We  therefore  assume  that  there  is  no  significant 
economic difference between the travelling time of the two.  There  are no 
construction  costs:  the  only  distinguishing  variable  concerns  the 
externalities.  
We know that the detour is approx. 42 km longer than the B7 route; we 
have already estimated the extra externality that is implied. The extra costs 
of the detour indicate that the B7 would be the cheapest cost avoider route. 
This result holds even if one sets the externality relative to the concerned 
population: the towns and villages along the B7 comprise a population of 
approx.  30.000.  One  of  the  many  towns  along  the  detour  route,  Bad 
Hersfeld, has the same number of inhabitants. As a consequence, all figures 
                                            
198 For a discussion of the optimism bias, see HEATCO 2005. 
199 For simplicity, the social discount factor in Table 3 3 is zero. This assumption is 
not invalidating. It is discussed further on. 
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indicate that the detour involves higher externalities which concern a higher 
number of persons than the B7 route (see Table 3 4). 
Table 3-4 Comparing detour to B7 
In million €  Detour  B7 
Population 
concerned 
> 30.000  ~ 30.000 
Extra  externality 
costs 
738.8  1863.7  6284.9  0 
 
Why,  then,  are  the  trucks  redirected  onto  the  detour?  We  consider  three 
possibilities. The first is that we have neglected a significant variable in the 
above  reasoning.  If,  say,  the  population  close  to  the  existing  motorways 
does  not  suffer  a  high  utility  loss  from  the  extra  pollution  caused  by  the 
detour, and if the population along the B7 suffered an extremely high utility 
loss from having trucks drive through their villages, then the result would be 
inversed and the detour would be the cheapest cost avoider solution.  
It could also be that HGV traffic causes high repair costs on the B7. 
An alternative explanation is that the damage imposed on the B7 residents 
by  the  trucks  was  treated  according  to  the  polluter  pays  principle,  i.e. 
making  the  transport  sector  responsible  for  the  reduction  of  the  damage 
caused by it (in this case to zero), without taking into account that it might 
be  more  efficient  to  allow  the  trucks  to  impose  the  harm  on  the  B7 
residents, rather than to make them generate greater harm on the larger 
number of persons living along the detour. 
Now let us compare the construction of the A44 to opening the B7 to HGVs. 
Assume  that  as  the  route  is  the  same,  so  the  externality  costs  and  the 
concerned  population  do  not  differ  between  the  two.  The  A44  needs 
building, but it has the economic advantage of reducing the time it takes to 
travel from Kassel to Eisenach. 
Tables 3 5 and 3 6 show that it would only be better to build the A44 if one 
adopts  a  long  term  horizon.  If  traffic  does  not  increase,  the  economic 
benefits from the faster A44 do not outweigh the costs of constructing the 
motorway  section  in  any  constellation  of  the  figures.  However,  if  the 
economic benefit increases, either because one adopts a longer time horizon 
as in Table 3 6, or because traffic has increased, it can become preferable to 
build the motorway, on the condition that the construction costs are not too 
high. 
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Table 3-5 Ten year horizon 
  Cost construction A44 
  Low  Medium  High 
   485,1   495   1701 
Economic 
benefit 
390  390  390 
Total   95,1   105   1311 
 
Table 3-6 Twenty year horizon 
 
 
Cost construction A44 
  Low  Medium  High 
   485,1   495   1701 
Economic 
benefit 
780  780  780 
Total  294,9  285   921 
 
It would clearly favour the transport industry to construct the missing link of 
the motorway. From an efficiency point of view, this can also be society’s 
best choice. 
Table 3-7 Minimum number of years to be taken into account to 
make the motorway the least cost option 
Mimimum 





















/  10  3 
 
134 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2008,  Paper 1
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2008/iss1/art1From the polluter pays to the cheapest cost avoider principle  
  120 
Table 3 7 shows that in the example, for a social discount rate up to 1%, 
the  number  of  years  from  which  it  becomes  preferable  to  build  the 
motorway depends on the chosen scenario. It exceeds 13 only in the worst 
case scenario of high costs for the motorway and low costs generated by the 
detour. The motorway construction becomes attractive relatively quickly and 
can, in the best case, save costs from the year it is built. Even the longest 
time horizon does not exceed 13 years, which is a gross underestimation of 
the length of time of the use of a motorway. The higher the social discount 
rate, the smaller the gain from building the motorway, and the faster the 
difference between the options becomes equal to zero. 
3.3.2  Legal reasoning on the B7 ban 
While not explicitly mentioned, the cheapest cost avoider principle is implicit 
in a great number of sentence justifications in all legal systems, including 
civil law countries like Germany
200. Let us take a judgement concerning this 
case study. 
In August 2005, the responsible legislator decided on a ban which prohibited 
trucks  over  3.5  t  from  driving  on  certain  parts  of  the  B7  and  the  B27. 
Following a legal suit by a local transport firm, this ban was examined in 
court  and  found  to  be  valid.
201  Interestingly,  the  explanation  of  this 
judgement follows the method of the cheapest cost avoider principle. 
The court recognises that it has to consider and compare the interests of 
two parties: the transport industry, which has to make a detour, and the 
residents, who are subjected to the noise and pollution caused by the trucks. 
To be valid, the gain from the ban must be proportionate to the tort caused 
by it (in German, this is the principle of Verhältnismäßigkeit). The decision, 
it  is  explicitly  mentioned,  must  be  in  the  interest  of  social  welfare 
(Gemeinwohl). 
The ban is expected to reduce the number of trucks on the B7 and the B27 
by 40 60%. A considerable reduction in noise pollution is obtained from a 
40%  reduction  in  the  number  of  trucks.  The  ban  is  thus  successful  at 
reducing  the  externality.  The  claimant  provided  the  court  with  no 
information on the costs of the ban for him or the transport industry. 
The alternatives to the ban are also studied. It is found that neither a speed 
limit,  nor  “reduced  noise”  trucks  lead  to  a  significant  reduction  of  the 
externality.  An  alternative  route  would  lead  to  imposing  the  same 
externalities on a different population.  
Also,  measures  taken  by  the  pollutees  are  considered:  sound  protection 
windows are installed. They are taken into account in the calculation of the 
sound reduction.  
The  judgement  in  favour  of  the  residents  is  based  on  the  fact  that  the 
claimant has not proven that his damage is disproportionate compared to 
                                            
200 See section 2.4. 
201 Verwaltungsgericht Kassel 2005. 
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the proven gain for the residents. In other words, in this case, the transport 
industry is considered to be the cheapest cost avoider. 
In economic terms, one can say that the court made a cost benefit analysis 
on the basis of the information offered in the hearing. The benefits of the 
ban were compared to the benefits of other measures and found to be the 
most effective way of reducing the externality. No information on the costs 
of the measure being available, the ban can be considered to be the least 
cost (or most cost effective) measure to reduce the externality. Its benefits 
outweigh its costs. Therefore, upholding the ban seemed to the court to be 
in the interest of maximising social welfare. 
3.4  The sectoral ban on the Inn valley motorway 
In 2003, the Tyrol government decided to introduce a sectoral ban on part 
of the Inn valley motorway (A 12) on HGVs over 7.5 tons transporting the 
following goods:
202 
•  Waste 
•  Corn 
•  Cork 
•  Ore 
•  Stones, earth 
•  Motor vehicles and trailers 
•  Steel for construction 
The Commission of the European Communities successfully applied to the 
European Court of Justice (EJC) for the suspension of the sectoral ban.
203 In 
what  follows,  we  will  apply  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  to  this 
example, followed by a comparison between the findings of the ECJ and the 
cheapest cost avoider principle. 
3.4.1  Cheapest cost avoider analysis 
The  sectoral  ban  on  motorway  driving  on  the  43km  section  of  the  A12 
causes  considerable  costs  to  the  transport  industry,  while  leading  to  an 
increase in ambient air quality. We will discuss these effects in turn. 
Baum et al. (2004) studied the effects of the ban on the German transport 
industry. They found that in Germany only, the costs would amount to 250 
million €, plus the loss of 2500 jobs. It can be assumed that the losses for 
the Italian transport industry are also high. There are a number of causes 
for these costs.
204 
                                            
202 See Baum et al. 2004, p 4. 
203  See  European  Court  of  Justice,  Case  C 320/03  R,  2  October  2003,  and  15 
November 2005. 
204 Baum et al. 2004. 
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Insolvencies  Transport  firms  are  highly  specialised:  80%  of  firms  make 
specialised investments in equipment for certain goods. A quarter of all firms 
concerned by the sectoral ban, all of which are small and medium size, see 
themselves threatened by insolvency. The sectoral ban would lead to a 210 
million € reduction in turnover due to insolvencies. 
Increase in costs  46% of the concerned companies see the possibility of 
shifting  to  a  different  transport  route.  Only  30%  of  the  goods  would  be 
shifted, involving higher transport costs and longer transport delays. Only 
3% of the goods can be transported by train. This mode of transport is not 
necessarily more costly, but it causes delays. 43% of the concerned firms 
indicate that they have no transport alternative to the A 12. Two thirds of 
the goods can no longer be transported. The increase in cost through the 
sectoral ban is estimated at 118 million €. Again, mainly small and medium 
sized transport companies are confronted with the increase in costs. 
Reduced demand  28% percent of firms, 89% of which have fewer than 
50  employees,  will  see  their  number  of  orders  fall.  Not  counting 
insolvencies, this would lead to a loss of 43 million €. 
Job losses  Counting that a reduction by 1 million € turnover leads to the 
loss  of  16  jobs,  the  reduction  in  turnover  would  cost  another  690  jobs. 
Insolvencies due to the ban imply the loss of 820 jobs. Statistically, one job 
in the transport industry is linked to 0.7 jobs in related branches, such as 
vehicle production or the petrol industry. The total loss of jobs in Germany 
thus amounts to approximately 2500. 
Let us now turn to the benefit of the sectoral ban in terms of the reduction 
of the costs of the pollution externality. NOx (oxide of nitrogen and nitrogen 
dioxide)  emissions  exceed  EU  limit  values  in  the  status  quo.  Austria  is 
compelled to take action in order to reduce NOx emissions below the limit 
value to acceptable levels. 
A 2004 study by the  IFEU  Heidelberg  evaluates the  reduction in pollution 
caused  by  the  ban.  It  takes  into  account  the  nitrogen  emissions  from 
different types of HGVs and from passenger transport.  
The  sectoral  ban  is  predicted  to  lead  to  a  reduction  by  6 12%  of  NOx 
emissions  on  the  concerned  route.  However,  the  study  points  out  that 
supplementary  emissions  will  be  caused  in  different  locations  because  of 
longer  detours  and  the  extra  emissions  caused  by  shifting  goods  onto 
trains.
205 
The same study considers three alternatives to the sectoral ban: a ban on 
technically out of date HGVs (according to their “Euro” class), a speed limit 
for all vehicles, including passenger cars, and the combination of the two. 
Depending on how severe the ban on outdated HGVs is, the reduction of NOx 
is estimated between 6% and 14%. This result is very similar to that of the 
sectoral ban. On the condition that transport is shifted onto newer models of 
                                            
205 IFEU Heidelberg 2004, p 13. 
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HGVs, this ban would not imply shifting the pollution to another location, as 
is the case for the sectoral ban. 
A reduction of the speed limit for all vehicles to 100 km/h would lead to only 
1% reduction of the emissions of HGVs, but to reductions of 36% and 8% 
respectively for diesel and petrol engine passenger cars. The total reduction 
in NOx is also estimated to lie between 6% and 14%. There are no pollution 
effects on other locations. Further advantages would be a reduction in the 
consumption of fuel, in the noise pollution, and in the severity of accidents. 
Finally, the combination of a ban on old HGV and a speed limit would lead to 
a  much  higher  reduction  of  local  NOx  emissions  of  17%     25%.  For  a 
summary of the effects, see Table 3 8. 
Table 3-8 Pollution effects of measures 
  Ban (1)  Limit on 























Based on this information, we can now proceed to the cheapest cost avoider 
analysis. Note that we have information about the cost of the ban, but not 
on the cost of the pollution. We can however assume that the reduction in 
NOx leads to a reduction in the cost of the externalities. While the costs of 
the  ban  seem  very  high,  in  a  first  step  it  is  not  possible  to  say  a  priori 
whether or not it is lower than the benefits from the reduction in pollution, 
i.e. whether the ban should be upheld. 
However,  we  can  use  a  cost effectiveness  analysis  to  achieve  a  result  by 
comparing the effects of the different types of measures (Table 3 8). While 
the  ban  on  old  HGVs  and  the  speed  limit  have  very  much  the  same  NOx 
abating  effect  as  the  sectoral  ban,  we  find  that  the  latter  has  high 
supplementary  costs  from  the  detour.  The  ban  of  old  HGVs  implies  lower 
extra costs, and the speed limit has no extra pollution costs; instead, it is 
accompanied  by  benefits.  We  do  not  know  the  economic  costs  of  the 
alternative measure; however, we can safely assume that they are  below 
the costs of the sectoral ban and, in the case of the speed limit, perhaps 
even  negligible:  neither  alternative  measure  would impact  on  a  particular 
type  of  good,  leading  specialised  firms  to  insolvencies,  nor  would  they 
necessitate  detours.  Thus,  if  the  aim  is  to  reduce  NOx  levels  by 
approximately 6 14%, the most beneficial measure would be the speed limit 
on all vehicles. 
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If the aim is to reduce NOx emissions as far as possible, the sectoral ban 
would also fail the test: the combination of a speed limit and a ban on old 
HGVs would lead to a higher reduction of emissions. The combination comes 
at a higher cost than the simple speed limit, because old HGVs would have 
to  be  replaced;  the  choice  between  the  two  measures  thus  depends  on 
whether the extra benefits of the combination in terms of the reduction of 
the externality outweigh the costs. 
Consequently, the sectoral ban should never be the chosen measure: it is 
neither  the  most  effective  at  reducing  NOx  emissions,  nor  is  it  the  least 
costly concerning other pollution effects. Supposing that all measures have 
the same economic cost, we conclude that it is not the most cost efficient 
choice. Furthermore, as noted above, we can assume that the costs of the 
measures are not the same; the sectoral ban can be assumed to entail the 
most economic costs. Therefore, it cannot be the cheapest cost solution. It 
should be suspended. 
3.4.2  The reasoning of the European Court of Justice 
The European Court of Justice, seized by the Commission of the European 
Communities, ordered Austria to suspend the ban on 2 October 2003
206. This 
order  was  confirmed  by  the  judgment  of  15  November  2005
207.  In  its 
findings, the ECJ balances the interests of the concerned parties. 
The ECJ establishes that the sectoral ban presents an obstacle to the free 
movement of goods (§62   §69): “The contested regulation must therefore 
be  regarded  as  constituting  a  measure  having  equivalent  effect  to 
quantitative  restrictions,  which  in  principle  are  incompatible  with  the 
Community  law  obligations  under  Articles  28  EC  and  29  EC,  unless  that 
measure can be objectively justified.”
 208 
The free movement of goods needs to be realised unless there is a contrary 
interest that has even greater and contradictory consequences. Therefore, 
the ECJ considers the possible justifications of the obstacle. In §70 it recalls 
that  “it  is  settled  case law  that  national  measures  capable  of  obstructing 
intra Community trade may be justified by overriding requirements relating 
to protection of the environment provided that the measures in question are 
proportionate to the aim pursued”. “In this case, it is undisputed that the 
contested regulation was adopted in order to ensure the quality of ambient 
air  in  the  zone  concerned  and  is  therefore  justified  on  environmental 
protection grounds” (§71). 
Furthermore, the nitrogen levels measured in the concerned section of the 
A12 exceeded the limit values determined by the 1999 European directive. 
As a consequence, “in those circumstances, having regard to the provisions 
of Article 8(3) of Directive 96/62, the Republic of Austria was under a duty 
                                            
206 ECJ 2003 Case C 320/03 R 
207 ECJ 2005 Case C 320/03 R 
208 ECJ 2005 Case C 320/03 R, §69, emphasis added. 
139 Schmidtchen et al.: The Internalisation of External Costs in Transport: From the
Produced by bepress.com, 2011From the polluter pays to the cheapest cost avoider principle  
  125 
to act” (§80). However, the Member State is required to implement a plan or 
programme  which  “must  contain  a  series  of  appropriate  and  coherent 
measures designed to reduce the pollution level in the specific circumstances 
of the zone concerned” (§81). §82 states that the measures of the sectoral 
ban “cannot be described as a ‘plan’ or ‘programme’ within the meaning of 
Article 8(3) of Directive 96/62, since they are not in any way connected to a 
specific situation in which limit values have been exceeded”. Thus, “even if 
one were to concede that the contested regulation is based on Article 8(3) of 
Directive  92/62,  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  constituting  a  correct  and  full 
implementation of that provision” (§83). 
The ECJ does however not “preclude the possibility that the obstacle to the 
free  movement  of  goods  arising  from  the  traffic  ban  laid  down  by  the 
contested  regulation  might  be  justified  by  one  of  the  imperative 
requirements in the public interest endorsed by the case law of the Court of 
Justice”  (§84).  §85  states  that,  “(i)n  order  to  establish  whether  such  a 
restriction is proportionate having regard to the legitimate aim pursued in 
this  case,  namely  the  protection  of  the  environment,  it  needs  to  be 
determined whether it is necessary and appropriate in order to secure the 
authorised objective.”
209 In other words, it is necessary that the gain (the 
protection of the environment) is pursued by the best means, and that it be 
proportionate to the losses caused by the sectoral ban. 
“On that point, the Commission and the intervening Member States stress 
both the lack of any genuine alternative means of transporting the goods in 
question and the existence of many other measures, such as speed limits, or 
toll systems linked to different classes of heavy vehicles, or the ecopoints 
system,  which  would  have  been  capable  of  reducing  nitrogen  dioxide 
emissions  to  acceptable  levels”  (§86).  The  “lack  of  genuine  alternatives” 
entails  the  high  costs  of  the  restriction,  as  described  in  3.4.1.  The  ECJ 
stresses the importance of studying other pollution reduction measures as to 
their cost effectiveness.  
Rather than an option, studying the alternatives is considered an imperative 
for the law maker: “… it suffices to say in this respect that, before adopting 
a  measure  so  radical  as  a  total  traffic  ban  on  a  section  of  motorway 
constituting a vital route of communication between certain Member States, 
the  Austrian  authorities  were  under  a  duty  to  examine  carefully  the 
possibility of using measures less restrictive of freedom of movement, and 
discount them only if their inadequacy, in relation to the objective pursued, 
was clearly established” (§87).
210 Put differently, the ECJ requires Member 
States to make a cost benefit analysis, including alternative scenarios. 
Thus,  “it  must  be  concluded  that,  because  it  infringes  the  principle  of 
proportionality,  the  contested  regulation  cannot  validly  be  justified  by 
reasons concerning the protection of air quality. Therefore, that regulation is 
incompatible with Articles 28 EC and 29 EC” (§91). 
                                            
209 Emphasis added. 
210 Emphasis added. 
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Note that, while the wording is different, the ECJ uses the same reasoning 
and finds the same results as the cheapest cost avoider principle approach: 
the ban’s aim of reducing pollution could have been achieved by less costly 
measures. The sectoral ban can therefore not be considered proportionate: 
it leads to unnecessary costs. Limiting the overall costs is the very idea of 
the cheapest cost avoider principle, which promotes the measures that lead 
to the least costs.  
In this case, it is well possible that a speed limit on all vehicles can be the 
cheapest cost avoider solution. Is this consistent with “polluter pays”? In a 
way,  yes:  all  vehicles  on  the  motorway  contribute  to  the  pollution. 
Passenger cars contribute to 51% of nitrogen emissions, compared to 43% 
for HGVs.
211 HGVs are thus certainly not the only polluters. 
However,  a  large  number  of  the  passenger  cars  belong  to  Inn  valley 
residents, who are also pollutees. In this case, the polluter pays principle 
would be tricky to apply: should polluters who are also pollutees be taxed at 
the same level as the transport industry? The cheapest cost avoider principle 
however leads to  clear answers. These  results as well as the method are 
validated by the European Court of Justice. The methods are even rendered 
obligatory for the decision making procedure of Member States. 
 
Part III shows that the cheapest cost avoider methodology, i.e. a complete 
regulatory  impact  assessment,  can  indeed  be  applied  to  real  life  cases. 
Although  the  analysis  can  only  be  incomplete  and  explanatory  in  this 
framework,  it  provides  clear  answers  on  which  decision  should  be  taken. 
Court  decisions  concerning  the  case  studies  obviously  apply  the  same 
reasoning as the cheapest cost avoider method, showing that this way of 
thinking is and even must be applied in practice. This finding is confirmed by 





                                            
211 See Ifeu Heidelberg 2004, p 11. 
212 European Commission 2005. 
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Conclusions  
The directive 2006/38/EC requires the Commission to provide a model for 
the  assessment  of  all  external  costs  of  road  transport,  which  are  to  be 
internalised in the form of infrastructure charges. A study was commissioned 
from CE Delft and Infras to offer proposals on how external costs are to be 
defined  and  measured,  and  on  why  and  how  external  costs  should  be 
internalised.  
The present study offers a critical assessment of the CE study (part I), in 
which  its  narrow  focus  on  the  “polluter  pays  approach”  is  identified  as  a 
fundamental methodological flaw. Another serious weakness can be seen in 
its failure to discuss matters in the context of the EU Commission’s Better 
Regulation Agenda, with its focus on regulatory assessment. Part II develops 
the theoretical foundations for the “cheapest cost avoider principle” which is 
superior  to  the  “polluter  pays  principle”  both  methodologically  and 
practically,  in  identifying  the  most  appropriate  policy  for  dealing  with 
external effects. 
The cheapest cost avoider approach takes into account the fact that external 
costs may be reduced by both the polluter and the pollutee. This insight has 
two fundamental consequences.  
•  First,  external  costs  should  be  reduced  no  further  than  a  socially 
efficient level, which takes into account the fact that reducing external 
costs itself is costly.  
•  Second, in order to minimise the welfare losses from external effects, it 
is the party that has the lowest cost that should make the investment; 
this party is not necessarily the polluter. It is identified by some form of 
cost benefit analysis. 
The  cheapest  cost  avoider  analysis  incorporates  “polluter  pays”  as  one 
possible  outcome,  but  does  not  mandate  it  without  consideration  of  the 
alternatives.  As  a  result,  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  presents  a 
number of clear advantages over the polluter pays principle: 
•  It  guarantees  efficiency,  i.e.  no  waste  of  resources,  which  is  in  turn 
fundamental  in  the  pursuit  of  the  Lisbon  goals  of  creating  jobs  and 
growth.  
•  It is a better means to achieve fairness than the polluter pays principle. 
•  It  studies  a  broader  set  of  options.  In  contrast  to  the  polluter  pays 
principle, it can lead to the choice of innovative projects. 
•  Its  use  of  cost benefit  analysis  in  a  welfare  economics  framework 
makes it take into account a much broader range of relevant variables, 
such as administration costs or moral values. 
•  The  logic  of  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  helps  to  avoid 
regulatory failure and contributes to the success of the Commission’s 
Better  Regulation  Agenda  at  the  heart  of  which  is  regulatory  impact 
assessment. 
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In  this  study,  we  advance  the  thesis  that  environmental  policy  should  be 
evaluated  in  the  light  of  the  principle  of  wealth  maximisation.  Wealth 
maximisation is found to be a good proxy to achieve maximal social welfare. 
Properly interpreted, it not only reflects people’s concerns about the size of 
GDP,  but  also  their  concerns  about  the  distribution  of  income  as  well  as 
environmental concerns. The idea that there is a tradeoff between efficiency 
and equality is incorrect: a bigger pie always makes it possible to distribute 
more  income  than  a  smaller  one.  Public  policy  should  resist  striving  for 
distributional  goals  by  using  tools  which  can  be  inherently  detrimental  to 
wealth maximisation, such as the polluter pays principle. Rather, it should 
rely on direct measures, i.e. income tax and subsidy schemes.  
A comparison of the polluter pays principle with the cheapest cost avoider 
principle  from  the  viewpoint  of  wealth  maximisation  clearly  favours  the 
cheapest cost avoider principle over the polluter pays principle. Whereas the 
cheapest cost avoider principle can guarantee efficiency, the polluter pays 
principle does not. This result cannot be overstated.  It is given additional 
support  from  what  can  be  called  the  ethics  of  wealth  maximisation:  In  a 
world  struggling  with  the  problem  of  scarcity,  wealth  maximisation  is  a 
moral imperative. We also deal with the question whether the inferiority of 
the  polluter  pays  principle  in  comparison  to  the  cheapest  cost  avoider 
principle  can  be  compensated  by  factors  such  as  corrective  justice, 
distributive justice, fairness between modes of transport and administration 
costs. 
A  careful  analysis  reveals  that  they  cannot.  In  a  symmetrical  vein,  we 
discuss  concerns  which  can  be  raised  against  the  cheapest  cost  avoider 
principle  despite  it  furthering  efficiency.  We  find  that  the  cheapest  cost 
avoider principle can meet all concerns, i.e. valuing non pecuniary factors 
such as life, pain, and suffering; including “soft variables” (intangibles) such 
as  environmental  values,  wildlife,  mountainous  scenery,  data  issues; 
fairness issues; rational individual welfare maximisation issues; questions on 
the value of the protection of nature; the interests of future generations; 
administrative costs; and social constraints. 
Thus, we do not find any rationale that justifies following the polluter pays 
principle instead of the cheapest cost avoider principle. 
The  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle  is  operational.  As  an  offshot  of  cost 
benefit  analysis,  this  statement  does  not  come  as  a  surprise.  The  term 
“cost benefit analysis” in its broadest sense refers to the measurement of 
the economic costs and benefits from any change in the resource allocation 
in the economy. A narrower, more conventional one refers to the evaluation 
of the net benefits to society from a specific investment project. Cost benefit 
analysis  is  a  well  established  approach  applied  in  the  evaluation  of 
thousands of investment projects financed by public expenditures. Its use is 
often  required  by  the  law.  However,  the  potential  of  cost benefit  analysis 
goes  beyond  the  assessment  of  investment  projects  financed  by  public 
funds: all measures of public policy, and in particular measures devoted to 
the internalisation of external costs, should be based on a calculation of the 
net benefits to society. In part III of this study, we demonstrate the basic 
logic of cost benefit analysis with the help of two practical examples: the 
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prohibition for trucks to use the B7 close to the city of Kassel in Germany, 
and the selective ban of the Inn valley motorway in Austria. 
The  case  studies  show  that  the  cheapest  cost  avoider  approach  can  be 
applied  in  practice.  The  scenarios  analysed  suggest  that  it  would  be 
beneficial to build the A44 motorway in order to avoid the detour caused by 
the ban for trucks on the B7. The detour is found to be inefficient. Legal 
reasoning  in  a  related  case  implicitly  applies  the  cheapest  cost  avoider 
principle.  As  for  the  sectoral  ban  on  the  Inn  valley  motorway,  a  cost 
effectiveness analysis reveals that the ban cannot be the least cost option. 
The  European  Court  of  Justice  implicitly  uses  a  cheapest  cost  avoider 
analysis to come to the same result. Both theory and practice show that the 
cheapest cost avoider approach can be, is, and must be applied in political 
decision making. 
The  methodology  developed  in  this  study  applies  to  policy  considerations 
concerning the transport industry. Its practical relevance however goes well 
beyond this sector of activity. For example, a related field to which it can be 
applied and for which it should be further developed is personal transport. 
Individual  means  of  transport  show  many  parallels  to  the  analysis  of  the 
transport industry, while posing some extra challenges due to the fact that 
drivers are both polluters and pollutees. 
This study has concentrated on the cheapest cost avoider methodology; for 
this  reason,  it  has  not  exhausted  the  issues  that  policy makers  need  to 
consider  when  taking  decisions.  For  example,  the  question  of  the  use  of 
funds  raised  when  taxing  polluters  or  pollutees  is  of  fundamental 
importance. We have seen that when pollutees can take action, taxes should 
not  be  used  to  compensate  their  damage,  in  order  not  to  distort  their 
incentives. But what should they be used for? Should they be earmarked for 
infrastructure projects or for environment projects? Should they be used for 
the cross subsidisation of other modes of transport? Another question is that 
of the macroeconomic impact of policies. Will an increase in the transport 
industry’s  costs  be  fully  transmitted  to  the  consumers  of  the  transported 
goods? This is the issue of the “trickling down effect” mentioned in section 
2.6.9. What is the effect on the quantities sold? Further study is needed to 
address these questions. 
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Recommendations 
•  It  is  not  necessarily  only  the  transport  industry  (i.e.  the 
polluter)  who  should  be  made  liable  for  externalities.  Other 
actors,  such  as  the  state  or  the  pollutee  may  well  be  in  a  better 
position to take measures to reduce externalities, and they should do 
so in the interest of economic efficiency and fairness. 
•  Not  all  harm  caused  by  the  transport  industry  should  be 
internalised.  Internalising  too  much  of  the  damage  would  cost 
society  more  than  it  would  benefit  it.  An  efficient  level  of  damage 
should be accepted. 
•  When  introducing  new  measures  to  reduce  pollution  by  the 
transport  industry,  all  existing  levies  should  be  taken  into 
account. Among other taxes, the transport industry pays VAT and 
fuel tax. Environmental requirements for vehicles also present a cost 
to the transport industry. Optimal incentives can only be obtained by 
taking the effects of all these measures into account. 
•  The type of measure taken to make the transport industry pay 
must  be  based  on  a  broad  impact  analysis.  Tolls,  taxes  and 
speed limits have different impacts on incentives. For example, a km 
toll  would  not  sufficiently  reduce  the  harm  caused  by  pollution  if 
trucks  could  employ  an  alternative  route  with  the  same  (or  even 
more)  emissions.  Furthermore,  making  the  polluter  pay  might  not 
solve  the  pollution  problem  and  it  will  give  no  incentive  for  the 
pollutee to solve the problem either 
•  Policy-makers  should  rely  on  efficiency-maximising 
mechanisms rather than on conceptions of fairness (i.e. the polluter 
should  pay)  that,  on  closer  scrutiny,  prove  insufficient  and 
contradictory to the well being of society. 
•  The  polluter  pays  principle  should  not  be  used  because  its 
underlying  economic  thinking  is  fallacious.  It  neglects  the  basic 
insight that external costs are caused jointly by all parties involved 
and that the externality is a problem of reciprocal nature. 
•  The  cheapest  cost  avoider  principle,  for  which  Ronald  Coase 
received  the  Nobel  Prize  for  Economics,  should  be  used,  also  for 
transport, because it guarantees efficiency. It is based on a complete 
cost benefit analysis (also called regulatory impact assessment), it is 
a  better  means  to  achieve  fairness,  and  it  finally  leads  to  better 
incentives for all parties involved. 
•  The cheapest cost avoider principle presents the fundamental 
tool  in  the  pursuit  of  the  European  Union  “Lisbon  Goals”  of 
growth, jobs and competitiveness. 
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Appendix 
To minimise the total costs of damage and damage prevention requires that 
both the residents and the transport industry should increase spending on 
damage prevention until the last Euro spent reduces damage by one Euro. 
 
A  little  formalism  can  prove  this  assertion.  Let  x  and  y  be  the  costs  (or 
sacrificed  rents)  of  the  transport  industry  and  the  residents,  respectively, 
and let D(x,y) be a strictly convex function of the parties’ costs of care x and 
y. The expected damage costs D(x,y) can be broken down into two parts: 
the probability of the damage, denoted p, and the damage itself, denoted d. 
Thus  we  have  D(x,y)  =  p(x,y)     d(x,y).  The  total  social  cost  is  the  sum 
D(x,y) + x + y, minimised at x
* and y
*.  
The more the transport industry spends on damage prevention, the lower 
the expected damage,  i.e. Dx  < 0. We assume that marginal productivity 
decreases,  which  means  that  additional  amounts  spent  on  damage 
prevention  reduce  expected  damage  at  a  decreasing  rate,  i.e.  the  second 
derivative of the damage function, D(x) with respect to x, is Dxx > 0.  
 
Assume  that  the  impact  of  care  by  the  residents  on  damage  reduction 
reveals the same pattern as shown for the transport industry. That means 
that Dy < 0 and Dyy > 0.  
Assume  further  that  an  extra  Euro  spent  on  damage  reduction  by  the 
residents increases the marginal productivity of an extra Euro spent by the 
transport industry, i.e. Dxy > 0, and precautions is substitutable:
213 if the 
precaution level of one party falls, the other party should increase its level of 
precaution. 
The  socially  optimal  care  level  for  both  the  transport  industry  and  the 
residents is the solution to the problem: 
Minx,y [x+y+D(x,y)]          (1)  
The first order conditions for a minimum are  
1 + Dx(x, y) = 0 or   Dx (x,y) = 1    (2)  
and 
1 + Dy(x, y) = 0 or   Dy (x,y) = 1.    (3)  
 
Equation (2) defines the point x
*(y) which represent the optimal care level of 
the transport industry for any precaution level y of the residents. Similarly, 
equation (3) defines the optimal levels of precaution y*(x) for the residents. 
                                            
213 Dxy < 0 means joint care, Dxy > 0 implies alternative care and Dxy = 0 implies 
independence of the parties’ care. 
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Obviously,  the  social  optimum  is  realised  at  the  intersection  of  these  loci 
such that x* ≡ x*(y*) and y* ≡ y*(x*).
214  
If x < x*, then a marginal increase in x would decrease damage by more 
than  one  euro,  and  if  x  >  x*,  then  a  decrease  in  x  would  result  in  an 
increase in expected damage by less than one euro (similar reasoning can 
be applied for y).  
A numerical example may help understand the intuition of the model.
215 For 
simplicity  we  assume  Dxy  =  0,  i.e.  independence  of  the  parties’  levels  of 
precaution. Next, assume the damage function D(x,y) = 100 4x
½ 16y
½.  
The partial derivatives of damage D(x,y), with respect to x and y, indicating 
the effect of an increase in x and y on D(x,y), respectively, are  Dx =  2x 
 1/2 
<0  and  –Dy  =   8y 
 1/2  <0  (for  all  values  of  x  and  y).  The  marginal 
productivity  of  costs  spent  on  damage  prevention  is  assumed  to  be 
decreasing, i.e. Dxx > 0 and Dyy > 0. In the numerical example: Dxx = x 
 3/2 
>  0  and  Dyy  =  4x 
 3/2  >  0.  The  social  costs  are  C  =  D(x,y)+x+y,  and 
numerically C = 100 4x
½ 16y
½+x+y.  
The first   order conditions for expected cost minimisation are  
Cx = 1+Dx(x,y) = 1 2x
 1/2 = 0 
Cy = 1+Dy(x,y) = 1 8y
 1/2 = 0. 
This implies x* = 4 and y* = 64.
216  
With x* = 4 and y* = 64, total social costs are  




This damage maximises society’s welfare. With x = 0 and y = 0, social costs 
would be 100. It is thus preferable to invest x > 0 and y > 0. With x = 4 and 
y = 64, social costs are minimised.  
The following figure represents the bilateral prevention model: 
 
                                            
214 See Miceli 1997, p 18. 
215 The example is borrowed from Wittman 2006, p 133 134. . 
216  The  second  order  conditions  ensure  that  we  have  a  minimum  rather  than  a 
maximum or an inflection point (see Wittman 2006, p 134).  
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Figure A-1 Efficient avoidance of an externality 
   
 
The following table lists some prominent points on these curves:  
 
Table A-1 Example curves 


























We interpret the model as represented by figure 2 9:  
Both  parties  contribute  to  the  prevention  of  the  damage:  Under  the 
assumptions made, the transport industry is not as productive in damage 
prevention  as  the  residents.  Efficiency  thus  requires  that  the  residents 
should bear the greater burden.
217 The cost borne by the transport industry 
                                            
217 Of course, in the case in which the figures for y belong to the transport industry 
and those of x to the residents, the opposite would hold. 
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amounts to area A = 4, the cost borne by the residents amounts to areas A 
+ B = 64. Thus total cost is 2A+B=68.  
The  transport  industry  prevents  damage  by  area  E+A.  
The  residents  prevent  damage  by  area  E+A+B+F.  
Welfare  increases  by  the  difference  of  the  two  areas:  [2(E+A)+B+F] 
[2A+B]=[2E+F]. 
Who is the cheapest cost avoider? The answer is, both are at the margin. 
They share the “job”. Outside the optimum (x*,y*), for example with x < x* 
and y > y*, the transport industry is the cheapest cost avoider: it should 
increase x to x* and the residents should decrease y to y*.  
With damage of, for example, D(x,y) = D(0, 0) = 67, i.e. a damage function 
D(x,y)  =  67 4x
1/2 16y
1/2,  neither  the  transport  industry  nor  the  residents 
should take care. The costs in the optimum would amount to 68, but the 
benefit would be a reduction of the damage from 67 down to zero – clearly a 
benefit that is not worth the cost of realising it. This conclusion holds for all 
values D(x,y) = D(0,0) < 68.  
Note that the model can also be applied to cases in which the prices of both 
damage reduction inputs to are ≠ 1. Let a and b denote the price of the 
input respectively used by the transport industry and the residents to reduce 
damage. Here, the optimum requires –Dx = a and –Dy = b.  
The benefit from the double investment is depicted by the sum of the areas 
under the Dx,y curves. The measures should be taken if the transaction costs 
that they imply to not exceed the benefit thus calculated. 
Modifying the assumptions that the model and the figure are based on can 
lead to a  solution in which only one  side should take action reducing the 
damage.  
Assume that the position of curve –Dx is such that there is no intersection 
with the horizontal line 1. Now, the transport industry should do nothing, 
since the net benefit to society would be negative (marginal costs of 1 are 
always  greater  than  the  marginal  benefit  –Dx).  The  residents  are  the 
cheapest  cost  avoiders.  The  optimum  (x*  =  0,  y*  =  64)  is  a  corner 
solution.
218 The remaining damage is 36. This case is generally called the 
unilateral  case,  because  only  one  of  the  parties  should  take  measures  to 
reduce the externality. Note however that unilateral causation is a result of 
bilateral cost minimisation, and not a different type of causation. 
The case of unilateral causation, i.e. the case where one of the Di curves 
(with i = x,y) does not cut the marginal benefit curve is exactly the case 
described in the “but for” test. For example, a patient could have prevented 
suffering  form  a  doctor’s  professional  error  by  refusing  an  operation. 
However,  a  lawyer  using  the  “but  for”  test  would  argue  that  it  is  not 
reasonable to refuse a life saving operation because of the risk of a mistake. 
We arrive at the same conclusion with the cheapest cost avoider method: 
the marginal cost of the prevention measure for the inhabitant would be so 
                                            
218 Note that this is different from the unilateral care case in which Dx = 0 or Dy = 0.  
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high that it can never be equal the marginal benefit of avoiding the damage. 
–Dy  would  move  far  to  the  left  and  result  in  y*  =  0.  Thus,  prevention 
measures should be taken only by the airline. This implies that the property 
right should be given to the inhabitant. Only now that these two steps have 
been taken can we apply the polluter pays principle in accordance with the 
cheapest cost avoider principle: if the airline infringes the inhabitant’s right, 
it should be liable. 
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